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Shining the Bright Light on

Police Interrogation in America
Mark A. Godsey*
RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE

INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE

(Harvard

University Press 2008)
I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Leo is uniquely suited to illuminate and critique the practices and

legal standards surrounding police interrogation in America. Many courts and
legal scholars through the years have opined on the legal standards adhering to
confession law, without a deep understanding of how interrogation are actually
conducted in the real world, or of the psychological pressure points that ultimately
bear on the matter. Prior to entering legal academia, however, Leo served as an
associate professor of psychology and criminology, and performed groundbreaking
empirical research into how police interrogators obtain confessions and how their
interrogations techniques affect suspects.' Now, as a law professor at the
University of San Francisco, Leo's new book Police Interrogationand American
Justice, deeply forges social science with legal scholarship to create an

enlightening picture of the modem interrogation room, the contradictions and
failures of our laws designed to regulate confessions, and the paths we must take to
ensure the integrity and fairness of confessions in the future.
Although interrogation practices, long veiled from public eye, have remained
one of the "darkest corners of the American criminal justice system," Leo's
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Director, Lois and Richard
Rosenthal Institute for Justice/Ohio Innocence Project. E-mail: markgodsey@gmail.com.
1 See, e.g., Police Interviewing and Interrogation:A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices
and Beliefs, 31 LAW AND HuM. BEHAv. 381 (2007) (with Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner,
Kimberly D. Richman, Lori H. Colwell, Amy Leach, & Dana LaFon); BringingReliability Back In:
False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIs. L. REv. 479 (2006)
(with Steven Drizin, Peter Neufeld, Brad Hall, & Amy Vatner); The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891 (2004) (with Steve Drizin); Adapting to Miranda: Modern
Interrogators' Strategies ForDealing With The Obstacles Posed By Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397
(1999) (with Welsh S. White); The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of PsychologicalInterrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
429 (1998) (with Richard Ofshe); Missing the Forestfor the Trees: A Response to Paul Cassell's
'BalancedApproach' to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 1135 (1997); The
Decision to Confess Falsely:Rational Choice andIrrationalAction, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 979 (1997);
The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False
Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 189 (1997); Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIM. 266 (1996); From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in
America, 18 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE: INT'L J. 35 (1992).
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analysis, as he notes, is "based largely on the type of data most other scholars do
not have access to: direct observations of hundreds of police interrogations." (P.
5.) Leo's additional research includes attendance at numerous police interrogation
training seminars, analysis of interrogation training manuals published from 1940
to the present, and conducted in-depth interviews over the past decade with scores
of interrogators and suspects. His research further includes a thorough review of
police reports, trial transcripts, and interrogation tapes of more than 2,000 felony
cases involving confessions. (P. 5.) It is fair to say that there are few, if any,
scholars who have witnessed the interrogation battlefield from the trenches, as has
Leo.

Leo blends his knowledge of interrogations in practice with his deep
understanding, as a law professor and legal scholar, of American interrogation law.
His powerful combination of law, psychiatry, and hands-on experience gives Leo a
perspective on police interrogation that few others share.
Leo provides his insights on questions that he understands are broader than
the interrogation rooms where they play out. He writes:
As a symbolic matter, police interrogation is a microcosm for some
of our most fundamental conflicts about the appropriate relationship
between the state and the individual and about the norms that should
guide state conduct, particularly manipulative, deceptive, and coercive
conduct in the modern era. In short, police interrogation and confessiontaking go to the heart of our conceptions of procedural fairness and
substantive justice and raise questions about the kind of criminal justice
system and society we wish to have. (P. 1.)
Moreover, police interrogations are a frequently repeated scene in cinema and
television because they are a "richly textured narrative and morality play involving
innocence and guilt, good and evil, and justice and injustice .... The drama and
power struggle of interrogation hold our rapt attention as they feed our vicarious
desire for justice, catharsis, and ultimately, resolution and restoration." (P. 2.)
Leo's purpose is to highlight contradictions imbedded in American police
interrogation methods and the law designed to regulate them. The overarching
contradiction is that the police need confessions to solve crimes, but there is almost
never a good reason for a suspect to confess. The tension created by this inherent
contradiction leads to several additional contradictions: interrogations remain
secret in what is considered one of the most democratic and open societies in the
world; police have created "scientific" interrogation techniques that are, in reality,
unscientific and unreliable; the law requires that confessions be voluntary, but
interrogations are successful because they are designed to convince suspects that
they have no choice but to confess; "the truth" is the stated goal and virtue of
police interrogation, yet police routinely rely on lies and deception to obtain
confessions; police view confessions as reliable, while in reality they are
"orchestrated" and "constructed" by the police in a way that is often misleading
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and unreliable; and juries view confessions as the most probative evidence of guilt,
but they are, in fact, quite often unreliable or even patently false.
While complaints about police interrogation methods have sometimes
centered on police brutality, fair play, or human dignity, Leo's loudest complaint is
the risk of false confessions by innocents that modem interrogation techniques
sometimes produce and modem confession law fails to adequately regulate. Thus,
his ultimate suggestions for reform focus on policy and doctrinal improvements to
reduce the number of false confessions and ensure that confessions admitted at trial
are trustworthy. Among these suggested reforms are implementing a legal
corroboration requirement for confession admissibility in the courtroom, and
requiring the videotaping of what takes place in the interrogation room from
beginning to end.
Let me admit at the outset that with respect to me, at least, Leo is preaching to
the choir. Leo's research has been very important in my own development as a
confessions-law scholar.2 I am a fan. When I first met Richard a few years ago, I
was shocked that he was not an elderly white-haired professor with a cane, such is
the depth of his body of work. And as the director of an Innocence Project, the
problem of false confessions is not just an abstract scholarly interest to me, but
something with which I have had to grapple in real life.
While many in law enforcement may object to Leo's analysis and
conclusions, he is not an enemy of police interrogation. He argues, and I agree,
that when done properly, police interrogation is "an unmitigated social benefit"
that renders "enormously important outcomes." (P. 2.) He notes that he has
trained police interrogators in numerous states, and served on advisory committees
to police departments. (P. 8.) Leo contends that it is critical not to undermine the
ability of the police to perform their important function of interrogating suspects,
but rather to educate others so that the quality and reliability of confessions can be
improved.
Nevertheless, based on my own experiences in attempting to reform
interrogation practices in my home state, I know that many will read Leo's book as
a broad attack on the institution of police interrogation. Some will write it off as a
liberal diatribe of a scholar who does not "understand what the police are up
against, and what really goes on in the interrogation room." Unfortunately,
because many police departments continue to resist opening up their procedures to
examination and study, 3 and continue to resist videotaping of interrogations, a
procedure that would provide a comprehensive record for further study, we will be
2

See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Reliability Lost, False Confession Discovered, 10 CHAP. L.

REv. 623 (2007) (symposium) (extensively citing Leo's works); Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the

Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings,90 MINN. L. REv. 781 (2006)
(same).
3 See Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OH-IO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003) (noting
resistance of many police departments to taping interrogations); Shaila K. Dewan, PoliceResist Fully
Taping

Interrogations,

N.Y.

TIMES,

Sept.

3,

2003,

available

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A06E3D71538F93 1A3575ACOA9659C8B63.
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unable to fully resolve this dispute. Until law enforcement allows closer scrutiny
of its practices, they are on thin ice when attacking Leo's conclusions.
This review is divided into three parts. Part II summarizes Leo's empirical
findings with respect to interrogation procedures in the real world. Part III
examines Leo's suggested reforms. Part IV offers my own critiques and insights.
II. THE INTERROGATION PROCESS IN AMERICA
A. PoliceInterrogationand the Adversary System

Leo asserts that the proper role of the police is to gather case information in a
"neutral and dispassionate manner" at the "preadversary stage" of the criminal
process. (P. 19.) The information police collect must be as complete and unbiased
as possible, because, in the first instance, prosecutors must use this information to
decide whether to charge the suspect, and therefore, commence formal adversarial
proceedings against him. When the adversary system later officially commences
with the filing of criminal charges, judges, defense lawyers, and ultimately juries
rely on the integrity of the neutral fact-finding process performed by the police.
Historically and today, police have gone to great lengths, through court testimony
and other information disseminated to the public about the investigation process, to
cast themselves in this neutral fact-finding role.
If police, on the other hand, are committed to the prosecutorial agenda in their
fact-collecting process, and develop evidence in a biased manner with the end of
obtaining a conviction, then the formal adversary system starts off-kilter. The
perceptions about the case held by the crucial actors in the real adversary systemprosecutors, defense lawyers, judges and juries-become distorted. This can lead
to erroneous results through a "garbage in, garbage out" sequence.
Based on his empirical research, including many interviews with police
interrogators, Leo asserts in Chapter 2 that the police have internalized the values
and goals of the adversary system. They see themselves solely as foot soldiers for
the prosecution in a war zone-a combat arena. They are "highly partisan,
strategic, and goal directed." (P. 11.) They are trained to assume that the suspects
they interrogate are guilty, and that all suspects will initially lie about their guilt.
(P. 22.) Detectives perceive the innocent man in the interrogation room as an
"urban legend perpetuated by naive liberals, muckraking journalists, or selfserving criminal defense attorneys." (P. 22.) Their job, as interrogators, is to
obtain a full confession, which they then label as "the truth." Moreover, the
interrogation process is aimed not simply to obtain an "I did it" confession, but to
manipulate from the suspect a police-orchestrated narrative designed to ensure a
conviction, and even better, a conviction by guilty plea. (P. 22.)
Thus, the reality, says Leo, is that the police interrogation process is not a
neutral, "Just the facts, Ma'am", evidence-gathering process. Leo writes, "Once
police have decided to interrogate a suspect, they have, in effect, crossed the line
that separates police work from prosecutorial work. They have aligned themselves
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with the prosecution in orientation and goal; their function at this point becomes
more prosecutorial than investigative." (P. 23.)
In one of many contradictions that pervades the interrogation process, the
police shield their true roles from the courts and the public by keeping
interrogations hidden from public view, and then putting a spin on what actually
occurs in the interrogation through their well-developed "external impression
management" strategies. (P. 35.)
The police not only hide their role in the adversary system from the courts and
public, they also hide it from the suspects they interrogate. Modem interrogation
is "fraudulent" not only because police are permitted to lie to suspects about the
evidence they have collected (fingerprints, DNA tests, etc.), but because detectives
seek to create the illusion that they share a common interest with the suspect and
that he can escape or mitigate punishment only by cooperating with them and
providing a full confession. Although the suspect's self-interest would usually be
best served by remaining completely silent, interrogators seek at every step to
convince him that what is in their professional self-interest is somehow in his
personal self-interest. The entire interrogation process is carefully staged to hide
the fact that police interrogators are the suspect's adversary. While they portray
themselves as seeking only to "collect the facts" and to help the suspect if he
cooperates, they, of course, try to construct a damning case against him. (P. 25.)
Leo asserts that the "genius and fraud of psychological interrogations ... lies
in its ability to persuade ... the suspect to view the act of self-incrimination-and
thus self-conviction-as both logical and rational under the circumstances." (P.
28.)
The interrogation process is additionally fraudulent because suspects rarely
get the attractive deal that detectives imply that they will get from selfincrimination. Typically, those who confess receive the opposite of what they
were promised-"more and higher charges, more and harsher punishment." (P.
33.) Thus, the suspect is deceived not only about the role of the police in the
interrogation process, but the consequences of confessing.
I suspected when first reading Leo's assertions here that he was preparing for
an Escobedo-type4 argument that suspects must have an attorney present in the
interrogation room, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Indeed,
Leo makes a case, reminiscent of arguments heard during the Escobedo era, that
police interrogation is the most crucial and most adversarial part of our criminal
justice system. He ultimately does not take the Sixth Amendment route, as we will
see, perhaps because he deems such a remedy unlikely to be adopted, or perhaps
because he sees such a remedy as snuffing out police interrogations altogether-a
medicine he does not espouse.
Rather, Leo makes the case that police interrogators see themselves as foot
soldiers for the prosecution in our adversary system with two goals in mind: to
provide an introductory context for his later recitation of how interrogations unfold
4

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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step-by-step in the real world, and to help us understand how police attitudes can
ultimately lead to unreliable confessions. This last point sets the stage for his
concluding chapters, where he lays out his recommended reforms.
Admittedly, Leo describes the values and goals of detectives during
interrogations in absolute and broad terms. One might criticize his analysis by
suggesting that he paints with too broad of a brush. It is Leo does not mean to
suggest, however, that in every interrogation the police automatically assume the
suspect is guilty, and that in every interrogation the police attempt to bend the
suspect's confession to fit their desired version of the facts, regardless of the truth.
Rather, Leo is generically describing overarching values that, according to his
research, permeate police culture today.
In any event, my response to such criticism strikes a theme that will be
frequently repeated in this review.
Leo has examined and studied actual
interrogations, and conducted interviews with real detectives and suspects, perhaps
to a greater extent than any other scholar today. If law enforcement critics wish to
rebut Leo's perhaps overbroad generalizations, they need to open up the
interrogation process to scrutiny by more widely adopting the videotaping
requirement that has been urged by many scholars, legislators, and courts or years.
B. PoliceInterrogationsin the Real World: Yesterday and Today
1. Exchanging the nightstick for the polygraph machine
Chapters 2 through 5 of Leo's book describe the evolution of the real-world
interrogation process in the past century.
Leo asserts that an historical
understanding of the evolution of interrogation process is necessary to an
understanding of police attitudes toward interrogation today. (P. 46.)
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the "third degree," which describes the physically
brutal interrogation techniques frequently employed by detectives to coerce
confessions from suspects prior to the Supreme Court's 1936 decision in Brown v.
Mississippi.5 The tortuous interrogation tactics utilized in this era have been
adequately described in prior publications 6 and even in popular media, and need
not be recounted in great detail here.
Leo states that the use of the third degree waned after Brown through the
1940s, dissipated even more during the 1950s, and then became rare to "nonexistent" by the 1960s. (P. 45.)
Acknowledging our country's unfortunate history of interrogation practices is
important, however, because Leo contends that many aspects of modem
interrogation practices evolved from the third degree. The Wickersham Report,

5

297 U.S. 278 (1936).

6

See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, REP. ON

LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (WICKERSHAM COMM'N REP.) (1931).
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the Brown decision, and later Miranda v. Arizona,7 forced detectives to alter
interrogation strategies from physical torture to psychological coercion. But many
vestiges of the third degree remain. Specifically, the basic values and goals
embraced by detectives in the interrogation room remain fixed in a third-degree
mentality. Namely, the suspect subjected to interrogation is always guilty, he will
lie about his guilt, and the detective must use whatever means and tricks he can
legally get away with to obtain not just a confession, but an orchestrated narrative
that will guarantee a conviction. (P. 77.) The basic goal of interrogation is the
same as it was a century ago: convince the suspect that he has no option but to
confess, and that it is in his self-interest to do so. Leo notes that this mentality is at
odds with our constitutional requirement that confessions be voluntary to be
admissible in court.
The police's insistence on secrecy, and keeping the public and courts in the
dark about what occurs in the interrogation room, is another attitude that was
burned into police culture in the era of the third degree, and to which police
departments continue to cling today. (P. 77.)
The third-degree era taught police departments that the easiest and most
expedient way to investigate a case was to coerce a confession from a suspect at
the front end of the investigation. In a sense, it made police investigators lazy,
hampered the development of their broader investigative skills, and fostered the
habit of leaning on the "home run" confession to clear their crowded case dockets.
Leo asserts that this over-reliance on confessions, learned during the earlier era,
remains a hallmark of police interrogation today. Leo writes:
[T]he decline of the third degree is also a story about the persistence of
police institutions and behavior. For the structure of early American
interrogation remains largely intact to this day, even if the content has
changed .... As in the era of the third degree, the primary goal of police
interrogators is not to elicit the truth per se but to incriminate the suspect
in order to build a case against him and assist the prosecution in
convicting him.
And interrogation still often occurs in secrecy.
Contemporary American police have skillfully adapted to the norms of
the adversary system, but like their predecessors, they do not aspire to be
impartial fact-finders. Rather, they are still essentially agents of the
prosecution. And they also continue to exercise a virtual monopoly of
power at the front end of the criminal justice system, manipulating
suspects to provide damning testimonial evidence against themselves
before any of the adversary system's checks and balances can be
meaningfully applied. The seeds of modem interrogation were sown in
the era of the third degree, and they have left an indelible, if largely
hidden, imprint on contemporary police methods. (P. 77.)

7

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Before turning to his depiction of modem interrogations, Leo pauses in
Chapter 3 to describe the emergence of new interrogation weapons developed by
police departments to secure confessions without physical violence. Leo asserts, in
short, that police interrogators have traded the nightstick and Billy club for pseudoscientific lie detection devices. Indeed, the police now employ lie detection
techniques as a means of coercing confessions. They do so by routinely coaxing
the suspect under interrogation into taking a polygraph so "we can close the case
and let you go." They then invariably inform the suspect that he has failed the
polygraph-even if he actually passed. Supported by the aura of scientific proof of
guilt, a suspect told he has failed the polygraph often comes to believe that he must
be lying and simply does not remember committing the crime, or, as the
interrogator is eager to verify, that all hope is lost, no one will now believe his
innocence, and that confessing to obtain the implied mitigation in punishment is
the only rational option.
Leo cites studies showing that polygraphs and the like are accurate no more
than sixty to seventy-five percent of the time. (P. 89.) Even more troubling is the
fact that, when inaccurate, they are more likely to classify a truthful suspect as a
liar rather than a lying suspect as truthful. Furthermore, behavior analysisreading the suspect's nonverbal cues and then classifying him as truthful or
untruthful-is even more unreliable and prone to error. (Pp. 98-99, 104-05.) And
worse still, police interrogators often receive just a day or two of training in
"demeanor evidence," and leave convinced that they can "see through" lying
suspects, when studies suggest that even an expert well-trained in such techniques
has mastered a "science" that has no verifiable reliability.
As a result of police training manuals and interrogation seminars, police
officers possess a deep belief in the "oracle-like" status of the polygraph and other
lie detection methods. Leo argues that the contemporary reliance on these sham
techniques for "divining truth" is no better than trial by ordeal in ancient societies.
(P. 81.)
Apparently however, the polygraph alone "was not an adequate substitute for
the third degree. Police reformers also turned to the field of psychology, which
like the polygraph carried the symbolism and authority of modem science." (P.
80.) From these related arenas, "the house of modem psychological interrogation
was built." (P. 80.) Today, interrogation is comprised of two elements: "the
studied detection of deception and the use of psychologically manipulative
methods." (P. 80.)
2. Modern interrogation
Modem interrogation techniques, Leo contends, are seeped in fraud,
manipulation and deception. (P. 120.) Police have developed fraud-based
interrogation techniques because they assume that every suspect under
interrogation is guilty and needs some coercion and trickery to come clean, and
because the police "view themselves as agents of the prosecution and thus the
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suspect's adversary." (P. 120.) Fraud and psychological coercion are present in all
four stages of modem interrogation outlined by Leo: the "softening up" phase, the
Miranda warning phase, the interrogation proper, and the post-admission phase.
(P. 121.)
The "softening up" stage comes first. The goal of this stage is to disarm the
suspect by making him believe that the police simply need to ask him a few
questions to help them solve the crime. The encounter is called an "interview"
rather than an interrogation. The subject is typically told either that he is not a
suspect, or that the police just need a few minutes of his time so that they can
check him off the suspect list. (Pp. 121-23.) Hidden from the suspect is the fact
that the interrogators have prejudged his guilt, that he is about to be intensely
interrogated, and that the sole goal of the interrogators is to obtain a confession for
the prosecution. (P. 122.)
The first step is to establish a rapport with the suspect. Police will often
flatter or ingratiate themselves with the suspect to create the appearance of a
nonadversarial relationship. One detective explained the goal of this stage to Leo
as follows: "I don't care whether it is rape, robbery or homicide ... the first thing
you need to do is build rapport with that person.. . I think from that point on you
can get anybody to talk about anything" (P. 123.) In short, police interrogation is
the first and perhaps most adversarial part of the adversary system, but the
"softening up" stage is designed to turn that truth on its head.
After the police have convinced the suspect that the purpose of the
"interview" is nonadversarial, and built a rapport with him, the next stage is to
move the suspect past the Miranda warnings while convincing him that he need
not invoke any of his rights. Leo contends that police have "developed multiple
strategies to avoid, circumvent, [and] nullify" Miranda, and indeed, "work
'Miranda' to their advantage." (P. 124.)
One way that detectives avoid Miranda is to falsely tell the suspect that he is
not in custody and that he is free to leave at any time. Because Miranda warnings
are only required when the suspect is in custody, police will "invite" the suspect to
the station for an "interview," and inform him that: "You're here on a voluntary
basis. You elected to come in here on your own and I appreciate that, okay? And I
told you on the phone I had no intention of arresting you." (P. 125.) The officer's
true intention-interrogating the suspect until he confesses and then placing him
under arrest-is, of course, never revealed.
Another way police interrogators frequently attempt to avoid Miranda is
simply to read the suspect his rights and then move straight into the questioning
without giving the suspect a chance to absorb the warnings or invoke them. If the
"softening up" stage has been executed properly, a suspect will feel it is
unnecessary or inappropriate to invoke his rights. If the suspect begins answering
the officer's questions, as they typically do, courts will hold that he has implicitly
waived his rights. (Pp. 125-26.)
Police interrogators increase the chances that the suspect will not invoke his
rights by minimizing, downplaying, and de-emphasizing the importance of the
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warnings. The goal is to convince the suspect that the Miranda warning/waiver
procedure is "akin to standard bureaucratic forms that one signs without reading or
giving much thought to." (P. 126.) The softening up stage, which precedes the
warnings, is important here, because it establishes a "norm of friendly
reciprocation and the expectation that the suspect will comply." (Pp. 126-27.)
Police interrogators further deemphasize the warnings by reading them in a
"perfunctory tone" and "bureaucratic manner." They do so without pausing or
making eye contact with the suspect, all while implying that the warnings are
merely a "matter of routine" and that it is a "foregone conclusion" that the suspect
will waive them. (P. 127.) In some instances, the interrogator will expressly
inform the suspect that the warnings are an unimportant formality that needs to
quickly be "dispensed with" so that the police can interview him and check him off
the suspect list. (P. 127.) In other cases, interrogators will persuade the suspect
that he must waive Miranda and talk, because it will be his only chance to "[T]ell
his side of the story" and get the matter cleared up quickly. (Pp. 128-29.)
Leo contends:
If the Supreme Court in Miranda sought to "level the playing field" by
having detectives notify the suspect that they are his adversary and that
the suspect's best interest may not be served by making statements that
will be used against him, then the strategies that American interrogators
use to obtain signed waivers have, in effect, turned Miranda on its head.
Miranda is often little more than a continuation of the softening up phase
of the interrogation. As in other stages, the detective's strategy is to
create the illusion that he and the suspect share the same interest and that
compliance is to the suspect's advantage. (P. 128.)
After the Miranda warnings, the interrogator may ask the suspect a few
questions, but then quickly moves on to the third stage. At this stage, the focus
changes from asking the suspect questions to "telling him the answers and
imploring him to confess." (P. 132.) The aim of the third stage is to move the
suspect from denial to admission. At the base of every interrogation is the same
message: "the suspect stands to receive intangible or tangible benefits and avoid
harms in exchange for an admission-ideally a full confession-to some version
of the offense." (P. 133.) His confession is "quid pro quo for an end to the
interrogation and avoidance of the worse-case scenario-harsher treatment or
punishment." (P. 133.)
Police interrogators induce suspects to confess by introducing negative
incentives and offering positive incentives. Negative incentives "break down the
suspect's resistance, reverse his denials; lower his self-confidence; and induce
feelings of resignation, distress, despair, fear, and powerlessness." (P. 134.) After
the suspect is broken down, positive incentives are offered "to motivate him to see
the act of complying and admitting to some version of the offense as his best
available exit strategy and option, given his limited range of choices and their
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likely outcomes." (P. 134.) The Los Angeles Police Department's interrogation
training manual captures this strategy by encouraging detectives to tell suspects:
"You did it. We know you did it. We have overwhelming evidence to prove you
did it. But the reason makes a difference. So why don't you tell me about it." (P.
134.)
Common negative incentives include harsh accusations that the suspect
committed the crime, and accusations that he is lying. These accusations are
repeatedly made. The suspect's denials are cut-off, and attacked with further and
repeated accusations. Repeated accusations exert psychological pressure on the
suspect, and shift the burden of proof. Suspects rarely understand that the
prosecution has the burden of proving the case against them. The message instead
is that the interrogation will not end until the suspect convinces the police of his
innocence, or confesses. Because the police make clear that they do not believe
that he is innocent-and never will-the only option to end the interrogation
becomes a confession.
Police interrogators strengthen their position at this stage by using false
evidence ploys. Evidence ploys are used to convince the suspect that he has no
choice but to confess. These tricks include falsely telling the suspect that an
eyewitness saw him commit the crime, that his fingerprints have been found on the
murder weapon, that his crime was caught on tape by a hidden video camera, or
that his DNA was found on the victim's body. Because suspects rarely understand
that the police can lie to them during an interrogation, they begin to see their
position as hopeless. (Pp. 138-44.)
At this point, polygraphs and other forms of lie detection are typically brought
into the picture. Suspects are told, "It's 100 percent accurate. There's no fault in
it." (P. 145.) Suspects are then invariably told that they failed the polygraph. This
ploy is intended to "break down a suspect's resistance by persuading him that he
has been exposed, that his denials are futile, and there is no escape from the
necessity of admitting guilt." (P. 145.) This process of accusations, attacking
denials, and using false evidence ploys is repeated over and over, often combined
with raised voices, screaming, and relentless badgering. As one suspect recounted
to Leo:
They just kept on and on. Hounding and hounding and hounding.
Finally, I said yes, so they'd just leave me alone .... I don't even know
what they said ....I tried to repeat what they said. I try to ask them. "I
don't know what you're talking about." I was just tired. It was just like
arguing with her. Finally ...they told me I was done .... I thought I
was going home. I didn't go home. It was just like a big dream, just like
something that just never happened.... I was so tired. It was like being
so confused. (P. 148.)
After a suspect is convinced that no one will ever believe his claims of
innocence, and that his situation is hopeless, interrogators dangle some positive
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incentives. The basic idea of positive incentives is simple: he will receive less
punishment or "some form of police, prosecutorial, or juror leniency if he
confesses, but he will receive greater punishment if he does not." (P. 151.)
Combined with this incentive is a warning that this is the suspect's only chance to
receive mitigation. It is "your opportunity to present your side of the story ...
before it is too late." A common phrase uttered by interrogators is: "For me to
help you, I need to hear your side of the story. .

.

. I need to understand what

happened." (P. 151.)
After the suspect breaks down and makes an admission-"Okay, I'll tell you
what you want to hear. I did it"-the final stage of interrogation begins. This
post-admission stage involves the construction of a narrative. Leo describes this
stage not as the confession-taking stage, but the confession-"making" stage. (P.
166.) He asserts that if the suspect's details do not match the interrogators vision
of the crime, the detectives will remain adversarial and combative, and will repeat
many of the negative and positive incentives introduced in the pre-admission stage.
The post-admission narrative is not a document in which the interrogator simply
acts as a stenographer; "[riather, it is actively shaped and manipulated-with the
suspect's participation to be sure, but at the interrogator's direction." (P. 166.) If
the suspect's narrative does not fit the detective's expectations, the interrogation
continues, with facts often supplied by the detective, until the suspect and detective
have a meeting of the minds on all important details. (P. 167.)
The detective's goal is to obtain a story that not only fits his conception of the
crime, but that will be believable and dramatic in court, thus guaranteeing a
conviction. The five things good interrogators strive to obtain in this last stage are:
(1) a coherent and convincing script; (2) a description of the suspect's motives and
explanations; (3) a display of knowledge of the crime's intimate details that would
only be known by the true perpetrator; (4) a description of what the suspect was
feeling at crucial moments; and (5) a strong acknowledgment that the confession is
voluntary. (P. 168.)
Leo states that these five goals are obtained through intense pressure.
Detectives often suggest emotions and motives for the suspect to adopt. They
might, through their questioning and badgering, reveal nonpublic facts about the
case that the suspect understands he is supposed to incorporate into his narrative.
(Pp. 170, 172.) A trick used by interrogators to make the confession appear more
reliable is, after the narrative is complete, to personally write it out by hand while
intentionally inserting errors on trivial facts. The interrogator will then ask the
suspect to review the confession and correct any errors by replacing incorrect facts
with correct ones, and to initial each change. In court, the marked up confession,
replete with corrections by the suspect, gives the appearance of a defendant who
was in full control in the interrogation room and directing even the intimate details
of the confession with confidence. (P. 176.)8
8 Leo provides numerous examples of this police practice of intentionally inserting mistakes
for the suspect to correct and the powerful effect such corrections later have in court, in TOM WELLS
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C. The Result: False Confessions and MiscarriagesofJustice
Many American courts have for years "reasoned that police deception during
interrogation is legally permissible because it is not 'apt to lead an innocent
suspect to confess."' (P. 190.) Surveys and interviews of jurors, police officers,
and prosecutors suggest that this belief is widespread. (Pp. 196-97.) Leo's
extensive body of work on the subject, however, summarized in Chapters 6 and 7,
demonstrates otherwise. He calls this misimpression the "myth of psychological
interrogation." (P. 197.) The myth is perpetuated because of the secrecy
surrounding modem interrogation; most people simply do not understand how
highly manipulative, deceptive and stressful interrogation can be. (P. 197.)
No one can put a percentage on the number of confessions that are false. But
the advent of widespread post-conviction DNA testing has revealed that false
confessions are disturbingly more common than most believe. Indeed, DNA
testing is like a crystal ball, allowing us to look back at old cases and see with great
clarity whether a confessor is truly guilty. The DNA revolution can be a great
learning moment for the criminal justice system, if we are open to the lessons
taught.
False confessions are one of the leading causes of wrongful conviction of the
innocent, second only to eyewitness misidentification. 9 The following chart (p.
244) depicts various studies of wrongful conviction cases, and the number and
percentage of those convictions that relied on false confessions:
Author/year

No. in study

No. of false
confessions

Bedau and
Radelet (1987)
Leo and Ofshe
(1998, 2001)
Warden (2003)
Drizin and Leo
(2004)
Gross et al.
(2005)
Innocence
Project (2007);

350

49

% Wrongful
convictions due
to false
confessions
14

60

60

N/A

42
125

25
125

60
N/A

340

51

15

200

31

16

Garrett (2008)

& RIcHARD LEO, THE WRONG Guys: MURDER, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND THE NORFOLK FOUR

[hereinafter 'THE WRONG Guys"].

9 See INNOCENCE PROJECT STATISTCs, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/.
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Leo outlines the four ways in which confessions can be discredited. One way
is when it is later conclusively proven that the crime did not occur. In one case, for
example, several defendants were convicted of murder based on their confessions
and a witness's testimony that the defendants had killed her newborn baby and
disposed of the body. Scientific evidence later established, after the defendants
spent years in prison, that the woman had never had a baby; she had had a tubal
ligation operation that prevented her from getting pregnant. (P. 241.)
The second way confessions are proven false occurs when it is demonstrated
that it would have been physically impossible for the defendant to have committed
the crime. In three different Chicago cases, for example, defendants who
confessed were later proven to have been in jail on the date that the crimes
occurred. (P. 241.)
Third, a confession is proven false when the identity of the true perpetrator is
later discovered. Chris Ochoa, for example, spent years in prison for armed
robbery, rape, and murder, until the true perpetrator came forward, confessed, and
led the police to the murder weapon and bag where he had hidden the fruits of the
crime.1 ° (P. 241.)
The final, and most common, way, that a confession is proven false is when
DNA evidence conclusively clears the inmate. Examples of this method are too
numerous to discuss. Indeed, today, 234 individuals have been conclusively
proven innocent through post-conviction DNA testing, with the number constantly
on the rise."' An alarming percentage of these innocent suspects falsely confessed
as a result of extreme psychological interrogation. I have personally handled two
false confession cases in Ohio that are not counted in this group of 234.
Common sense tells us that this number is just the tip of the iceberg. The
majority of serious crimes, like armed robbery and murder, are often "non-DNA"
cases. In these cases, the crime occurred in such a way that the perpetrator did not
leave his or her DNA at the scene. 12 And in most would-be DNA cases, the police
do not preserve the DNA after conviction and appeal. In Ohio, for example, in
two-thirds of the cases where inmates have sought post-conviction DNA testing,
the crucial DNA that could have proven innocence or guilt once and for all had

10 For

details

of

Chris

Ochoa's

exoneration,

see

http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/43.php.

1 See Innocence Project
http://www.innocenceproject.org.

website

for

profiles

on

all

220

cases,

at

12 For example, if A walks up to B in his backyard and shoots and kills him, and then leaves
the scene, it is likely that no DNA will exist to identify A as the perpetrator. The fact that most DNA

exonerations have occurred in rape cases is simply because rape is the type of crime where the
perpetrator most often leaves his biological material. DNA testing in rape cases has proven many
rape confessions to be false.
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been destroyed or lost by the time the inmate requested testing. 13 This14 percentage
is typical of the sorry state of DNA preservation in other states as well.
There is no qualitative difference between cases in which DNA testing exists
to prove innocence and the vast majority of the remaining cases where no DNA is
available. The same interrogation techniques are used in both types of cases. The
234 DNA exonerations, with the alarming number of false confessions these cases
have laid bare, are just a small percentage of the total number of cases where false
confessions may have occurred. The confessions in the remaining cases, however,
cannot be demonstrated true or false because no conclusive check exists on the
backend to verify the validity of the confession. By any measure, however, the
myth that innocent suspects simply do not confess is patently wrong.
Leo next outlines three types of false confessions based on a typology
developed by Kassin and Wrightsman. 15 (P. 199.) A voluntary false confession
occurs when a citizen suddenly confesses on his own, subject to no police
coercion. The mentally disturbed defendant in Colorado v. Connelly16 falls into
this first category. (Pp. 200-01.)
The coerced-compliant false confessor, on the other hand, is a suspect who
privately knows while he is confessing that he is innocent. This type of suspect
confesses because the extreme interrogation tactics, including false evidence ploys,
convinces him that his situation is hopeless, he will be convicted, and that the only
way he can get the interrogation to end, and simultaneously avoid harsher
punishment, is to tell the interrogators what they want to hear. This type of
confessor comes to rationally believe that confessing is his only option, and the
lesser of two evils.' 7 (Pp. 201-10.)
The final type of false confession is the coerced-internalizedconfession. This
type of suspect, hearing the "overwhelming" evidence of his guilt the police have
laid at his feet during the interrogation, and not knowing that this evidence is
fabricated, comes to doubt his own memory and believe that he must have
committed the crime. This type of confessor comes to believe that he either
committed the crime while sleepwalking or in an alcohol-induced blackout, or that

13 See Geoff Dutton and Mike Wagner, Lost Hope: When DNA Evidence Goes Missing, So
Does the Chance for an Exoneration, THE COLuMBuS DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2008, available at
http:l/www.dispatch.comllivelcontentllocalnews/stories/2008/01/27/dnal .html.
14 Id.

15 Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightman, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EvIDENcE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE (1985) (Chapter 3, Confession Evidence).
16 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
17 Perhaps the best examples of how false confessions occur can be found in Richard Leo's
new nonfiction work, with Tom Wells, THE WRONG Guys, see supra note 8. In this book, Leo
describes from beginning to end how several defendants in that case gave coerced-complaint
confessions to a crime they did not commit.

HeinOnline -- 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 725 2008-2009

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:711

he has simply suppressed his memories of the crime because they are too painful to
accept.' 8 (Pp. 210-225.)
Although false confessions are highly counterintuitive, and often difficult to
wrap one's mind around, one can understand how they occur by reading
examples-by examining the actual case studies. Leo provides numerous detailed
case studies of each type of false confession. Each story is uniquely compelling.
A reader of these case studies can come to fully understand how the suspect would
falsely confess as a result of extreme psychological pressures. Other compelling
depictions of how false confessions can be manufactured are found in John
Grisham's nonfiction work The Innocent Man,' 9 and in Leo's co-authored nonfiction story, entitled The Wrong Guys, 20 which describes the numerous false
confessions made by the "Norfolk Four." Although providing narrative depictions
of interrogations that led to false confessions is beyond the scope of this review,
readers who wish to understand this phenomenon should read one of these two
excellent books.
There is more to the story. Part of the problem, says Leo, is that detectives
are engrained with the belief that all suspects they interrogate are guilty. Training
seminars have convinced detectives that they are "highly accurate human lie
detectors," thus building false confidence in their biased intuition of guilt. Leo
asserts that this phenomenon is both wrong and dangerous. (P. 226.) He writes:
In the more than 2,000 interrogations I have studied, I have rarely
encountered interrogators who remember most of the specifics from the
laundry list of supposed nonverbal and verbal indicators of deception
taught by interrogation training firms such as Reid and Associates.
Rather, detectives tend to confidently believe that they can reliably infer
whether a subject is lying or telling the truth based on their own intuitive
analysis of his body language and demeanor. They sometimes refer to
their superior human lie detection skills as stemming from a "sixth
sense" common to police detectives. The unfortunate effect is that
interrogators will sometimes treat their hunch (or "gut") as somehow
constituting direct evidence of the suspect's guilt and then confidently
moving to an aggressive interrogation. In my analysis of disputed
confession cases, I have found that interrogators are often more certain in
their belief in a suspect's guilt than the objective evidence warrants and
tenaciously unwilling to consider the possibility that their intuition or
18 Joe Dick, one of the Norfolk Four described in Leo's book THE WRONG Guys, see supra

note 8, provided several coerced-internalized false confessions. Dick's interrogators were so
convincing that he continued to falsely believe that he had participated in the crime many months
later.
19 JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOwN
(Doubleday 2006).
20

See THE WRONG GuYs, supra note 8.
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behavioral analysis is wrong. These tendencies may be reinforced by an
occupational culture that teaches police to be suspicious generally and
does not reward them for admitting mistakes or expressing doubts in
their judgment. (P. 229.)
False confessions also occur because, in cases in which little evidence of guilt
exists, the detectives are convinced in their "gut" that the suspect is guilty, so they
become Hell bent on obtaining a confession. (Pp. 229-30.) In cases where ample
evidence of guilt exists, on the other hand, police may not need a confession or
may decide to refrain from interrogation altogether. As a result, extreme
psychological interrogation occurs most often when police have relied on little
more than their own hunch or intuition to determine guilt. And, as Leo has
demonstrated, these intuitions and gut-feelings are often wrong.2 ' Thus, extreme
psychological interrogations do their work most often in cases where strong
evidence of guilt is lacking, and thus, in cases where suspects are most likely to be
innocent.
A confession is usually seen by actors in the criminal justice systemprosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and jurors-as one of the most powerful
indicators of guilt. (P. 248.) As a result, when a false confession exists, it is often
admitted into evidence at trial and the defendant is convicted as a result of his
confession. Studies show that once a suspect falsely confesses, he possibly has
more than an eighty percent chance of being wrongfully convicted. (Pp. 250-51.)
HI. THE NECESSARY REFORMS: POLICY DIRECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE

Leo's suggested reforms not surprisingly revolve around the necessity of
reducing false confessions. At the outset, he rejects the idea of abolishing police
interrogation. He believes that interrogation, properly done, is both a necessary
and valuable tool to solve many crimes. (P. 271.) He further dispenses with the
suggestion of others that the interrogation function be performed by prosecutors,
magistrates, or judges. (P. 271.) Leo contends that prosecutors and judges should
remain unburdened by the interrogation process, to ensure that they do not become
tainted by the inquisitor's role. (P. 271.)
The reforms Leo urges come in two forms: legal and practical. Leo first
suggests reinvigorating the reliability rationale of the due process voluntariness
test. Reliability played an important role in determining the admissibility of
confessions for much of American jurisprudential history, until the Supreme Court

21 To further illustrate the point, DNA testing performed at the FBI laboratory of suspects
identified by police investigation excluded 20 percent of the primary suspects, and resulted in a
match with the primary suspect in only about 60 percent of the cases. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PRoGRAMS, PUB. No. 161258, CONvICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE To ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFrER TRIAL xxviii (June 1996).
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undermined that policy rationale in Colorado v. Connelly.22 I have previously
echoed these same concerns, noting that Connelly was ironically decided shortly
before the DNA Revolution commenced, which cleanly laid bare the problems
with false confessions and the dire need for a reliability focus in determining
confession admissibility.23
Leo's primary legal focus is on the creation of a new reliability test. A judge
should not admit a confession into evidence, Leo argues, unless he or she has
weighed three factors and determined the confession is trustworthy. These factors
are:
(1) whether the confession contains nonpublic information that can be
independently verified, would be known only by the true perpetrator or
an accomplice, and cannot likely be guessed by chance; (2) whether the
confession led the police to new evidence about the crime; and (3)
whether the suspect's postadmission narrative fits the crime facts and
other objective evidence. (P. 289.)
This "totality of the circumstances" analysis should be performed after the
court has determined that the confession is voluntary. The prosecution would have
the burden of establishing trustworthiness by a preponderance of the evidence. (P.
290.) Of course, for this sort of analysis to work properly, all interrogations would
have to be videotaped from beginning to end. Judges would need an objective
record by which to analyze and weigh these three prongs. As discussed later, Leo
believes that taping should be a universal requirement.
The legal basis for such a reliability test can be found in Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.24 Although an unreliable confession may still be minimally relevant
under this rule, it is not particularly probative of the suspect's guilt. And because
confession evidence weighs so heavily in the minds of jurors, an unreliable
confession is unfairly prejudicial to a defendant and devastating to the innocent.
(P. 290.) Leo contends that this sort of screening on trustworthiness grounds is not
"new or novel." (P. 290.) It routinely occurs with respect to other types of
evidence, including most out-of-court hearsay statements.
Leo's primary practical reform goes hand-in-hand with the new reliability
test-a requirement of universal videotaping of interrogations from beginning to
end. He notes that this reform has picked up momentum in recent years, with
several states now requiring taping either by statute or court decree. (P. 292.)

22 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Due Process Clause is not violated by the admission of an unreliable

confession if the state did not coerce it).
23 See Godsey, Reliability Lost, supra note 2.
24 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 excludes evidence if the risk of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value.
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Similar legislation is5 pending in several states across the country, including my
2
home state of Ohio.
Leo believes, and I agree, that a broad requirement for videotaping
interrogations is the single most important reform. (P. 296.) The benefits of this
reform are legion. First and foremost, videotaping creates a clean, objective, and
comprehensive record of an interrogation-the equivalent of instant replay. This
would prevent false confessions from leading to wrongful convictions in three
ways. First, after-the-play scrutiny of police conduct would help professionalize
police departments. It would ensure that police play within the bounds of
permissible interrogation techniques. Second, it would allow experts to analyze
the tape before trial. This opportunity is crucial because expert witnesses could
look for earmarks of reliability or falsity, such as whether the police fed the
suspect facts to adopt, or whether the suspect truly came up with nonpublic facts
on his own. Third, videotaping would provide judges with an objective record to
make the three-pronged inquiry in Leo's new reliability test.
Taping protects the police by preventing suspects from making false claims
that they were abused in the interrogation room, or that the police officer failed to
recite Miranda warnings. It removes secrecy from this important part of our
adversarial process and "eliminates the gap in our knowledge that the Supreme
Court complained of more than four decades ago in the Miranda decision." (P.
297.) Law enforcement agencies benefit because a tape recording of a reliable
confession is rock-solid evidence at trial. (P. 301.)
Taping also furthers the investigative abilities of the police. Indeed, things
said by a suspect during an interrogation may seem unimportant at the time. As
the investigation progresses, however, new facts give rise to new angles. A tape
allows the police to go back and capture the suspect's original statements that,
without such a clean record, might have been forgotten by the interrogators or gone
unnoted. (Pp. 300-01.)
Recording also saves time and money, drastically cutting down on the time
police, prosecutors, judges and juries must litigate disputes regarding what was
said in the interrogation room. When interrogations are recorded, fewer pretrial
suppression motions are made, and fewer claims are made that the police neglected
Miranda's dictates. (Pp. 301-02.) Finally, recording improves relations between
the police and public. By "removing secrecy from interrogations, recording should
increase public perceptions of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system more
generally." (P. 303.)
Studies show that taping does not decrease the frequency of confessions. (P.
303.) And complaints about cost have not been borne out by departments that
have adopted such requirements. In this day and age, recording equipment is
25 See S.B. 358, 127th Leg., Reg. Session (Ohio 2008). See also Geoff Dutton and Mike
Wagner, Proposed Reforms Shown to Work, THE COLuMBus DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.dispatch.comlive/content/1ocal-news/stories/2008/02/24/DNA-fix.ART-ART-02-2408_A1_R29EO33.html.
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inexpensive, hours of recording time can be saved on an expensive digital hard
drive, and any minimal costs are offset by the cost-benefits of reduced litigation to
the entire criminal justice system. (P. 303.) Objections from law enforcement
about operator mistakes or equipment failure are resolved in states that have a
recording requirement by implementing "safety valves," or exceptions when
recording is not possible or resulted from unintentional error. (P. 304.)
Finally, Leo proposes several "piecemeal" reforms to fight against false
confessions. These reforms include improving police interrogation training,
requiring probable cause to interrogate, prohibiting implicit and explicit threats and
promises, banning false evidence ploys, imposing time limits on interrogations,
providing additional protections for vulnerable populations such as the mentally
handicapped and juveniles, embracing in-court expert testimony on the reliability
or unreliability of confessions, and improving jury instructions.26 Requiring
probable cause to interrogate, and banning false evidence ploys, are perhaps the
two most controversial of his suggested reforms. I will discuss these reforms
further below.
IV. CRITIQUES, INSIGHTS AND ADDITIONAL REFORMS

Two broad questions were in my mind when I finished reading Leo's book.
The first is whether Leo's conclusions about the attitudes of detectives toward
interrogation and their suspects, how interrogations occur in the real world, and the
frequency with which false evidence ploys and extreme psychological coercion are
used, are entirely accurate. The second question is whether the problem of false
confessions outweighs potential benefits to our society from modem forms of
psychological interrogation. I cannot definitively answer either question.
Regarding the first question, I, like most scholars, am limited by the fact that I
have not performed decades of empirical research as has Leo. To truly test Leo's
claims I would have to review the tapes of the thousands of interrogations he has
studied over the past decades, or perform my own empirical research to determine
whether his sample set is representative.
We all have our beliefs and biases about police interrogation, however,
whether stemming from television, scholarship, or real world experience. I have
I participated in several
limited personal experience with interrogations.
26

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in 2004 that:

[W]hen the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant's confession or statement that
is the product of a custodial interrogation or an interrogation conducted at a place of
detention . . . and there is not at least an audiotape recording of the complete
interrogation, the defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction advising that the
State's highest court has expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded

whenever practicable, and cautioning the jury that, because of the absence of any
recording in the case before them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant's alleged
statement with great caution and care.
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E. 2d 516, 533-34 (Mass. 2004).
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interrogations with federal law enforcement agents as an Assistant United States
Attorney, including a twelve-hour interrogation in which the suspect ultimately
made incriminating statements leading to a prosecution for murder. None of the
psychological techniques or false-evidence ploys described in Leo's article were
used. But I was not present for the vast majority of police interrogations that I
later introduced into evidence in court. And I have no real world experience, either
as a participant or voyeur, outside of that limited realm.
My instincts suggest that Leo is more or less on point, however. Leo's
empirical research is extensive. He has probably witnessed, either live or on tape,
more actual interrogations than many veteran police interrogators in high-crime
urban centers. But, whether his conclusions are biased, I cannot say. This brings
me to the point I made in the introduction of this review. I suspect that Leo's most
enthusiastic critics will be law enforcement personnel. Such critics should be
deflected with a single point. If law enforcement personnel wish to prove Leo
wrong, they must open up the process for further scrutiny and study. Those who
hide the ball are on thin ice to complain that others have mischaracterized the
situation.
I experienced my first resistance to videotaping interrogations in my first
weeks as a federal prosecutor in 1995. A suspect and his attorney from another
state came in for a "proffer session," an "interview" conducted by an FBI agent
and me to determine if he was a suitable candidate for cooperation against other
suspects in the same conspiracy. The suspect's attorney asked that the session be
videotaped. It seemed like a reasonable request to me. I then asked my supervisor
if I could videotape the encounter, but received a strong rebuff. I was informed
that such a request was against the policies of the United States Department of
Justice. The supervisor explained that the "public would not understand the things
we have to do."
More recently, as Director of the Ohio Innocence Project, I have worked to
have videotaping legislation passed in Ohio.27 I have given talks in support of the
legislation to prosecution groups, sheriffs associations, and police unions across
the state. So far, I mostly have been met with stiff resistance. The chief of police
of a major Ohio city was quoted as saying that the legislation demonstrates "a great
distrust of law enforcement." 28 To law enforcement critics of Leo's conclusions
about police attitudes and values in the interrogation room, I respond that you do
not have a leg to stand on until you allow widespread videotaping, so that Leo's
assumptions can be empirically put to the test by a variety of scholars across many
spectrums.
My second question is whether the current risk of false confessions outweighs
the benefits to society of intense psychological interrogation. We all know the
See Dutton & Wagner, supranote 25.
28 Jim Siegel, Columbus PD Finding Problems With New DNA Bill, THE COLuMBUS
27

DISPATCH,

Aug.

21,

2008,

available

http:/blog.dispatch.com/dailybriefingl2008/08/columbus-pdfinding-problems-w.shtml.
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maxim that it is "better that 10 guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer."2 9 But what if current interrogation methods result in one thousand
convictions of murderers and rapists who would otherwise still roam the streets for
each innocent person who falsely confesses? The bottom line is that we simply do
not know-and cannot know-the true costs involved in the various tradeoffs
between competing interests. It is quite possible that all of Leo's suggested
reforms could be implemented with little to no loss of prosecutions of the guilty.
But Leo does not pretend to know. Rather, he identifies the problem of false
confessions, which is real, and then prescribes medicine to remedy this problem
without any report on the side effects of this medicine. Leo apparently believes
that the current state of affairs is simply unacceptable regardless of the unknown
costs his proposed reforms might entail. Where others fall on the spectrum of
choices may be a matter of personal politics.
Nevertheless, I wholeheartedly agree with two of Leo's suggested reforms:
the need for universal videotaping and the need for judges to vigorously screen out
unreliable confessions under Rule 403 for the reasons he stated. Videotaping
opens up the process. It professionalizes interrogation practices. Detectives know
that judges and juries will later scrutinize their behavior in the interrogation room.
Detectives can still push hard for much needed confessions, but the eyes of
outsiders provide a check against egregious practices. Videotaping also provides
an objective record for future litigation. It cuts down on litigation by ending false
claims of abuse or Miranda failure. Most importantly, it allows the interrogation
to be reconstructed after-the-fact by experts and courts to determine a confession's
reliability.
And Leo's case for a renewed emphasis on confession reliability as a
prerequisite to admission is overwhelming. Leo selects Evidence Rule 403 as the
regulator of unreliable confessions. I have made the case in a California Law
Review article that a stringent requirement for confession reliability is inherent in
due process.30 Through a series of doctrinal errors, beginning in Brain v. United
States31 and culminating in Colorado v. Connelly,32 the Court stripped the

reliability factor from the due process inquiry, 3 even as DNA testing began to
shed light on the serious problems of unreliable and false confessions resulting in
wrongful convictions in this country. 34 For both legal and policy reasons,
reliability needs to find a home in our confession law jurisprudence. This home
could rest both the Due Process Clause and in Rule 403, as Leo suggests.
29 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Clarendon Press 1765).

30 Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Testfor
Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv. 465 (2005).
31 168 U.S. 532(1897).
32 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
33 See Godsey, Reliability Lost, supra note 2.
34 Id.
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Leo's other reforms-embracing expert witnesses on the reliability issue,
improving police interrogation training, and creating new jury instructions to deal
with the issue of unreliable confessions-are all needed reforms. Coupled with
videotaping and a new thrust toward screening out unreliable confessions on the
front end, these reforms together would go a long way toward minimizing the
harmful impact of false confessions.
In one respect, I would go farther than Leo. Leo seems to give up on the ideal
of improving Miranda, but I believe that Miranda can be revitalized to some
extent, to help it achieve its intended function. I made the case in a Minnesota Law
Review article that an additional warning should be added: "If you choose to
remain silent, your silence cannot be used against you. ' 35 This warning was not
part of the original Miranda warnings because the Court had not yet ruled in
Doyle36 that post-Mirandasilence is inadmissible. The Court in Miranda believed
that this Doyle-warning was implicit; suspects will naturally understand that
silence cannot be used against them. 37 But Leo's own empirical research has
shown that suspects do not "get" this right as the Miranda Court believed. Many
suspects feel they have no choice but to talk-and thus are compelled to speaksimply because of an erroneous belief that silence in the face of damning
accusation will equate with guilt in the eyes of the jury. 38
Leo established that Miranda has little effect, in part because detectives
deemphasize it by reciting the warnings quickly, in a perfunctory tone and then
launching into intense interrogation without giving a suspect the chance to absorb
or consider his rights. His description made me suddenly consider a new way to
combat this Miranda nullifying effect. Now that we are in the digital age, with
universal taping of interrogation within our grasp, I would consider having
Miranda warnings recited to suspects in custody by a judge or defense attorney via
videotape. Much like the "seatbelt" video one watches on commercial airplanes,
Miranda could be neutrally explained and emphasized in a way that ensures that
suspects truly understand their rights and have time to consider them. Suspects
could then verify in writing that they have watched the video, understand their
rights, and wish to submit to questioning before interrogation commences. Some
have suggested having suspects brought before a magistrate for Miranda warnings
or interrogation. Leo asserts that this improperly crosses separation-of-power
lines. But a video of a magistrate informing the suspect of his rights would help
cure Miranda'sills without infringing on the judiciary's independent role.
Leo also urges the prohibition of any threats or offers during interrogations. I
have a different-although somewhat similar-take on this issue. Although a full
recitation of my admittedly complicated theories about penalties and offers are
35 Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings supra note 2.
36 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
37 See Godsey, Reformulatingthe Miranda Warnings,supra note 2 at 790-92.
38 Id. at 794 (citing Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and the IrrationalAction,74 DENy. U. L. REV. 979, 1002 (1997)).
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beyond the scope of this review, I have previously set forth an argument that the
Self-Incrimination Clause was designed to regulate this matter to ensure 39
that
suspects are not penalized in any way for exercising their right to remain silent.
The reforms with which I continue to struggle are Leo's requirement for
probable cause to interrogate and his proposed ban on false evidence ploys. Leo
argues that detectives should, just like with search warrants, have to go before a
magistrate and establish probable cause before they may interrogate a suspect.
(Pp. 307-08.) I understand his reasons for setting forth such a requirement. Police
interrogate more intensely the more they need a confession. They most need
confessions in cases where other evidence of guilt is weak. The requirement of
probable cause might reduce the risk of false confession.
I also suspect, however, that a large number of serious crimes are solved each
year with reliable confessions that would not have been solved with such a
probable cause requirement 40 If this were the only reform available at this time to
combat the problem of false confessions, I might consider it. I think the proper
balance can be struck, however, by requiring videotaping, a three-pronged
reliability inquiry prior to confession admissibility, embracing expert testimony,
and improving jury instructions. If the only evidence of guilt in a given case is the
defendant's confession, having the interrogation on videotape, so that proper
examination of the confession's reliability can be performed, sufficiently attacks
the problem without eliminating otherwise reliable confessions and convictions
that might be unattainable with such a probable cause requirement.
Finally, I do not have enough data to agree at this time with his proposed ban
on false evidence ploys. Leo argues that it is hypocritical for detectives to hold out
interrogation as a truth-seeking venture when they intentionally intersperse lies in
the interrogation process. And while lying is generally unseemly as a cultural
matter, I am not yet convinced that false evidence ploys do not result in a net gain
in the pursuit of truth. I imagine, but lack data to back it up, that falsely telling a
suspect his fingerprints have been found at the scene often results in a guilty
suspect giving up the game and confessing, allowing scores of crimes to be solved.
In a recent Ohio Innocent Project case, I was convinced beyond probable
cause that an alternate suspect committed the rape for which my client had spent
more than a decade in prison. I interviewed the alternate suspect on the street
along with a retired detective who volunteers for my organization. The alternate
suspect made some strange and semi-incriminating statements, but did not confess.
I must admit that although I did not lie to him, I was tempted to falsely tell him
that our private DNA testing efforts put him at the crime scene. Why? Because I
wanted to see how he would respond. I intuitively believed that he would not
confess unless he knew that the game was over. If he did not confess in response
to this news, I at least wanted to gauge his reaction. Did he quickly provide an
39

See Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule, supra note 30.

40 Leo also does not explain how his requirement for probable cause would work in Terry stop
scenarios based on reasonable suspicion.
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explanation for why his DNA was at the scene, which could later be discounted
through investigation? Did his response give the impression that he was expecting
to hear such news and had premeditated a story to try to explain it away? Or was
he genuinely stumped? This would have been supremely helpful information to
obtain.
Without knowing how many true confessions and incriminating statements
are obtained each year through false evidence ploys, I cannot say that their
tendency to cause innocent suspects to falsely confess outweighs their potential
benefits. And while I agree that a detective lying to a suspect during an
interrogation is unseemly, I believe other reforms Leo has suggested are sufficient.
Detectives will know that their actions will be caught on tape and viewed by a
judge and jury at a later time. Detective will be held accountable for their actions,
and the factfinders will be able to determine whether the suspect's responses
merited the detective's approach. The judge, making a reliability determination
before admitting the tape into evidence, will be able to see whether the false
evidence ploys eventually beat down the suspect and convinced him that he had no
choice but to conjure up a false confession. Or, the judge will see that the false
evidence ploy immediately led to strange and incriminating statements from the
suspect, such as providing non-public information about the crime. Experts will be
able to view such tapes as well, and offer their opinions as to whether the false
evidence ploys had a detrimental effect on the truth seeking purpose of the
interrogation.
V. CONCLUSION

Richard Leo body of work, summarized in Police Interrogationand American

Justice, shines the bright light on police interrogation in American today. He
depicts the values and structure of interrogation in a way that few, outside of the
actual subjects/victims of interrogation, fully understand. Although I do not agree
with all of his conclusions and proposed reforms, his work convincingly raises a
point that we must heed: If we are to ensure the integrity and fairness of
confessions in this country, we must adopt universal videotaping requirements
across all jurisdictions, and develop new reliability tests to screen out false
confessions.
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Is There Too Much Criminal Law?
Stuart P. Green*
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2008)

Is there too much criminal law? Are there too many overlapping criminal
statutes, covering too much conduct, resulting in sentences that are too long?
Douglas Husak says yes, and in this splendid book offers an original and
persuasive explanation for why that is so.
His argument for a "minimalist" conception of criminal law takes an elegant
form. Chapters 2 and 3, which contain Husak's theory as to what kind of conduct
can legitimately be subject to criminal sanctions, comprise the heart of the book:
Chapter 2 considers what he calls his "internal constraints" on criminalization,
those derived from within the criminal law itself, while Chapter 3 offers a
discussion of what he calls "external constraints," those that depend on a
"normative theory imported from outside the criminal law itself." (P. 55.) The
first and last chapters function as bookends for the argument in the middle:
Chapter 1 consists of a freestanding indictment of our bloated, overextended
system of criminal justice, while Chapter 4 offers a critique of several alternative
theories of criminalization: law and economics, utilitarianism, and legal moralism.
There is so much in this book that is smart and insightful that one is tempted
just to sit back and admire it. That would probably not make for a very interesting
review, however. Although I will highlight a few aspects of the book that seem to
me particularly successful (including Husak's potent critique of the law-andeconomics approach to criminalization), my main focus will be on those areas
where I see fault in his intricate argument. My criticisms center for the most part
on formal rather than substantive aspects of his theory-not on the conclusions that
he draws, most of which I agree with-but rather on the path that he takes to those
conclusions. In particular, I take issue with the notion that the first four normative
constraints on criminalization that he identifies--even if they are the right onescan properly be found within the contours of criminal law itself. In addition, I
offer several possible revisions to his theory (two constraints that seem to me
redundant, another that might have been included but was not) and consider
quibbles on several further points.

. Professor of Law & Justice Nathan L. Jacobs Scholar, Rutgers School of Law-Newark.
Thanks to Vera Bergelson for her comments on an earlier draft.
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I. SETTING THE STAGE

Husak begins his analysis, in Chapter 1, with a powerful critique of the
overcriminalization phenomenon. Piling detail on top of detail, Brandeis-Briefstyle, he paints a vivid picture of an American criminal justice system bursting at
the seams: A large number of new, broadly reaching, and often overlapping
criminal offense provisions have been enacted; police, prosecutorial, judicial, and
prison resources have been squandered; and harsh new sentences have been
authorized and imposed, impacting not only those who are convicted of crimes but
also their families and communities.
Arguing that we have "too much
punishment" in the sense of both too many crimes and punishment that is
disproportionate to the acts committed, he describes a range of doctrinal
developments that have contributed to this surfeit of criminalization: outrageously
broad conspiracy laws; the increased use of strict liability; newly minted drug,
juvenile, white collar, and intellectual property offenses; and a plea bargaining
regime that favors the prosecution at every turn. (P. 3.)
This is clearly a subject about which Husak feels passionate, and that passion
comes through in his prose. He has, he says, "tried to maintain a sober and
academic tone in describing this sorry state of affairs. Still, [he] can barely conceal
[his] outrage about what [he] believe[s] to be an injustice of monstrous
proportions." (P. vii.) The unusual combination of philosophical rigor and
adversarial zeal makes for a good read.
Indeed, the basic structure of the book reveals Husak to be something of an
intellectual risk-taker.
One would have expected that the question of
overcriminalization would be addressed only after a theory of criminalization had
been developed first. Analytically, this would have been the safe approach. But it
would also have made for a less engaging book. Husak jump starts his analysis
with a "presumptive and intuitive" case for his thesis that our system is
overcriminalized. (P. 3.) In my view, his gamble pays off. By beginning his
discussion in the real world of facts and figures rather than in philosophical
speculation, he breathes life into what might have been a dry subject and allows
the reader to see why the analysis that follows actually matters.
II. LOOKING FOR CONSTRAINTS WITHIN THE CRIMINAL LAW

Having set the stage with his presumptive case for overcriminalization in
Chapter 1, Husak then turns in Chapters 2 and 3 to the core of the book, a
normative theory to distinguish those uses of the criminal law that are justified
from those that are not. Such a theory is necessary, Husak says, because "[tihe
criminal sanction is the most powerful weapon in the state arsenal; the government
can do nothing worse to its citizens than to punish them." (P. 95.) It is here that
most of the theoretical heavy lifting occurs.
The theory consists of seven basic limitations on the criminal law. As noted,
he claims that the first four are "internal" to the criminal law in the sense that they
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can be derived from within "the general part of criminal law, and from reflection
about the nature and justification of punishment. (P. 103.) Any "adequate theory
of criminalization," he says, "must include" these constraints. (Id.)
The first of the internal constraints is the idea that criminal liability should not
be imposed unless statutes are designed to prohibit a "nontrivial harm or evil." (P.
66.) I agree with Husak that the requirement of harm should be regarded as the
first principle of criminalization. I disagree with him, however, about the proper
source of this principle.
According to Husak, several familiar defenses in criminal law-necessity or
lesser evils, consent, and de minimis-are "unintelligible unless criminal offenses
are designed to proscribe a nontrivial harm or evil."' (P. 66.) "None of these three
...defenses," he says, "can be interpreted or applied unless each penal statute is
designed to prevent a nontrivial harm or evil." (P. 67.) Put another way, I
understand Husak to be asserting that the existence of such defenses presupposes
the existence of a nontrivial harm constraint.
The connection that Husak draws between the criminalization question and
these "general part" doctrines is ingenious and insightful. It provides him with the
opportunity to reflect on a whole host of significant issues in criminal law theory.
And he is no doubt right that there are interesting parallels between the principles
of criminalization and criminal law doctrine. I am not persuaded, however, that
reference to criminal law doctrine can establish a principle of criminalization.
Conceptually, the question of what kinds of conduct should be subject to criminal
sanctions properly precedes the question of how various criminal law doctrines
found in the general part should be formulated. Ultimately, Husak seems to be
attempting to extract an ought from an is. Current criminal law justification
doctrines may well presuppose a nontrivial harm constraint, but that hardly means
that the nontrivial harm constraint is correct or justified. In my view, any
justification for criminalization must come from some principle outside the
criminal law, from an independent principle of justice.
Ironically, Husak's own account demonstrates exactly why the criminalization
question ought to precede the substantive criminal law question. Assuming that
our positive criminal law is as misguidedly overcriminalized as Husak says it is,
there is no reason to think that our legislatures and courts will have done any better
a job of creating a just general part. Husak is too careful a scholar not to recognize
this problem. He acknowledges the "tension in claiming that we can extract
normatively defensible constraints on criminalization from a system of criminal
law that has serious normative deficiencies." (P. 76.) Unfortunately, there isn't
much that can be done to relieve the tension. In my view, the attempt to draw
I Husak seems to be using the term "harm or evil" rather than just "harm" to refer not only to
conduct that causes wrongful setbacks to the interests of others (in Joel Feinberg's phrase) but also to
conduct that risks causing setbacks to interest. See (pp. 70-71) (quoting JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING: THE MORAL LIMlTS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1988)). It is unclear whether Husak would
also allow criminalization of acts that cause harms to self or offense to others.
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foundational principles from the positive law, rather than from fundamental
external principles of justice, is essentially a non-starter.
A similar problem of putting the conceptual cart before the horse undermines
Husak's account of his second constraint on criminalization, namely, that penal
liability not be imposed unless the defendant's conduct is wrongful. Here, Husak
draws interesting connections to a collection of excuse defenses. Drawing on the
work of Jeremy Horder, z he argues that legal excuses (such as insanity or
intoxication) "can be understood only against a background of criminal
wrongdoing: If the defendant is not guilty of wrongdoing, there is nothing to
excuse." (P. 72.)
As in the case of the nontrivial harm principle, I agree with Husak that
conduct that is not wrongful should not be subject to criminal sanctions. 3 Once
again, however, I do not believe that those principles can be derived from the
substance of criminal law itself. As before, I think they must come from external
sources, such as Mill's or Feinberg's wrongful harm principles.4
My main problem with Husak's third principle-the idea that "punishment is
justified only when and to the extent it is deserved" (P. 82)-is whether it should
even properly be regarded as a constraint on criminalization. More precisely, I am
not convinced that the desert constraint necessarily adds anything to his theory of
criminalization not already covered by his principles of nontrivial harm and
wrongfulness.
There are three different senses in which Husak talks about the desert
constraint. One is simply the idea that an actor, in order to be held criminally
liable, should not have an excuse defense, such as insanity or intoxication. This
constraint makes sense but seems already to have been covered by his
wrongfulness constraint, which, as noted, references Horder's account of excuses.
As such, inclusion of this additional constraint would seem to violate the demands
of Occam' s Razor.
Husak also uses the desert constraint to introduce into his analysis the idea
that the conduct criminalized must somehow implicate the interests of the public at
large and not merely those of individuals. As Husak puts it, "not all wrongdoing
makes persons eligible for punishment imposed by the state. Private wrongdoing
•.. does not render persons deserving of state punishment." (P. 83.) I certainly
have no quarrel with this point. But I do not understand why it is not enough,
following the work of Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall, simply to incorporate
2

See generally JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME (2004).

3

My own account of wrongfulness in the criminal law can be found in STUART P. GREEN,
LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 39-46 (2006).
4 See generally FEINBERG, supra note 1; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Edward Alexander

ed., 1999) (1859).
5

See generally R. A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONStBILITY AND LIABILrrY IN THE

CRIMINAL LAW (2007); S. E. Marshall & R. A. Duff, Criminalizationand Sharing Wrongs, 11 CAN. J.

L. & JuRis. 7 (1998).
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the notion of "publicness" into the concept of harm. Under this approach, Husak's
nontrivial harm or evil constraint would be rewritten to specify that criminal
liability should not be imposed unless statutes are designed to prohibit a nontrivial
harm or evil that affects or implicates the public interest. My criticism here, once
again, is formal rather than substantive.
A similar formalistic problem bedevils a third aspect of Husak's desert
constraint. According to Husak, "punishments may be undeserved when they are
excessive. The desert constraint underlies the principle of proportionality.. . ." (P.
83.) In other words, Husak seems to be saying that a theory of criminalization
should take into account not simply whether given conduct should be subject to
criminal sanctions, but also the extent of those sanctions. Once again, I am in full
agreement with him on this point. But I am not convinced that the "amount of
punishment" question is not also covered by the wrongfulness and harmfulness
constraints. In general, I would think that the more wrongful and harmful a given
type of act, the greater the amount of punishment it deserves.
The inclusion of the desert constraint highlights a deeper ambiguity in
Husak's theory. Most of the time he is focused on whether a legislature should
authorize criminal penalties with respect to a certain kind of conduct-a crime
type. His theory is thus characterized as a "decision procedure for justifying
criminal laws." (P. 55 n.3, emphasis altered.) Other times, however, he seems
concerned with whether a prosecutor or judge or jury should apply criminal
penalties to a specific defendant in a particular case, a crime token. Thus we have
the inclusion of the desert constraint.
The two inquiries are related, of course, but they are nevertheless distinct.
Legislatures are obliged to consider, prospectively, the extent to which certain
kinds of harm and wrong are associated with certain types of conduct in the usual
or typical case. They do not concern themselves with whether there might be
excuses that diminish the desert of individual defendants in individual cases. That
is precisely the sort of thing that prosecutors, judges, and juries look at, however.
On the other hand, prosecutors and judges need not typically make judgments
about whether an act is sufficiently harmful or wrongful to justify criminal
penalties of a certain severity; that judgment has already been made for them by
the legislature. Thus, there are some elements of the criminalization inquiry that
are relevant to legislatures, but not to prosecutors, judges, and juries, and other
elements that are relevant to prosecutors, judges, and juries, but not to legislatures.
As far as I can tell, Husak's account seems to conflate these two distinct sets of
decision procedure into one.
I am more impressed by Husak's fourth internal constraint, which he calls the
burden of proof constraint. This constraint is framed as follows: "Because
punishments implicate and potentially violate important rights-the right not to be
deliberately subjected to hard treatment and censure by the state-the burden of
proof should be placed on those who favor criminal legislation." (P. 100.) In
explaining exactly what he has in mind here, Husak offers a helpful and typically
engaging example:
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Suppose the state decides to curb the problem of obesity by criminalizing
the consumption of doughnuts. If we assume that the liberty to eat
doughnuts is not especially valuable, the state should need only a
minimal reason to dissuade persons from doing so. Clearly, the fact that
doughnuts are unhealthy provides such a reason. This reason might
justify noncriminal means to discourage consumption-increased
taxation, bans on advertising, educational programs, and the like. But
the interests implicated by a criminal law against eating doughnuts are
much more significant. Persons not only have an interest in eating
doughnuts but also have an interest in not being punished if and when
they disregard the proscription. This latter interest is far more important
than the former, and qualifies as a right. (Pp. 101-02.)
As an element in the criminalization decision procedure, this seems to me a helpful
addition.
In deciding whether to criminalize particular kinds of conduct,
legislatures should consider not simply whether they are harmful and wrongful,
and therefore worthy of proscription, but also exactly what it would mean to back
up such proscriptions by means of liberty-infringing criminal sanctions.
III. LOOKING FOR CONSTRAINTS OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL LAW

Chapter 3 offers a second set of constraints to supplement the first. These
constraints derive from what Husak acknowledges is an admittedly controversial
political theory about the conditions that "must be satisfied in order to justify
infringements of the right not to be punished." (P. 120.) Here, in appealing to
considerations outside the body of criminal law itself, I believe Husak's theory is
on generally firmer footing than in Chapter 2.
Husak argues, first, that before a legislature can enact a penal statute, it must
identify a substantial, and legitimate, state interest. The concern here is, as he
acknowledges, "closely related" to the question raised by the harm or evil
constraint. (Pp. 132-33.) But the focus is somewhat different. Much of the
discussion here concerns whether the harms and wrongs caused by the putatively
criminal act are the proper concern of the public. For example, everyone can agree
that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing physical harms (such as those
found in murder, rape, and assault), preventing forced transfers of property rights
(such as those found in theft), and, perhaps more controversially, enforcing
solutions to coordination (or collective action) problems. The harder issue is
whether the state has a legitimate and substantial interest in expressing its
disapproval of such kinds of conduct. This question, of course, lies at the core of
punishment theory.
In this connection, Husak gives us an interesting account of the Supreme
Court case of Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.6
6

478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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(P. 142.) The case involved a First Amendment challenge to a Puerto Rico statute
that prohibited casino gambling-related advertising when aimed at locals but
allowed it when aimed at tourists. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute,
Husak says, the majority simply deferred to what it imagined to be the objectives
of the legislation, making no serious effort to assess whether the state had a
genuinely substantial interest in enacting the law. (P. 143.) His theory shows why
such an approach is unacceptable. As he explains:
A minimalist theory of criminalization places the burden on the state to
defend penal legislation. We must do our best to identify the real
objective of the legislature, assessing the accuracy of our description by
examining the degree of fit between means and ends. Only then can we
determine whether this interest is sufficiently important to qualify as
substantial and thus capable of overriding the right not to be punished.
(P. 144.)
Husak then turns to the second of his external constraints: not only must we
determine whether a particular statute serves a substantial state interest, we must
also ask "whether the law directly advances that interest." (P.145.) Speaking of
the demand for empirical evidence that the legislative purpose will actually be
served, Husak says, "[i]t is hard to think of a single innovation that would have a
more profound impact on the phenomenon of overcriminalization. At the present
time, persons may be subjected to hard treatment and censure, despite the complete
lack of evidence that the statute in question will attain its objective." (P. 145.)
Here again the strength of Husak's analysis, and much of the interest of the
book, lie in his willingness to apply his theory to complex questions of public
policy. Husak is particularly masterful in discussing the almost complete lack of
evidence that drug laws advance their stated purpose-presumably, deterring
citizens from using illicit drugs. He draws on his encyclopedic knowledge of the
literature in this area to explain why such proscriptions likely fail to achieve such a
goal. (P. 147.) For example, he explains that, in enacting drug laws, legislatures
fail to take into account the extent to which prohibitions on certain drugs will:
cause users to switch to other drugs (the substitution effect); make the use of
certain drugs more attractive to certain users (the forbidden fruit effect); and,
through incarceration, exacerbate the criminogenic tendencies of those who would
otherwise be short-term users. (Pp. 147-48.)
Finally, Husak offers the third of his external constraints-namely, that the
challenged offense be no more extensive than necessary to achieve its stated
purpose. (P. 153.) Under this rule, the state must consider the possibility of
alternative means of achieving its statutory purpose and must determine that there
is no equally effective alternative that is less extensive than the statute in question.
Among the concerns that Husak raises here is that criminalization might be
overinclusive-that it might apply to conduct that does not actually cause, or risk,
the harm or evil that the law is meant to proscribe. As he explains, offenses of risk
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prevention, especially those involving proscriptions of drugs and guns, are
particularly vulnerable to such a charge. (P. 154.)
Despite Husak's ambitious attempt to develop a comprehensive set of
constraints on criminalization, there is at least one factor that finds its way only
partially, and then not explicitly, into his theory. I have in mind the costs of
criminalization. A proposed criminal statute might directly advance a substantial
state interest and be no more extensive than necessary to achieve such purpose, and
yet its costs might still outweigh its benefits. Certainly the enactment of
overinclusive legislation, and the consequent effect of chilling socially beneficial,
or at least socially neutral, conduct counts as costs of criminalization. But there
are other costs as well, less explicitly acknowledged. All forms of criminalization
entail costs in terms of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and punishment.7
Sometimes these costs are direct, such as paying salaries to police, prosecutors,
public defenders, judges, prison guards, and probation officers. Other times they
are indirect, such as when family members suffer because a parent or spouse is in8
prison, or when an offender has difficulty finding a job after release from prison.
But the costs of criminalization also vary from crime to crime. For example, given
the unusually heavy costs of prosecuting crimes such as welfare fraud, which fall
mainly on the poor, we might decide that such legislation is not worth whatever
benefits it might entail. As a result, we might decide to decriminalize.
IV. COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF CRIMINALIZATION

Having developed his own theory of criminalization in the middle chapters,
Husak then offers, in the final chapter, a critique of several alternative theories of
criminalization: law and economics ("L&E"), utilitarianism, and legal moralism.
My focus here will be on the first of these alternative theories.
L&E scholars like Richard Posner claim that "[tihe major function of criminal
law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from bypassing the system of
voluntary, compensated exchange-the 'market,' explicit or implicit-in situations
where.., the market is a more efficient method of allocating resources than forced
exchange." 9 Given detection, apprehension, and conviction rates of considerably
7 See generally Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV.
323 (2004).
8
Regarding indirect costs of criminalization, such as stress on families, single parents,
stigma, harm to family dynamics, diminished earning potential, increased juvenile delinquency, and

increased risk of abuse, see generally

INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); John Hagan & Ronit

Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonmentfor Children, Communities, and Prisoners,in
PRISONS 121 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
9 See P. 181 (quoting Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985). Perhaps the first scholar to offer an economic theory of crimes
was Gary S. Becker, in Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). Becker's main focus was on the optimal level of criminal enforcement.
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less than one hundred percent, simply requiring a defendant to compensate the
victim for his loss after it has occurred is normally inadequate to serve as a
deterrent. We need, in Posner's words, "to impose additional costs on unlawful
conduct where the conventional damages remedy alone would be insufficient to
limit that conduct to the efficient level."' Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed
called these supra-ordinary sanctions "kicker[s]." H In the context of criminal law,
we call such kickers "punishment."
Husak is highly critical of the L&E approach. Like other retributivist
theorists, 12 he points out the pointlessness of postulating an "implicit market" that
is "bypassed" when offenders intentionally murder or rape one another. (P. 184.)
And he focuses on the inability of L&E to explain the singular role played by the
concepts of culpability and blame in criminal law. He demonstrates the inability of
L&E to explain, for example, why criminal law systems universally punish murder
more severely than manslaughter and manslaughter more severely than negligent
homicide. There is certainly no reason to assume that intentional homicide
necessarily requires more deterrence than unintentional homicide. The reason we
punish intentional homicide more severely than unintentional homicide is simply
that the former is the more culpable act and therefore deserves more punishment
than the latter.
Husak does not stop with what has become the standard retributivist critique
of the L&E approach, however. He develops an argument that takes on L&E on its
own turf. If there is any set of criminal offenses for which the L&E approach
might make some sense, it is surely acquisitive offenses like theft and fraud.
Unlike those who kill in a heat of passion, many thieves probably do make
calculations about the costs and benefits of their conduct. Yet Husak offers a
sophisticated argument showing why, even in the context of theft, the L&E
approach is deeply flawed. (P. 183.)
First, he argues that, if promoting efficiency were the sole aim of the criminal
law, it is hard to see why we would want to criminalize cases in which the thief
values the good stolen more than its owner. (Id.) On their face, such transactions
would seem to be efficient. For example, a poor person without other means of
transportation may well be able to make better use of a wealthy person's rarelydriven "backup" vehicle than the wealthy person himself. The transfer of such
property, even when involuntary, would seem to reflect a net social benefit. And
this is true even in situations that would not be recognized by the defense of
necessity or choice of evils.' 3 L&E scholars respond that such thefts are not in fact
10 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONouc ANALYSIS OF LAW 164 (1977).
11 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1126 (1972).
12 See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency ofMens Rea, 88 CAL. L. REv. 895 (2000).
13 The classic case involves D, a hiker, stranded in a snowstorm, hungry, cold, and without
food or shelter to sustain himself, who breaks into an empty ski lodge and consumes various canned
goods and uses firewood. Even if the hiker never reimburses the owner for his loss, there has still
been a net gain in terms of social utility. The ski lodge owner uses his property only when he is on
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efficient because of "secondary" costs, such as the costs of security and of
avoiding victimization.14 But Husak calls them at their bluff, pointing out that
such claims are nothing more than ipse dixit, an "article of faith." (P. 183.)
Second, Husak argues that the idea that the function of criminal law is to
protect markets is one that seems to apply only, or at least primarily, in capitalist
societies, and that the task of justifying the criminal law is "no less onerous when
economic activity is controlled by the state." (P. 184.) He points out the
peculiarity of supposing that "the basic principles of criminalization will differ
radically depending on the fundamentals of political economy." (Id.)
Finally, he takes issue with Posner's qualification of the L&E theory to the
effect that coercive transfers of wealth are inefficient only when they are "pure."
(Id.) According to Posner, a transfer of wealth is pure only when it is "not an
incident of a productive act."' 5 In response, Husak points out, quite rightly, that
plenty of lawful business activity involves transfers of wealth that are involuntary
from the standpoint of the losers, and that Posner never offers a satisfactory
account of how to distinguish such transfers from the illegal ones. (P. 184.)
Husak's critique of the L&E approach to criminal law seems to me a powerful
one. Clearly, any account that focuses single-mindedly on the goal of efficiency
will be inadequate to explain or justify the complexities of the criminal law.
However, the choice need not be between focusing exclusively on costs and
benefits (as the economists would have it) and ignoring them entirely (as
retributivists like Husak would do). Economic analysis, and particularly the idea
of punishment as a kicker, can at least provide a useful element in a hybrid theory
of criminal law, one which takes account not only of retributive aims, but of
deterrent ones as well.
V. THREE QUIBBLES
In an argument as sustained and complex as Husak's, there are bound to be
points with which a reader will want to quibble. I offer three such quibbles here.
First is Husak's claim that the "absence of a viable account of criminalization
constitutes the single most glaring failure of penal theory as it has developed on
both sides of the Atlantic." (P. 58.) While I agree with him that the rationale for
criminalization has often been neglected in the literature on criminal law theory,
particularly in comparison to the rationale for punishment, I am nevertheless
puzzled by his statement. What is arguably the single most significant work in
Anglo-American criminal law theory in the last half century-namely, Joel
vacation. He can easily replace the goods lost without any significant reduction in his standard of
living. The goods made it possible for D to prevent death or serious illness.
14 See Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and Benefits from Crime, 13 INT'L REV. OF
L. & ECON. 225 (1993); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J.224 (1967).
15 Posner, supra note 9, at 1196.
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Feinberg's Moral Limits of the Criminal Lawl 6-is

a work that focuses explicitly

on the criminalization question.
Husak is hardly unaware of Feinberg's
contribution; he cites Feinberg as much or more than any other scholar in the field
and explicitly acknowledges his debt to his methodology. (P. x.) So how can
Husak say that there exists no viable account of criminalization? Presumably,
Husak does not regard Feinberg's theory as a true theory of criminalization.

He

may be right, but he never really explains why this is so. In addition, he fails to
give sufficient attention to Jonathan 17Schonsheck's earlier full-length study of the
subject, entitled On Criminalization.

A second quibble is as follows: in his discussion of the amount of criminal
law on the books, Husak cites one "theorist" who estimates that there are

approximately 300,000 federal regulations enforceable through civil or criminal
sanctions.' 8 (P. 10 n.24.) Although there is some ambiguity about exactly what is
meant by federal "regulation," the estimate is by almost any measure baldly
overstated. Two more recent, systematic, and likely accurate estimates suggest
that the number of federal criminal offenses is somewhere in the neighborhood of
three or four thousand. 19
My final quibble involves Husak's discussion of my own work. Husak seeks
to show how his theory of internal constraints-requiring harm, wrongdoing, and
desert-would apply to the category of offenses known as mala prohibita. He
takes issue with my attempt to show that punishment may be deserved when
persons commit crimes of this type. (P. 117.) He focuses in particular on my
claim that tavern owners who violate a local ordinance that prohibits Sunday
alcohol sales act wrongfully because they obtain an unfair advantage over those
tavern owners who comply with the ordinance-and thereby cheat.20 Husak asks:

16 Feinberg's monumental effort comprises four volumes: HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 1;
OFFENSETOOTHERS (1985); HARMTO SELF (1986); and HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).
17 JONATHAN SCHONSHECK, ON CRIMINALIZATION: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1994).

18 The source of the estimate seems to have been as follows: A prominent white collar
criminal defense lawyer named Stanley Arkin made the estimate in remarks at a conference on white
collar crime held at George Mason University in October 1990. Arkin's estimate was reported in an
article by another practitioner who was present at the conference. See Thomas B. Leary, The
Commission's New Option That FavorsJudicialDiscretion in CorporateSentencing, 3 FED. SENT'G
REP. 142, 144 n.10 (1990). Leary's article, in turn, was referred to by Professor John Coffee, in his
oft-cited article, John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 216 n.94 (1991).
19 See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., THE FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR LAW & PUB. POL'Y STUD., MEASURING
THE ExPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION (2004), available at http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20070404_crimreportfinal.pdf; TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW, AM. BAR ASs'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (James A. Strazzella rptr., 1998).
20 Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalizationand
the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1589-90 (1997).
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[W]hy do their profits not simply represent the fruits of capitalistic
competition; what is the basis for describing the advantage gained by
those establishments that sell alcohol on Sunday as an "unfair" case of
"cheating"? Green's account may explain the wrongfulness of a few
offenses, such as paying subminimum wages to employees. But the
particular example of the malum prohibitum regulation he selects
probably has less to do with fair competition than with an attempt to
enforce religious morality. Persons who break this law are not free riders
who exploit a system of mutual forbearance by taking a privilege they
withhold from others who are similarly situated. Again, they would
allow (even though they would not prefer) all taverns to sell alcohol on
Sundays. (Pp. 117-18.)
I believe that Husak misunderstands my point. It is not that Sunday closing
laws are intended to ensure fair competition. My point is rather that one who fails
to comply with such laws, when his competitors do comply, primafacieengages in
unfair competition. From a moral perspective, the precise content of the rule is
essentially irrelevant, the way it is in football, which requires ten yards for a first
down. Ten yards may or may not be the rule that best furthers the underlying goals
of athletic prowess and spectator enjoyment, but it is the rule, and violating it (say,
by moving the ball after the whistle has blown) constitutes cheating. Provided that
the rule itself does not unfairly promote the interests of one individual or group
over others, 21 I see no problem in saying that violation of such a rule constitutes a
moral wrong.
VI. CONCLUSION

There is so much in this book that is smart and well-informed and reasonable
that one feels churlish to focus on the negative. Such, however, is the nature of
book reviews. I have focused on a number of points at which I believe Husak
loses his otherwise sure footing, particularly in his central case for constraining
criminalization. Such focus should not be understood as diminishing the
importance of his achievement.
Some scholars make their mark as counter-punchers, criticizing the views of
others and offering incremental changes to existing theory. Husak is as good as
anyone at critique. But this book offers much more. He has taken on as big and as
important a set of issues as there is in the philosophy of criminal law and has
developed a lucid, closely argued, and highly original theoretical approach to their
21 Admittedly, the violation of Sunday closing laws was probably not the best example of a
reasonable malum prohibitum offense. Imagine an industry in which the norm is staying open for
business six days a week. If one were an observant Jew or Seventh Day Adventist, and therefore
prohibited from working on Saturdays, one would, in fact, be unfairly disadvantaged by a law that

prohibited opening on Sundays since one would be able to compete only on the other five days of the
week.
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resolution. The book stands as a significant milestone in an already distinguished
career.
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Proportionality for High-Tech Searches
Peter P. Swire*
CHRISTOPHER

SLOBOGIN,

PRIVACY

AT RISK:

SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

(University of Chicago Press

2007).
Professor Christopher Slobogin of the Vanderbilt University Law School
shows his mastery of the Fourth Amendment in Privacy at Risk: The New
Government Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment.

Slobogin argues with

passion that we need a fundamental revision of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
He begins the book by saying: 'This book is about an insidious assault on our
freedom and the failure of the law to respond to it." (P. ix.) The assault comes
from a wave of new surveillance technologies and techniques. The failure comes
from a timid Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that is allowing these techniques to
spread with few limits from the courts.
Slobogin hopes to re-organize Fourth Amendment doctrine for hightechnology searches around the Proportionality Principle, which focuses on the
degree of intrusiveness of a government action. This book review first describes
Slobogin's main findings in areas such as physical searches of the home, physical
searches of persons when in public, and government access to records held by third
parties. It then underscores the importance of using the proportionality literature
for an emerging controversy: searches of laptop computers and other electronic
devices at the border without individualized suspicion. Finally, it focuses its
comments on two topics that Slobogin does not address but which are clearly
relevant to his project: the growing prominence of national security searches and
the well-developed literature on the Proportionality Principle and government
searches in other liberal democracies.
I. SLOBOGIN'S "PRIVACY AT RISK"

After a brief
The structure of Slobogin's book is straightforward.
centered on
framework,
introduction, Slobogin introduces his Fourth Amendment
the Proportionality Principle. He then examines three areas in detail: high-tech
searches of the home; camera surveillance of public spaces; and surveillance of
transactions through subpoenas and other means.
An implicit theme of the book is that there is a "new" government
surveillance based on emerging technologies: newly powerful sensors feed data to
* C. William O'Neill Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University.
My thanks to Joseph Buoni for fine research assistance.
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the government; the data is stored in newly powerful computers; and computers are
linked in newly powerful networks. These technological trends have occurred for
many years, but legal issues based on new technology arise in new profusion since
the widespread use of personal computers in the 1980s, the rise of the Internet in
the 1990s, and pervasive cameras and other sensors even more recently.
In response, Slobogin proposes a framework for Fourth Amendment law
premised first on the "Proportionality Principle." This principle "allows courts to
modulate the cause needed to carry out physical and transaction surveillance
depending on its intrusiveness." (P. 210.) This emphasis on intrusiveness is
perhaps the single organizing theme of the book, and I discuss it in more detail
below. Slobogin also supports what he calls the "exigency principle." This holds
that, "whenever there is time to do so, even surveillance authorized on less than
probable cause will be subject to ex ante review by someone not involved in the
search." (P. 210.)
A. Surveillance of PrivatePlaces

Slobogin examines modem physical searches of the home. In this realm,
Kyllo v. United States1 is generally considered the biggest recent victory for those
who support stronger Fourth Amendment protections. As readers of this journal
likely know, the Supreme Court in Kyllo concluded that the government could not
use thermal imagers to measure the warmth of a home without a probable cause
warrant. 2 Privacy advocates salute Kyllo because of its holding of constitutional
protections against a new, high-tech form of search.
Slobogin, though, "wonders whether Kyllo is a Pyrric victory." (P. 51.) He
persuasively analyzes a key loophole in Kyllo, which is that a warrant was needed
where the technology, such as a thermal imager, was not in "general public use."
Slobogin calls this the "Wal-Mart test"-"if the item is available at Wal-Mart, it is
likely to be affordable to and accessible by a large segment of the public." (P. 57.)
The problem, as Slobogin persuasively explains it, is that the cutting-edge
technology of one year is on the discount shelf at Wal-Mart the next (or perhaps a
couple of years after that). For instance, Wal-Mart sells night-vision binoculars
that purport to permit magnified night viewing "even in total darkness." (P. 57.)
Police that peer into a home using such binoculars quite possibly can do so without
a warrant, even after Kyllo.
In response, Slobogin argues that "the ubiquity of the enhancement device the
police use is irrelevant." (P. 73.) Similarly, "[slo is any inquiry into whether the
details observed through enhancement could have been viewed with the naked eye

2

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 41.
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from a lawful vantage point."3 (P. 73.) Instead, Slobogin deploys the
proportionality test, where validity of a search "would depend on the level of
justification and the level of intrusion." (P. 73.) In the alternative, Slobogin would
support legislation that would "ban nonconsensual, warrantless 'visual
surveillance' of 'private locations."' (P. 76.)
B. Surveillance ofPublicPlaces

After this discussion of surveillance of private locations, Slobogin's next two
chapters address surveillance of public places. Closed-circuit television ("CCTV")
cameras are already ubiquitous in the United Kingdom and may rapidly become so
in the United States. The surveillance threat from CCTV increases greatly as such
cameras become smaller, cheaper, more networked, equipped with zoom lenses,
backed by electronic video storage and search, and more intelligent (with face
recognition and other software enhancements).
For CCTV, the key precedent is United States v. Knotts, which found that "[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.",4 To
overcome Knotts, Slobogin must first explain why the Constitution applies to
public surveillance and then propose how judges could actually implement such
constitutional protections. For the first task, Slobogin helpfully explains the
variety of constitutional sources that could apply to CCTV surveillance. Slobogin
underscores what he calls the "right to public anonymity." (P. 90.) Pervasive
public surveillance can undermine freedom of speech and association, such as the
right to anonymous political speech in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,5 or
the privacy of membership lists in NAACP v. Alabama.6 The Due Process Clause
protects both the right to travel, such as in Kent v. Dulles,7 and the right to repose
and freedom from stalking, such as in state cases enjoining anti-abortion activists
from videotaping people entering and leaving an abortion clinic. (P. 103.) The
general right of privacy, traced to Griswold v. Connecticut,8 protects personhood
and what Jed Rubenfeld has argued is "the fundamental freedom not to have one's
life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state." 9 Slobogin
also develops survey evidence that pervasive CCTV surveillance is considered

3

This "lawful vantage point" idea is important because of cases that allow surveillance

without a warrant from low-flying aircraft, through a small hole in a wall or curtains, or through other
chinks in a house's armor. Id. at 73.
4 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
'

514 U.S. 334 (1995).

6 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
7

357 U.S. 116 (1958).

'

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

9

Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 753 2008-2009

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:751

highly intrusive and thus, a violation of what society actually considers a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
After assembling these arguments, Slobogin writes: "Surely if CCTV
implicates the First Amendment, the due process rights to movement and repose,
or the general right to privacy, it ought to implicate the Fourth Amendment as
well." (P. 106.) As Slobogin explains, however, the problem is that the Supreme
Court has adopted two linked doctrines: (1) the assumption-of-risk doctrine,
whereby individuals have assumed the risk of being surveilled when in public; and
(2) the public-exposure doctrine, whereby individuals have no right to privacy
when in public. (P. 108.) Slobogin responds with a call for doctrinal change:
"[W]hat is misguided is not the Court's insistence on privacy as the linchpin of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but its equation of Fourth Amendment privacy
with the assumption-of-risk and public-exposure concepts." (P. 108.) The key
doctrinal shift, in Slobogin's view, is to have "an analysis grounded on the Court's
alternative, and arguably more fundamental, admonition that the Fourth
Amendment's scope be defined according to expectations of privacy that 'society
is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."" (P. 108.)
I have long been sympathetic to courts' giving renewed emphasis to what
constitutes a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the light of changing
technology.10 For CCTV and other public surveillance, however, I have been
baffled by what role courts could usefully play. It has been difficult for me to
imagine that a magistrate should issue a warrant before a camera could view a
public street. More generally, it has been difficult for me to envision an
administrable approach that says when a law enforcement official is allowed to
take specific action to watch individuals who are in public. After all, the history of
legitimate police activity has included the "cop on the beat," keeping an eye out for
suspicious behavior."
Slobogin responds with a different and intriguing approach, with
constitutional scrutiny focused on the creation of the camera or other surveillance
system. Relying on his proportionality approach to the Fourth Amendment,
Slobogin argues that "courts should set minimal guidelines and monitor police
decisions to ensure that such surveillance is conducted in a reasonable manner."
(P. 118.) Slobogin favors a four-step set of requirements on law enforcement:
1.

Justify the need for the particular camera system;

2.
3.

Develop policies for how each camera system operates;
Develop policies for the storage of camera records and information
sharing with other entities;

1o See Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead,Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904 (2004).
11 For a discussion of how the "cop on the beat" shifts for enforcement in cyberspace, see
Peter P. Swire, No Cop on the Beat: Underenforcement in E-Commerce and Cybercrime, J.
TEIcOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2008).
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Assure accountability to entities outside of law enforcement to
comply with the first three requirements.

In my view, these four steps are entirely sensible as a matter of policy.
Indeed, the steps closely track the Privacy Impact Assessments that the federal
government began to use widely for new computer systems when I worked in the
Clinton Administration, 2 and which were required in federal law by the EGovernment Act of 2002.13 In addition, Slobogin's attention to information
sharing is similar to my support for a "due diligence" process for government
information-sharing programs. 14
Slobogin would go beyond these federal requirements in three ways, however.
First, the requirements would apply to camera systems, which do not always
qualify as the "computer systems" covered by the E-Government Act. Second, he
would apply the four steps to state and local camera systems. Although somei
states have begun to do Privacy Impact Assessments for state computer systems, 1
most state and local camera systems are installed without such a process. Third,
and perhaps most importantly, Slobogin would require these procedures as a matter
of constitutional law rather than public policy. This position seems to admit that
public surveillance does not lend itself to the traditional authorization for
surveillance of each individual (such as a stop-and-frisk under Terry v. Ohio16) or
of each place (such as a search warrant for a home). Instead, Slobogin essentially
advocates that the Fourth Amendment apply to surveillance systems, with a
rational bureaucratic process to ensure that the intrusiveness of the systems is
matched with proportionate procedural protections. In my view, it is an intriguing
thought that Privacy Impact Assessments could be required constitutionally, but
that doctrinal shift is quite possibly larger than any United States court in the near
future would undertake.

12 The use of Privacy Impact Assessments for new computer systems became a best practice
for federal agencies.
13 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002); see also E-Gov:
Powering

America's

Future

with

Technology,

available

at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/index.htm.
14 See Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L.

REv. 951 (2006).
15 In 2008, for instance, Ohio enacted H.B 46, requiring privacy impact assessments. See
127 t '
General
Assembly
of
the
State
of
Ohio,
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=127_HB-46; see also R. STEvE EDMONDSON, OHIO
OFF.
INFO.
TECH.,
PRIVACY
IMPACT
ASSESSMENTS
(2008),
http://www.oit.ohio.gov/IGD/policy/pdfs-bulletins/ITB-2008.02.pdf
requirements).
16 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

(implementing
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C. Surveillance ofPrivateRecords

Slobogin next turns to the growing surveillance of private records, observing
that "subpoenas and their progeny are far more important than physical searches of
homes, businesses, and effects." (P. 141.) His basic point is simple to state but
complex to put into practice: "Not all recorded information warrants maximum
protection from government intrusion. But much of it deserves far better
protection than it receives today." (P. 169.)
Slobogin goes into some detail on the history of subpoenas. In Boyd v. United
States,17 the Supreme Court held under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments that
a subpoena could not compel an individual to turn over private papers.' 8 The Fifth
Amendment protections against self-incrimination were mostly stripped away late
in the twentieth century, in cases involving, for example, tax accountant records.' 9
The Fourth Amendment protections were stripped away under the so-called "thirdparty doctrine," which provides that a third party that holds an individual's records
can provide those records to the government.
Along with many other
commentators, Slobogin criticizes third-party doctrine cases, such as United States
v. Miller, where the Court found no Fourth Amendment protections for financial
information voluntarily conveyed by a bank depositor to a bank. Slobogin is fullthroated in his criticism: "[T]he Court simply defies reality when it says that one
voluntarily surrenders information to doctors, banks, schools, and phone and
Internet providers." (P. 156.) Even if one accepts the "voluntary" nature of having
those records available to a third party, "the Miller Court's second key assertionthat one thereby assumes the risk that the third party will convey it to the
government-is pure judicial fiat." (P. 157.)
Slobogin's doctrinal answer is to emphasize the distinction between
government access to corporate as opposed to personal records. He agrees with
William Stuntz that ready government access to corporate records is needed in
order to administer many health, safety, and economic regulatory regimes.
Slobogin emphasizes the importance, however, of respecting the autonomy of an
individual acting in a personal capacity and the importance of using the Fourth
Amendment to respect that autonomy. In my view, such a distinction between
commercial and individual activity is far from easy to apply, as discussed in my
own writing about how current information technology is blurring the distinction
between "consumers" and "producers" in consumer protection law. 21 It may be
quite difficult, for instance, to determine when someone selling on eBay is acting
"commercially," with easier government access to records, as opposed to "in an
17 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
18

Id. at 638.

19 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
20

425 U.S 435 (1976).

21 See Peter P. Swire, Consumers as Producers (May 26, 2008) (Social Science Research
Network, Working Paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1137486.
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individual or household capacity," analogous to an old-fashioned yard sale. With
that said, however, Slobogin's approach has the distinct advantage of allowing the
continuation of health, safety, and other desirable regulations while also protecting
individuals' sensitive personal records that are increasingly held outside of the
home.
To implement this constitutional doctrine, Slobogin provides a detailed
proposal that would essentially create constitutional rules for what today is covered
by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. To simplify considerably,
Slobogin's approach would very roughly track the categories under current
statutory law but would be a notch or two stricter in many instances before the
government could get access to transactional data. (P. 186.) When it comes to
what he calls "envelope information"-the information about who sent or received
a communication-Slobogin says he is convinced by empirical data and critiques
of his earlier work that the rules should be stricter than he previously advocated.
(P. 189.) Slobogin also proposes detailed, and somewhat complex, rules for data
mining.
II. ASSESSING THE BOOK: THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE AND OTHER
ASPECTS

In my view, Slobogin's book largely succeeds in what it sets out to do. The
book shows the author's mastery of Fourth Amendment doctrine. It is thoroughly
researched and well-written, and the analysis of cases and doctrines merits the
reader's confidence. I particularly like Slobogin's use of empirical surveys to
inform a court's view of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." In that respect, it
may be useful to draw on the history of survey evidence used in trademark
litigation. In the Lanham Act and other trademark cases, the courts have often
relied on consumer surveys to address issues such as whether there is a "likelihood
of confusion" between two products.22 Survey evidence in both settings can help
the legal system reach a better-informed decision about the relevant facts-the
views of typical or reasonable individuals in society.
In my comments on the book, I first agree with the urgency of shifting to a
proportionality approach, using the current example of border searches of laptops.
I then argue that Slobogin's account would be ultimately more compelling if it
were located in two crucial contexts-national security searches and the large
international law literature on the Proportionality Principle.

22
See, e.g., Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Consumer Survey in
Litigation Under Trademark Opposition, TrademarkInfringement, and False Designationof Origin
Provisions of Lanham Act (15 US.C. §§ 1063, 1114, and 1125), 98 A.L.R. FED. 20 (1990);
RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETmON § 23 (1995).
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A. The Urgency of the ProportionalityTestfor BorderLaptop Searches

The usefulness of the Proportionality Principle is effectively illustrated by a
category of search that became much more prominent in 2008-border searches by
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of laptops and other electronic devices such
as Blackberries. This issue has come into sharp focus since the April 2008
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in US. v. Arnold.23 That panel
clearly ruled that CBP can seize a laptop computer at the border and examine its
contents without any reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. 24
Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not provide a
witness for the first congressional hearing on this issue, in June 2008, DHS
subsequently articulated arguments about why it believes such suspicionless
searches are appropriate. The basic argument is that the federal government has
long had plenary power to do suspicionless searches at the border, so there is
nothing new about searching laptops as well. The Department said: "Making full
use of our search authorities with respect to items like notebooks and backpacks,
while failing to do so with respect to laptops and other devices, would ensure that
terrorists and criminals receive less scrutiny
' 25 at our borders just as their use of
technology is becoming more sophisticated.
There are many reasons for objecting, as a matter of law and policy, to
suspicionless border searches of laptops. I have testified in Congress about a
number of such reasons. In essence, though, the point is that searches of laptop
computers are more intrusive than traditional physical searches at the border, even
the occasional decision by a border agent to copy a few pages from a journal.
Consider four reasons, among others one could develop, about why laptop searches
are more intrusive. First, laptop searches last longer. The search of a backpack is
complete when the traveler leaves the border. For a typical laptop, the government
can make a copy of the hard drive and then search every file at its leisure. Second,
the scale of laptop searches is far greater. A border agent might read a page or a
few pages in a physical search. The typical laptop today has eighty gigabytes of
storage-many orders of magnitude more intrusive. Third, a laptop search is like
searching your home in terms of what is likely contained within. Laptops today
often contain family photos, medical records, finances, personal diaries, and all the
other detailed records of our personal lives. Fourth, laptops quite often contain
confidential and privileged information, including journalists' notes about an
investigative story, trade secrets and other key business information, and much
more.
Lawyers' laptops quite possibly contain attorney-client privileged

23

523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008).

24

Id. at 948.

2 Jayson Ahern, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Answering
Questions
on
Border
Laptop
Searches
(Aug.
5,
2008),

http://www.dhs.gov/journaalAeadership/2008/08/answering-questions-on-border-laptop.htm].
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information, all revealed to the government when the border search results in the
copying of the hard drive.
Using traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court of Appeals in Arnold
found the case to be an easy win for the government-there is a traditional border
search power, and so the government need not justify its search of a laptop
computer. The court found unpersuasive the analogy to intrusive physical searches
such as body cavity searches, where the26 Fourth Amendment does require at least
reasonable suspicion even at the border.
By contrast, a Fourth Amendment oriented around the Proportionality
Principle would have given advocates and the court far more room to make factual
arguments about the intrusiveness of a laptop search compared with the traditional
suitcase or backpack search at the border. A Fourth Amendment that insisted on
Slobogin's Exigency Principle also would have insisted that the Department of
Homeland Security have effective policies in place in advance, before carrying out
these sorts of intrusive searches. In short, the border laptop setting illustrates the
usefulness of Slobogin's approach.
B. The Incompleteness ofa Fourth Amendment Approach

Slobogin's book takes on the large task of proposing a new, integrated
approach to Fourth Amendment law for high-technology searches. It may seem a
bit unfair to critique such an effort for being too narrow in scope. Nonetheless, the
task of the book is too narrow in two key respects.
First, Slobogin's discussion of criminal procedure law does not address the
intersection with the growing phenomenon of national security searches and
seizures. For wiretaps, a majority of wiretap orders occur under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) rather than under law enforcement
authorities.27 The update of FISA enacted in 2008 will continue that trend toward
widespread use of national security authorities. 28 National Security Letters (NSL)
are used by the government to get telephone, banking, and other records without
need for recourse to a judge. Although the Justice Department said as recently as
2004 that NSLs had been used only "scores" of times, evidence came to light that
instead they have been used at a rate of over thirty-thousand times per year since
September 11.29
Significant discussion of technology and civil liberties
increasingly requires a discussion of both law enforcement rules, which Slobogin
26 Arnold, 523 F.3d at 945-46.

27 Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1306, 1308 (2004).

28 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
29 Responding to the Inspector General's Findings of Improper Use of National Security

Letters by the FBI: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Judiciary Comm.,
110th

Cong.

(2007)

(testimony

of

Peter

P.

Swire),

http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2679&witid=6286.
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discusses, and national security rules, which he does not. Going forward, we will
need an integration of law enforcement and national security authorities to come to
any meaningful conclusions about the state of civil liberties in an era of evolving
technologies.
Second, for this reader, there was a striking omission from the book.
Slobogin's single biggest emphasis in the book is on the importance of the
Proportionality Principle. He would like that to become the fundamental principle
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As discussed above, he provides intricate
doctrinal recommendations for how that principle could apply to physical searches,
public activities, and surveillance of private records. Slobogin fails, however, to
integrate his project into the rich international literature on the Proportionality
Principle. Vicki Jackson has written recently on the pervasiveness of the
Proportionality Principle:
[I]n Canada, Germany, the European Court of Human Rights, India,
Ireland, South Africa, and on occasion even in the United States, courts
or tribunals invoke the basic concept of proportionality not only to
review the propriety of sanctions, but also to measure the legality of a
wide range of government conduct through some form of means-ends
analyses. In a number of countries, proportionality analysis is treated as
a general principle of public law, applicable not only to constitutional
law, but also to administrative and even to international law questions.3 °
In reviewing a book on the principle by Canadian David Beatty, 31 Jackson
summarizes how it applies: "[A] distinguishing feature of proportionality analysis
is its eschewal of doctrinal sub-categories, its commitment to returning to
foundational questions of constitutional purpose in structuring analyses of
come
challenges to government action, and its requirement that the government
32
forward with justifications for statutes that infringe on protected rights."
This summary of the Proportionality Principle closely matches the way that
Slobogin would approach issues such as CCTV surveillance: (i) eschewal of
doctrinal sub-categories (Slobogin would apply Fourth Amendment protections to
"public" actions); (ii) returning to foundational questions of constitutional purpose
(Slobogin articulates constitutional values that justify protection of "public"
actions); and (iii) a requirement that the government come forward with
justifications for its actions (Slobogin would require the government to articulate
policies in advance, and have review in general by judges or others who did not
propose the surveillance).

30 Vicki C. Jackson, Being ProportionalAbout Proportionality,21 CONST. COMMENT. 803,
804 (2004) (book review).
31 DAVIDM. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004).

32 Jackson, supra note 30, at 804.
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The European Union applies the Proportionality Principle to the range of
issues covered by Slobogin's book. Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights provides:
1.
2.

Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.3 3

In the past decade, the European Court of Human Rights has upheld personal
rights under this Article for areas including CCTV,34 telephone interception,35 and
secret government files.36 It has also provided guidance on how much "law" must
be provided in advance to make government surveillance lawful.37
In a new article, UK Professors Ian Brown and Douwe Korff emphasize that
the European Court of Justice has accepted data protection as a fundamental,
constitutional issue that should be applied in accordance with the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights.38 They summarize the emerging European
jurisprudence, founded on the Proportionality Principle, that applies to government
access to personal data.
[The courts] require a legal basis for any collection, storage, use,
analysis, disclosure/sharing of personal data for law enforcement and
anti-terrorist purposes-but a vague, broad general statutory basis is not
sufficient. Such processing must be based on specific legal rules relating
to the particular kind of processing operation in question. These rules
must be binding, and they must lay down appropriate limits on the
statutory powers such as a precise description of "the kind of information
that may be recorded," "the categories of people against whom
surveillance measures such as gathering and keeping information may be
33 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
8, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S. 005.
34 Peck v. United Kingdom, 2003-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 126.
35 Amann v. Switzerland [GC], 2000-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 247, 248.
36 Rotaru v. Romania [GC], 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 111, 112.
37 Copland v. United Kingdom, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
38 Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Terrorism and the Proportionalityof Internet Surveillance,
EuR. J. CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1261194.
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taken" and the circumstances in which such measures may be taken.
Legislation must include a clearly set out procedure to be followed for
the authorisation of such measures, limits on the storage of old
information and on the time for which new information can be retained.
It must also include explicit, detailed provision concerning the grounds
on which files can be opened, the procedure to be followed for opening
or accessing the files, the persons authorised to consult the files, the
nature of the files and the use that may be made of the information in the
files. Such rules can be set out in subsidiary rules or regulations-but in
order to qualify as "law" in Convention terms, they must be published.39
This summary gives a sense of modem jurisprudence for government
surveillance in the democracies of Europe.
The next question is what, if anything, we in the United States should learn
from the extensive jurisprudence outside of the United States about the
Proportionality Principle. Vicki Jackson has argued in the Harvard Law Review
for what she calls "engagement" with foreign constitutional sources of law: "[Tihe
constitution's interpreters do not treat foreign or international material as binding,
do they put on blinders that
or as presumptively to be followed. But neither
40
exclude foreign legal sources and experience."
European
I find this engagement approach to be entirely sensible.
same
law
the
of
many
face
citizens
and
courts,
governments, regulators,
recent
The
States.
United
the
as
issues
security
national
and
enforcement
European decisions apply constitutional principles to precisely the sorts of issues
that Slobogin analyzes and that we are facing in this country-CCTV, telephone
wiretaps, and sensitive personal records held in databases. Where the Europeans
create legal protections, and those structures appear stable and workable, then
arguments from law enforcement that they are unworkable become less persuasive.
A useful analogy is how other courts looked to opinions by Judge Cardozo
and other out-of-state judges during the common-law heyday of torts and contracts
in the U.S. No one considered out-of-state decisions to be binding or hierarchical
authority. Nonetheless, such decisions could readily be persuasive authority-a
source that a responsible judge should consult for insights into facts and legal
reasoning. When Slobogin omits reference to the large literature on the
Proportionality Principle, he foregoes a major persuasive argument for his
proposed reworking of the Fourth Amendment. Many of his proposed solutions
have persuasive precedents in the law of other democratic legal systems. An

'9 Id. at 8.
40 Vicki C. Jackson, ConstitutionalComparisons:Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119
HARV. L. REV. 109, 114 (2005).
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informed consideration of the Proportionality Principle should examine those
precedents. 4 '
ImI. CONCLUSION

Christopher Slobogin has done a large public service by reconceptualizing
how the Fourth Amendment should apply to high-technology searches. The
emerging problems with searches of laptops at the border further exemplify the
reasons to support the Proportionality Principle at the level of either constitutional
or statutory law, where greater intrusiveness of government action leads to greater
safeguards. The next challenge is how to integrate this impressive theory of the
Fourth Amendment into the broader international debates about the Proportionality
Principle, as well as to seek to unify our understanding of how legal protections
should apply both to Fourth Amendment searches, covered in this book, and
national security searches, which are not.

41 One objection to learning from Europe on this issue is less persuasive than it might appear
at first glance. The objection would be that Europe simply imposes stricter privacy rules than the
United States, as shown by the E.U. Data Protection Directive that went into effect in 1998. This
stricter privacy regulation has indeed long been true with respect to data held by the private sector, as
I have written about at length. See PETER P. SwIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BusINESS:
WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DmECrIVE (1998).

The

common wisdom, however, has been that it is the United States that has a stronger libertarian view
when it comes to surveillance by the government. The Europeans, by contrast, have often allowed
the government greater scope to gather personal data for use in the social-welfare states of Western
Europe. When it comes to issues relevant to the Fourth Amendment, then, the baseline assumption
has been that the United States historically has been stricter in important respects than Europe. It is
thus an especially acute criticism of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence if individual rights
protections in the U.S. fall significantly below those in Europe. This is not an instance of a
generalized European preference for privacy regulation; instead, comparison with current European
constitutional law shows a lack of protections under the Fourth Amendment compared with nations
that historically have often been less protective than the U.S. of individual rights in this sphere.
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Search and Seizure History as Conversation:
A Reply to Bruce P. Smith
Andrew E. Taslitz*
I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent review of my book, Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment: A
History of Search and Seizure, 1789-1868,' in the pages of this journal, Professor
Bruce P. Smith said, 'This is an ambitious, provocative, empathetic, and
prodigiously researched book.",2 He also described it as "strange" in a good way,
drawing a parallel between the history recounted by C. Van Woodward in his
seminal book, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, in which Woodward recounted
obscure historical events leading to the reign of Jim Crow, while I addressed
"themes in the history of criminal procedure that have long escaped attention."3
I thank Professor Smith for these words because, as an author, I was pleased
to read them and hope that they might convince potential readers of my book to see
it as a worthwhile project, whatever its flaws. The bulk of Professor Smith's
review was, however, far more critical of my effort. I have no interest in writing a
detailed, heavily-footnoted response to those criticisms (though I will not footnote
every proposition, I will offer some meaty footnotes for controversial points or
where I believe it enhances the argument). In any event, several other reviewers of
my book have a very different take on it than does Professor Smith, and I do not
want to re-plough the ground that they have worked-though I hope interested
readers of this essay will take a look at their reviews for some startlingly different
perspectives from Smith's. 4 Instead, I want to concisely clarify a small number of
* Welsh S. White Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School
of Law; Professor, Howard University School of Law; former Assistant District Attorney,
Philadelphia, PA.; B.A., Queens College, 1978; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1981.
The author thanks his research assistant, Natasha Williams, for her able assistance in completing this
essay, and the Howard University School of Law for its financial support of this project.
1 ANDREW E. TASLrrz, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 (2006).
2 Bruce P. Smith, The Fourth Amendment, 1789-1868: A Strange History, 5 OHIO ST. J.
ClM. L. 663, 678 (2008).
3 Id. at 678 (citing C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955)).
4 See, e.g., Deborah Dennison, Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 647,
658 (2007) (book review) ("Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment is well researched, lucid,
articulate, and also a novel approach to the subject. While both parts of the book might exist
independently, Taslitz expertly ties them together and in so doing conveys the brilliance and
importance of this fundamental constitutional right."); Daniel W. Hamilton, Reconstructing the
FourthAmendment: A History of Search and Seizure, 1789-1868, 94 J. AM. HIST. 1236 (2008) (book
review) ("Andrew E.Taslitz... has written a careful and nuanced account," a "bracing contribution
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matters that I see as underlying my dispute with Professor Smith. Furthermore, I
bother writing at all primarily in the hope of advancing dialogue on the subject.
For those readers who have not read my book, I first offer a micro-synopsis.
The bulk of the book is devoted to detailing the too oft-ignored history of searchand-seizure practices during the nineteenth century struggle over slavery. These
practices were aimed not only at subordinating slaves themselves, but also at
silencing and intimidating their white supporters. At various times, this struggle
over search-and-seizure practices was waged in such elite fora as judicial opinions
and congressional and political debates. But the struggle was also embodied in the
day-to-day lives of the slaves, abolitionists, anti-tyrannical Northern whites, whites
unfriendly to nationwide emancipation, and the slave masters themselves. The
struggle came to be understood as one about the very meaning of the American
republic, and this tug-of-war continued through Reconstruction, altering
understandings of constitutional search-and-seizure principles in important ways.
My principal legal argument (as opposed to historical argument) is that the
Fourteenth Amendment is best read as applying these revised understandings of
search-and-seizure to the states as a matter of constitutionallaw. One way (but not
the only way5) to capture this application is to view the Fourteenth Amendment as
incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states, in effect creating a
"Reconstructed Fourth Amendment." To better envision the historical continuities
and discontinuities involved in this act of reconstruction, my book begins with a
brief chapter on the events leading up to the "Original Fourth Amendment,"
to the somewhat dormant field of constitutional history ... that will be of interest to any historian of
the Constitution. The book's main accomplishment is that it combines contemporary and historical
arguments without slighting either, while providing important new evidence and insight into each.");
Krystal E. Noga, Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment: A History of Search and Seizure, 17891868, 33 CRIM. JUST. REv. 421 (2008) (book review).
Taslitz takes his reader on an extremely well written and brilliantly thorough trip back in
time to revisit some of the most stimulating, yet disturbing, times in American history.
No history of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore search and seizure, would be
complete without reliving the struggles of the early Americans against the tyranny of the
British Crown, the horrors of slavery, and the great effort of the Reconstruction. What
unfolds is a highly intellectual discussion that reminds us that the Fourth Amendment is
one of the few constitutional provisions enacted to protect the political rights of "the
People," read to mean one cohesive and integrated group.
Id. at 422. See also Priscilla H. M. Zotti, Reconstructing the FourthAmendment: A History of Search
and Seizure, 1789-1868 (2007), 17 LAW & POL. BOOK REv. 282, 282, 285 (2007) ("Taslitz's
contribution is to make the history of the Fourth Amendment even richer by meticulously accounting
the use of search and seizure practices to support slavery and racial discrimination"; "I found
Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment insightful in its approach to the Fourth Amendment, not only
in terms of the law itself, but what is searched and seized, who particularly is subject to search and
seizure, and what abuses led to broadening, thus capturing the full rich detail of the Fourth
Amendment.").
5 See TASLrrZ, supra note 1, at 284 n.40 (exploring an alternative understanding, and
explaining the book's relevance even to those thinkers who reject the idea of the incorporation of
most of the Bill of Rights against the states in favor of a more expansive freestanding Fourteenth
Amendment due process approach to constitutional search-and-seizure issues).
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ratified in 1791. In doing so, I tell a familiar story but emphasize under-weighted
aspects of that history, such as concerns about freedom of movement rather than
only privacy, the role of Lockean thought in search-and-seizure principles, the fear
of humiliation at the hands of the state, and the link between theories of political
representation and search-and-seizure practices. In particular, I emphasize the
communicativefunction of those practices, the ways in which they send messages
about, and thereby affect, the distribution of power in society.
Here, as in later chapters, I view the relevance of history to law as a
conversation-sometimes in deed, other times in word-between elites and
ordinary people. Although the work is primarily one of history, I briefly draw
admittedly contestable "lessons" from that history to illustrate how it potentially
plays a role in altering a variety of modem Fourth Amendment rules, principles,
and constitutional methodologies. But the lessons are drawn not to articulate a
thorough set of Fourth Amendment rules for modem times, nor to craft yet another6
comprehensive "foundational" theory of constitutional interpretation in this area.
Rather, the lessons seek to spark debate about the modem legal relevance of
devoting greater attention to nineteenth century history in crafting modem
constitutional search-and-seizure doctrine.
Along the way, the book seeks to savage the view of the Fourth Amendment
as a mere technicality, suggesting instead that it is as important to individual and
collective freedom and to the American identity as provisions more widely
recognized as doing so, such as First Amendment protections of speech, press,
assembly, and religion. Indeed, I argue, the First and Fourth Amendments are best
understood as closely linked.
Professor Smith's critiques come down to a few major points: first, that my
purported policy prescriptions in my ten "lessons" are not dictated by the history
that I recount and are, in any event, vague and impractical; second, that the first
part of my book, which covers what I describe as the "original Fourth
Amendment," is itself unoriginal; and third, that I have not addressed the rise of
professional policing during the eighteenth century nor addressed the judiciary's
doctrinal treatment of the Fourth Amendment post-1868. I see much (though not
all) of the substance of Professor Smith's criticisms as turning on disagreements
between us on the role of history in constitutional interpretation. Some aspects of
Smith's critique also respond to claims that he insists that I made that I, at least,
never intended to, so I will try to clarify my position on those points further in the
pages to come.
Following this Introduction, Part H of this essay examines the role of history
in the constitutional law of search-and-seizure. Specifically, Part IIA begins by
defining what I mean by historical "lessons" and correcting Smith's too facile
6

See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE

MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002) (debunking the value of foundational
theories seeking to use a single overriding principle to explain all constitutional interpretation, and
instead favoring the multi-faceted, flexible approach of common law evolution).
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attacks on the usefulness to legal decisionmakers of any one lesson. I explain that
the right lesson or combination of lessons can be chosen effectively in
commonsense fashion in a way that amplifies their usefulness well beyond what
Smith's approach of isolating one-lesson-at-a-time would suggest. Part HA next
explains why lessons are not rules (and why it's a good thing too); do not suffer
from ad hoc reasoning; speak to legislatures as well as courts; and contain a
"romantic" element infusing concerns about human emotion, motivations, and
aspirations that are both practically useful and more likely to inspire political
action than the dry, technical images of a mechanistic constitutional law. A
consistent theme of Part H1A is that constitutional interpretation must be understood
in part as a conversation among the living and with the dead about how we should
best constitute ourselves as a People today.
Part UB defends the idea that history's lessons for moderd !law can best be
learned through the prism of history itself as a past conversation between legal
elites and ordinary Americans. Listening to that conversation requires heeding the
words and deeds of both groups and of relevant sub-groups and seeing how they
interact. To seek less of history is to leave it interesting but of little practical value
to the modem lawyer or lay citizen. To seek more of history is to give it a clarity
that contradicts its complexity, exceeds human abilities, and gives to history a
controlling force that it cannot and should not hold. Any legal history, my own
included, ultimately serves modest goals, being but a single brick in a
constitutional wall.8
While Part 11A therefore focuses on modem conversations-which are partly
about the past-Part IB focuses on ancient conversations as the usablepast. Part
HB next explains how such an understanding of history can improve constitutional
talk today, thus returning to and elaborating upon Part IIA's model of modern
constitutional conversation.
Part II in its entirety, therefore, articulates a
conversational approach to constitutional interpretation generally and to Fourth
Amendment interpretation specifically.
Part UC offers brief musings on the best "tone" for engaging in academic
debate, with Part IH offering some concluding thoughts.

7

See id. at 152-68 (summarizing dangers of any foundationalist theory); ALAN M.

DERSHOWrIZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?: COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND THE FIFrH

AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11, at 55-65, 86, 101-02 (2008) (focusing on critiquing originalism and other
formalist uses of history in constitutional interpretation).
8 See DERSHOWrTZ, supra note 7, at 55 ("The object of any historical inquiry must therefore
be modest: to convey a sense of how the relevant issues were understood, considered, addressed, and
rationalized during the [relevant] period of time .... ").
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II. THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A. What Does It Mean to Say That the Law Can Learn "Lessons"From History?

1. Defining Historical "Lessons"
I start with a preliminary observation. Counting endnotes, approximately
forty-five pages of my 342-page text concern potential modem implications or
"lessons" of the history that constitutes the bulk of the book. Yet a critique of
several of those lessons seems to be the primary thrust of Professor Smith's
review. As I explained in the introduction to my book's final chapter, however,
"[m]y main task in this book has been to tell a story, a historical narrative that
helps us to ask new questions about the Fourth Amendment's meaning or to see
old questions in a new light." 9 My lessons were meant "to start a new way of
thinking, not to end it, to prompt future conversations rather than to halt past
ones." 0 In short, the lessons were meant to be illustrations, subject to debate, to
show why paying attention to the nineteenth century's history of disputes over
search-and-seizure issues can matter today. Yes, I have tried to defend some of
these lessons in greater detail elsewhere but based primarily on grounds other than
history, for I do not and did not claim that history offers the sole support for these
lessons (converging evidence from many sources, including social science and
philosophy, offer additional support)," nor do I claim that these lessons necessarily
alone dictate any specific modem policy prescriptions. But they can, I maintain,
lead us to see modern issues in a way we may not before have adequately
considered. Explaining and illustrating why this can be so is the task to which I
now turn.

9

TASLrrZ, supra note 1,at 258.

10 Id.; see also Zotti, supra note 4, at 285 (recognizing the role of my lessons as prompting
"ongoing conversation," an approach that political scientist Zotti concluded had "left [her] thinking
about the book long after ...complet[ing] it.").
11 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15 (2003) (explaining what I see as among the most important functions of history in
constitutional reasoning); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the FourthAmendment: Data with
the Power to Inspire PoliticalAction, 66 LAw & CONTEMw. PROBS. 221 (2003) [hereinafter Taslitz,

Racial Auditors] (illustrating the role of social science in constitutional argumentation); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2257, 2281 (2002) (explaining the importance of converging sources of data in Fourth
Amendment analysis). Smith notes that my book "echo[es] themes advanced in a series of earlier
" Smith, supra note 2, at 664. He is right. I want to be clear, however, first,
scholarly articles ....
that I defended those themes in articles relying primarily on data sources other than history and,
second, that, although I draw on the earlier pieces for small portions of the book, the vast bulk of the
book's material-especially the history I recount-is entirely new and not derivative of earlier works.
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2. The Usefulness of Even "Vague" Historical Lessons
i. Even Broad Lessons Can Help to Resolve Some Difficult Problems
Professor Smith is right to describe many of my lessons as vague, at least if
that term is taken to mean that they are recited at a high level of generality. I do
not see doing so as either illegitimate or unhelpful. In the vast majority of modem
cases, history simply does not, and it certainly should not, alone determine the
12
meaning of the Constitution for reasons well-explored by other scholars.
"Originalists" of some stripes, whether focusing on original "intent" or original
"meaning," would sharly disagree with this last statement, but it is the starting
point for my analysis.1 Some originalists, on the other hand, take an approach
somewhat similar to my own, choosing to describe "intentions" or "meaning" at a
higher level of generality.1 4 But that approach, too, makes assumptions about the
controlling hand of the past that I reject.
I see studying the past as an important tool for understanding human nature
and for making sense of the American experience. It is a way, as constitutional
scholar Robin West puts it, of helping us to decide today how we, as a people,
should "constitute" ourselves.' 5 History matters, therefore, in important part, in
crafting a modem narrative, and all narratives proceed over time, linking the living
to the dead. 16 Professor Jed Rubenfeld has been among the ablest defenders of this
narrative function of history in constitutional interpretation, taking seriously the
idea that only crafting such a narrative can make sense of the idea of there being an
American "people."' 17 Professor David A. Richards makes a somewhat similar
point, explaining the relevance of history to the constitutional enterprise this way:

12 See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 10-28 (summarizing the critique of
originalism by numerous scholars and including their own critique); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth
Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1739 (2000) (critiquing the Court's "new"
originalism as applied in the Fourth Amendment context).
13 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 10-28 (summarizing the arguments originalists
raise in their own defense).
14 See ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME: How JuDGEs AND LAWYERS
MAKE THE

LAW 46-77 (2008) (debunking reliance on framers' intent by noting the various levels of generality
at which such intent can be described).
15 See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIvE CONSTITUIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT 1-40, 192-98 (1994) (arguing that history matters to help inform us of how we shall
constitute ourselves as a people today).
16 See Taslitz, Respect and the FourthAmendment, supra note 11, at 70-72.
17 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL

SELF-

GOVERNMENT 148-59 (2001). For Rubenfeld, constitutionalism in a democracy consists of a
people's struggle over time to craft and live out its most fundamental, enduring commitments, even if
they are contrary to the popular will at a given moment in time. See id. at 183-84.
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American constitutionalism should be understood in terms of historically
evolving interpretive practices that aspire to narrative integrity in telling
the constitutional story of a people's self-consciously historical struggle
to achieve a politically legitimate government that would guarantee
persons their equal human rights. Constitutional interpretation must
make use of historical argument constructively to articulate the thread of
legal texts, principles, and institutions that constitute over time the
struggle for a political community in the genre of American
revolutionary constitutionalism. Such interpretation must use the best
available political theory of human rights to make contextual sense8 of the
project.'
ultimate rights-based normative ends of the constitutional
I do not claim that this is the only way to use history in constitutional
reasoning, but I do claim that it is most often necessary to resolve the truly difficult
modem disputes about constitutional meaning and, in any event, it is the way I
meant to use history to craft the lessons recited in my book. Does this mean that
these lessons, if accepted, can provide a comprehensive framework for resolving
all modem Fourth Amendment doctrinal questions? Of course not, and I would be
skeptical of any effort by anyone to do so. 19
18 DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW
OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 17 (1993).

Accuracy in the recounting of history should, of

course, to the extent that is humanly possible, be an essential part of this project, however difficult a
goal it may be to achieve. Certain events either happened or they did not, and their meaning to actors
at the time must be based upon a careful evaluation of the evidence. See Taslitz, Respect and the
Fourth Amendment, supra note 11, at 71 n.326. But the lessons that we draw from that history for
modern constitutional law are unavoidably normative ones, and the most important of such lessons
must proceed at a high level of generality precisely because they aim to articulate the fundamental
principles that should constitute the American people as who they are. It is arguably for this reason
that the constitutional text itself is so often abstract, speaking of' "equal protection" or "unreasonable
search and seizure" without more precise definition. For similar reasons, constitutional scholars so
often speak in terms of "community," "justice," "inclusion," "tyranny," and other broad, emotionallycharged, contestable, yet essential terms. The judiciary also struggles to give meaning to such terms,
turning partly to history to do so, but rarely relying solely on history, and facing the interpretative
task of giving that history meaning for us today, no matter what some judges or justices may claim to
be doing. See supra Part I.B.; ERWN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION X, xii (1987)
("[T]he U.S. Constitution serves the dual function of protecting deeply embedded values... from the
political process, and of serving as a powerful symbol unifying the country."). Chemerinsky
continues: "[I]t is desirable to have a constitution written in fairly abstract language enshrining...
fundamental values about the proper structure of government and the rights of individuals. It is left
for each generation to impart specific meaning to these deeply embedded abstract values."
19 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 8, 141, 150-52, 161-62 (challenging the wisdom
of any "grand theory" that purports to reduce our messy, conflicting, ambiguous constitutional
history, text, politics, and policies to a fundamental maxim mechanically resolving all questions and
effectively restraining judicial discretion; but, Farber and Sherry argue, case-by-case adjudication
struggling to craft evolving principles to guide, but not determine, future cases, and relying upon
varied methods and data sources, is both normatively superior and a better description of what
American judges in fact do and will continue to do). Professors Farber and Sherry summarize their
argument in one pithy paragraph worth quoting at length:
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One of my lessons is about the importance of "respect," which I define as
treating individuals and salient social groups "fittingly" in accordance with some
shared core human attribute (whether it be labeled rationality, autonomy, the
capacity to achieve moral goodness, or being made in God's image); 20 any lesser
treatment is insulting, and I craft an argument for history's role in helping us to
gauge what state action is insulting or humiliating. That argument, however,
cannot resolve the contours of the modem "automobile exception" to the Fourth
Amendment's "warrant requirement" or even whether we should recognize such an
exception.
Respect has far more relevance to other, quite specific, questions addressed by
the Court and by constitutional scholars, notably including whether it is
"reasonable" for a police officer to terrify, harangue, and arrest a woman
committing a motor vehicle violation that is punishable only by a fine (the Court
says yes, while I say no); whether race discrimination should matter to the
reasonableness inquiry (the Court apparently says no, while I say yes); and
whether the Terry Court was right to recognize that stops-and-frisks of minority
group members have the effect of humiliating those members and provoking
community resentment, while insisting that there is little the Court can do to
minimize that ill effect (I think there is much it could have done). 2,
Moreover, as I explain in my book, whether done under the rubric of respect
or not, many judges and United States Supreme Court justices have found similar
arguments about the importance of avoiding humiliation convincing.2 2 That
reasonable people may disagree with these justices, and that a focus on "respect"
does not mechanically resolve all modem interpretive Fourth Amendment issues,

The key problem is that each foundationalist is engaged in an ultimately futile search for
certainty, purity, and consistency: a sort of "unified field" theory of the Constitution.

They all have what one academic has wittily called "the endemic disease" of
academics-"a hardening of categories that transforms a lower-case theory into an uppercase Grand Theory." But constitutional law is a complex human creation, not an elegant
intellectual puzzle. Each theorist, by focusing on only a single aspect of the multi-faceted
Constitution, reduces its complexity by sacrificing accuracy. The ... scholars are much
like the blind men and the elephant. Each man feels only a part of the elephant, and thus
describes very different things: the trunk feels like a snake, the tusk like a horn, the legs
like a tree, and the tail like a broom. But the whole elephant is none of these things-or,

rather, is all of them at once-and each man misses the mark in his description. So it is
with... foundationalists, who each ignore all but a favored aspect of the Constitution.
Id. at 8. See also RIcHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 13 (2008) ("[J]udicial philosophies (such

as 'formalism,' 'originalism,' 'textualism,' 'representation-reinforcement,' 'civic republicanism,' or,
the newest contenders, 'active liberty' and 'judicial cosmopolitanism,') are either rationalizations or
decisions based on other grounds or rhetorical weapons. None is a politically neutral lodestar guiding
judges' decisions.").

20 See TASLrrZ, supra note 1, at 262.
21 See id. at 2, 76-89, 259-60.
22 See id. at 81-83, 263-74.

HeinOnline -- 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 772 2008-2009

2009]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE HISTORYAS CONVERSATION

render a jurisprudence of respect "either hopelessly vague, ad
does not thereby 23
hoc, or toothless.

ii. You Have to Choose the Right Lesson or the Right Combination of
Lessons for the Right Problem
The importance of respect is only one of ten lessons that I suggest can be
drawn from the history recounted in my book. While some lessons may be
inapplicable to some situations, others might still be relevant. Moreover, several
lessons might interact. Furthermore, because the lessons are not exhaustive, none
might apply to a particular circumstance, requiring a re-examination of history to
address the new problem.
Smith thus argues, for example, that "respect" is useless in deciding the
constitutionality of operating biometric surveillance systems at the Super Bowl,
which occur without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion that any
individual being surveilled has done anything wrong. I am not sure I even agree
with this point: how the searches are conducted; how the procedures for doing so
were created; and whether there are adequate limits on police discretion or existing
guidelines to handle disagreements over the accuracy of biometric results may
affect whether an individual or group has a justifiable reason to feel insulted by the
process. 24 Granted, actual insult can occur only if those observed know they are
being watched. But, the right question is whether they should be insulted were
they so aware.
Just as a person who is unaware that the reason that he did not get a job was
his potential employer's racism has nevertheless been disrespectfully treated in
23

Smith, supra note 2, at 671 (characterizing my approach to constitutional interpretation).

Concerning the unavoidability and wisdom of interpretive disagreement over the meaning of
constitutional text, see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENsION

OF JUDICIAL DECISION 92 (2008) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE] ("The Constitution of
the United States starts from exactly [this] ... presupposition: disagreement on matters of great
importance is ineradicable, and it is a tragic mistake to attempt to eliminate it."). Law professor
Steven J. Heyman makes a similar point in the First Amendment context that could apply just as
easily to the Fourth Amendment context on which I write:
I do not mean to say that this theory is capable of generating easy answers to free speech
problems. As I have stressed, these problems typically involve important values on both
sides. Individuals and groups will often disagree about the relative importance of these
values and about how conflicts between them should be resolved. It follows that there

will always be ideological disagreement over the scope of free speech. The goal of First
Amendment theory should be not to eradicate such disagreement, but to develop a

common language or framework within which we can engage in reasoned debate about
controversial issues.
STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HuMAN DIGNITY 3 (2008).
24

Cf Martin Marcus & Christopher Slobogin, ABA Sets Standards for Electronic and

PhysicialSurveillance, 18 CRIM. JUST. 5, 13-19 (2003) (summarizing the American Bar Association
Standards on Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance, which include limitations of these sorts

on the collection and use of, for example, video-camera surveillance information).
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fact, so a person whose privacy has unjustifiably been invaded, albeit unbeknownst
to him, has likewise been objectively treated with disrespect. Furthermore, if some
people are ultimately singled out for further investigation based upon biometric
surveillance, they at least (and perhaps the press) will then know it has occurred.
Persons who are confident that police act pursuant to relatively objective
guidelines, administered in a neutral fashion and subject to some oversight, have
less reason to feel that they are being treated more as things than as persons. It
does not take much to encourage a sense of "thing-hood," an experience I myself
have had on the small number of occasions when police stopped me for no
apparent reason, offering no comprehensible explanation, and treating me rudely in
the process. Such concerns should, it seems to me, be relevant to the
reasonableness of the police conduct even if not necessarily determinative.
Even conceding that respect is not relevant to the biometric testing question,
my "lesson" that "privacy in public is not an oxymoron," that is, that the Court is
wrong to have held that we "assume the risk" of full observation by the state any
time we expose ourselves to a public place25 -a position defended in various ways
by a growing number of well-respected scholars 2 6-is indeed relevant to whether
the Fourth Amendment even applies in the first place to biometric Super Bowl
surveillance. People do and should care about who is watching them, for what
purposes, by what means, and for what length of time even when they are in
"public" places. Under current doctrine, the Fourth Amendment would not even

apply to such surveillance because, in a public place, there simply is no privacy to
protect, while my position is quite the opposite. Likewise, my emphasis on the
lesson that "individualized justice" really should matter-in more familiar
language, that we should not too easily jettison the purported commitment to
individualized suspicion involved in probable cause and reasonable suspicion
determinations 27 -is of obvious relevance to the Super Bowl situation in which no
such suspicion is required. Again, to say that the privacy and suspicion lessons are
relevant and merit weight does not mean that no other considerations matter.
However, to isolate each lesson to test its relevance to a particular legal problem
without exploring whether other lessons or a combination of them might do a
better job in that instance-in short, to follow Smith's approach-is to caricature
the meaning of the lessons I advanced.
25 See TASLrrz, supra note 1, at 59-60, 273.
26 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made

OfP, 41 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 781, 796-804 (2008) (arguing that the third-party doctrine defeated the
liberal promise of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), the seminal case creating the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test for when the Fourth Amendment applies); Daniel J. Solove,
Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 356-57 (2008) (complaining
that the third-party doctrine leaves data-mining unprotected by the Fourth Amendment). But see Orin
Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MIcH. L. REV. 561 (2009) (standing as the lone
recent effort by a leading scholar in the field to defend the third party doctrine).
27 See TASLrrz, supra note 1, at 83-89. To say that a commitment to individualized justice
should not be too easily-jettisoned is not to say, however, that that commitment must never bend to
competing concerns. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
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iii. A Lesson is Not a Rule
Smith also treats my lessons as if they were "rules" rather than reminders of
questions to be asked, factors to be weighed, and guidelines for what weight to
give them. Thus, he ridicules my "commitment" to individualized suspicion as
one that would flatly ban all "group searches," such as roadblocks, drug testing,
police camera surveillance, and data mining. 28 The problem is that I never
suggested any such outcome.
A rhetorical commitment to individualized justice, as Smith notes, is of course
already part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. My complaint, like that of
several other scholars, 29 is that the Court and other governmental entities have
steadily eroded that commitment, while often not candidly admitting, much less
justifying, that they are doing so. Notably, "probable cause" and "reasonable30
suspicion" are increasingly found on highly general and questionable evidence.
Furthermore, even when the courts jettison the individualized suspicion
requirement openly, they sometimes do so too easily, with too little thought given
to the costs of doing so and how to compensate for them. 31 That does not mean
that individualized suspicion should be required in every case. My own
contribution is merely to emphasize that history highlights the requirement's
importance and that sacrificing, diluting, altering, or replacing it needs to be
considered more carefully.
I do not think such reminders to take care are meaningless as recent
psychological research suggests that reminders and re-emphases of various sorts
can often alter, dare I say improve, decision making.32 Furthermore, so long as the
Court relies on a balancing of law-enforcement-versus-individual-interests

28 See Smith, supra note 2, at 672.
29 In particular, see David A. Harris, ParticularizedSuspicion, Categorical Judgments:
Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 975

(1998).
See id. at 987-1012 (analyzing a number of cases supporting this proposition).
31 See id. at 1017-22 (offering a number of examples); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling
30

and the Fourth Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RuTGERS
L. REV. 195 (2005) (exploring the dangers of sliding down a slippery slope toward further

unwarranted loss of Fourth Amendment freedoms by continuing to embrace the logic of current
individualized suspicion doctrine---doctrine that reflects a blinkered vision of the social costs of tooquickly abandoning the suspicion requirement).
32 See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR

DECISIONs 206-15 (2008) (describing a series of experiments in which asking participants to recall
the Ten Commandments or to take an honor code oath shortly before performing a competitive task
for a reward completely eliminated cheating, apparently because it reminded the participants of the
importance of honesty); id. at 208-09 ("[I]t was not the Commandments themselves that encouraged
honesty, but the mere contemplation of a moral benchmark....").
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approach to determine the reasonableness of searches, 33 I do not see an alternative
to trying to articulate guidelines to aid in evaluating the weight of those interests.
Never once did I suggest that such guidelines, however, tip the scale in favor of
requiring individualized suspicion in every case.
Smith thus cites Christopher Slobogin for the proposition that an undue
obsession with individualized suspicion-with which Smith charges me-can
sometimes be too socially costly. 34 I agree with Slobogin, however, on this point.
Indeed, I discuss with approval in my book the American Bar Association's recent
Those
adoption of Standards on Technologically-Assisted Surveillance.35
standards seek to correct for the Supreme Court's refusal to find the Fourth
Amendment applicable to observation of public activities, thereby presumably
permitting unregulated public video surveillance. 36 The ABA accordingly
proposes filling this regulatory gap by articulating potential legislative standards
for the states to enact. Those standards, of which Slobogin was the primary
architect, do not adopt an individualized suspicion requirement. They recognize,
however, the risks of abuse thereby involved, compensating for them by permitting
such surveillance "only when a fairly stringent series of conditions are met,
including the opportunity of the public likely to be affected by the surveillance to
express its views on the wisdom of the effort and to propose changes in its
execution, that public being heard repeatedly on these matters, both before and
during the surveillance. 37
The ABA and Slobogin thus seem to embrace in this context yet another of
the lessons that I have articulated-the importance of community voice-while
recognizing that, where public safety requires the sacrifice of individualized
suspicion, alternative but nevertheless muscular safeguards are required. If
Slobogin is thus also guilty of the "populism" with which Smith rightly but
derisively charges me,38 I am proud to be in such company. Similarly, both
Slobogin and I serve on an ABA Committee on Transactional Surveillance
Standards, part of whose function is to suggest rules governing state access to a
wide range of electronic data held by third party institutions-rules that, at a
minimum, can be workable only with at least some modification of traditional
notions of individualized suspicion.39 I do not expect to be a dissenter from that
Committee's evolving standards on this point.
33 See ANDREW E. TASLrTZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE C. HERBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL

CRIMINAL PRoCEDURE 175-76 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the Court's categorical "reasonableness

balancing approach").
34 See Smith, supra note 2, at 671-72.
35 See TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 59-60.
36 See Marcus & Slobogin, supra note 24, at 14-18.
37 See TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 59-60.
38 See Smith, supra note 2, at 673.
39 Cf Christopher Slobogin, Government DataMining and the FourthAmendment, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 317, 336-41 (2008) (recognizing the need for reducing, modifying, and even eliminating the
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iv. Judicial Minimalism, Code-like Rules, and the Role of the Legislature
a. Broad Lessons, When Applied to Specific Cases, Are Not "AdHoc-ery"
My use of history to inform doctrine in this fashion is sympathetic with a
comnitment to judicial minimalism of which Professor Cass Sunstein so
convincingly writes. 4° "Judicial minimalism" is the case-by-case accretion of
doctrinal change that relies on "incompletely theorized agreements," that is, on
concepts and their justifications recited at a sufficiently high level of generality so
as to permit broad agreement on their terms, without straight-jacketing future
doctrine in service of some totalizing, comprehensive model that may ignore
experience in the service of narrow notions of consistency and logic. 41 That is not
to say that my lessons, if accepted and read as I suggest, would not substantially
alter current doctrine, but they would do so incrementally, open to the need for
course corrections, and with acceptance that they rely on incomplete theories.
These lessons are thus merely guidelines meant to assist in analyzing problems
raised by specific cases. They are not a code-book of narrowly specific rules prejudging the wisest resolution of every Fourth Amendment problem.
My approach is also reminiscent of feminist theories that emphasize
particularity and uniqueness, and with modes of judicial reasoning that applaud the
common law method.42 Any interpretive approach partly relies on some sort of
theory, but the common law method, as I understand it, accepts Sunstein's idea that
application of general concepts to particular cases can lead to strongly justifiable
results even if we cannot all agree on a single, comprehensive explanation for how
we got there or should have gotten there.43 Additionally, the common law method
accepts that "truth" of some sort can be achieved in an individual case that is

individualized suspicion requirement for at least certain types of government data-mining).

The

ABA Committee is still in the early stages of its work, so I cannot now know what the final product

will say. However, our internal discussions and drafts suggest that it is highly likely that we will
recommend modification, alteration, or elimination of the individualized suspicion requirement for
certain types of transactional surveillance, including certain types of data-mining.
40 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT 11 (1999) (crafting an extended defense of "incompletely theorized agreements" and

the wisdom of gradual, case-by-case evolution of constitutional law).
41

FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 161 (arguing that grand theory in constitutional

interpretation impairs judges' ability to learn from experience).
42

See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 171,

196-209 (1999) [hereinafter Taslitz, What Feminism Offers] (summarizing such feminist theories);
see also infra text accompanying notes 43-45 (discussing some virtues of the common law method).
43 See SuNsTEIN, supra note 40, at 1-40; FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 152 ("Applying

large scale theories is clearly not the primary way judges make decisions. Instead, they tend to
proceed incrementally, moving case by case. Rather than attempting to articulate a general theory
from the start, they try to develop and elaborate principles as they go along.").
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recognized as unique. 44 Of course, the accretion of reasoning explaining such
cases leads to principles meant to guide future cases too (serving as precedent), and
there is always a tension between the needs of the individual case and the
precedent set for future ones. 45 Nevertheless, precedent is ultimately guidance
rather than the statement of a simple mechanically-applied rule; it is one set of
weighty reasons to be considered in making future decisions but can often be
distinguished from a particular new case.46 Case-specific reasoning is thus always
part of the common law method.
Such an approach of course allows for the interplay of at least subconscious
judicial biases and political preconceptions. While the law should do what it can
to minimize such influences where they are pernicious, I do not think that they can
ever be eliminated.47 Moreover, for the important questions of constitutional law,
good arguments have been made that it is self-delusion to believe that these forces
are not at work and that it is even desirable that they play a role, as long as the
underlying political and ideological arguments are brought into the open, thereby
subjecting them to efforts at defense and critique.48 Such arguments accept that the
44 Richard Posner makes the point this way:

So pervasive is pragmatic thinking in the American political culture that legalists are
[unconvincingly] driven to defend the blinkered results to which their methodology of
strict rules and literal interpretations tends as yielding better consequences [that is, as
being more pragmatically useful] than a fuller engagement with the facts of a case, a
greaterwillingness to knead rules into standards,and a looser interpretationof rules that
were created without reference to the situationpresented by the new case would do.
POSNER, supra note 19, at 239-40 (emphasis added).
45 See id. at 238-39 (arguing that sensible pragmatic judges consider the social consequences
of a rule crafted in a specific case and not only the consequences for the parties in the case before it).
46 See id. at 39-51, 54-56, 144-45, 184 (analyzing the roles of precedent and the doctrine of
stare decisis in legal theory and practice); see generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF
PRECEDENT (2008) (articulating a comprehensive theory of the role of precedent in constitutional
decisionmaking).
47 See POSNER, supra note 19, at 19-56, 107-21 (surveying nine theories of judicial behavior,
most of which recognize a prominent role for the subconscious in judicial reasoning, and arguing
that, via intuition and good judgment, subconscious reasoning is often, though not always or entirely,
a good thing).
48 Judge Posner explains:
If the Justices acknowledged to themselves the essentially personal, subjective, political,
and, from a legalist standpoint, arbitrary character of most of their constitutional
decisions, then-deprived of "the law made me do it" rationalization for their exercise of
power-they might be less aggressive upsetters of political applecarts than they are. But
that is probably too much to expect, because the "if' condition cannot be satisfied. For
judges to acknowledge even just to themselves the political dimension of their role would
open a psychologically unsettling gap between their official job description and their
actual job. Acknowledging that they were making political choices would also
undermine their confidence in the soundness of their decisions, since judges' political
choices cannot be justified by reference to their professional background or training.
Id. at 289. Cf Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (2007) (articulating empiricists' argument
emphasizing the powerful subconscious forces at work in judging, observing their benign and
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Court is a political institution, though not operating in the same way as a
legislature or the executive. 49 The Court itself thus contributes to an ongoing
conversation with the other branches and the people about what aspects of political
50
morality do and should constitute the basic law of the American people.
Effective conversations require give-and-take as well as constant adjustment and
flexibility. Rigid, narrow rules designed to cover a vast swath of legal disputes are
not conducive to such
conversation. To Smith this is "ad-hoc-ery"; to me it is
51

principled realism.

b. Clearer Rules and the Legislature

The criticism that ad hoc reasoning often gives police officers and private
citizens too little guidance to assist them adequately in their daily tasks is,
nevertheless, sometimes a valid one. The Court's current approach to the Fourth
Amendment has widely been critiqued as being a confusing, complex, inconsistent

pernicious effects, and recommending a variety of reforms for compensating for the ill effects, a
model they call the "intuitive-override" mode of judging).
49 See POSNER, supra note 19, at 157, 204, 264-65, 369-77 (summarizing the institutional and
internal constraints on judging that leave the judiciary a wide berth for exercising discretion in
creating and applying law, but a discretion different from that exercised by legislatures and far from
unlimited). Posner sees the discretionary, quasi-legislative role of the judiciary as unavoidable in our
legal culture and often desirable:
[T]he reasons for the legislative character of much American judging lie so deep in our
political and legal systems and our culture that no feasible reforms could alter it, and
furthermore that [this is] the character of our legal system is not such a terrible thing.
The falsest of false dawns is the belief that our system can be placed on the path to
reform by a judicial comnitment to legalism-to conceiving the judicial role as
exhausted in applying rules laid down by statutes and constitutions or in using analytic
methods that enable judges to confine their attention to orthodox legal materials and have
no truck with policy.
Id. at 15.
50 See ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1-8,

85-105 (2003) (arguing that our governmental institutions are designed to promote widespread
conversation among the branches and between them and the American people, a model in which the
courts play an important role). H. Jefferson Powell, relying on his understanding of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes's work, likewise stresses the importance of conversation:
Holmes's point is that the unavoidably coercive aspect of political community is, in the
American system, dependent on conversation, on the ability of those subject to its
coercions to participate in the community's choices.
The constitutional virtues
collectively inculcate a predisposition to understand American constitutionalism in this
manner, as a privileging of talk over command, inclusive conversation over divisive
exercises of power.
POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 102.
51 See Smith, supra note 2, at 671 (decrying what he sees as my ad hoc constitutional
reasoning); but cf POSNER, supra note 19, at 238-39 (denying that case-specific evolution of legal
rules is a "synonym for ad hoc adjudication" because judges consider both the consequences to the
parties in the immediate case and the wider systemic consequences of decisions).
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mess, and it seems that every theorist thinks that he or she can do better.52 Crafting
highly specific rules, however, seems to be generally a legislative task.53 That is
not to say that the legislature can do it alone. It must act in conversation with the
judiciary, which can ensure enforcement of some minimal standards of
constitutional protection. The judiciary can also offer incentives for legislatures to
take the time to craft specific rules and to do so in accordance with broad
constitutional guidelines-an incentives-creating technique that Erik Luna has
dubbed using "constitutional roadmaps. 54
The judiciary is thus at its best when it draws on history, precedent, and a
wide array of other sources to resolve individual disputes. Though the rules it
crafts certainly impact future cases too-the latter being the major point of stare
decisisY The articulation of highly specific rules meant to govern a broad run of
cases, however, is generally a better job for the legislature. The legislature, like
the judiciary and the executive, is bound by the Constitution, and so it should feel
obliged to act as informed by the same historical, empirical, and moral concerns
that worry courts wrestling with constitutional questions. 56 But precisely because
the crafting of specific, trans-case rules can be so controversial, that job is often
best left to the legislature. Accordingly, I devoted some significant effort in my
book to argue that the lessons I articulated should guide legislative thinking, as
well as that of the executive and the judiciary.57 In doing so, I embrace a variant of
a growing 58school of thought that sees a major role for legislatures in constitutional
reasoning.
Any legislative code will suffer from inconsistencies, and it will still require
the courts to apply that code to specific cases, but an enhanced legislative role in
consultation with the courts helps to address concerns about ad-hoc thinking. That
principles, passions, and history have, do, and should guide Congress in playing
52 See, e.g., AKHWL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 1 (1997) ("The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment.... All searches and
seizures must be grounded in probable cause-but not on Tuesdays.... The result is a vast jumble of
judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but often perverse."); CRAIG
M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REvOLUTION (1993) (critiquing the Court's
messy doctrine).
53 Cf MARK TuS-NEr, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (crafting
an extended defense of the argument that legislatures, rather than courts, should play the primary role
in constitutional interpretation).
m See Erik Luna, ConstitutionalRoad Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125 (2000).
55 See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
56 See POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 12 ("[T]he distinction
between adjudication and constitutional decision by political actors is less dramatic than is often
assumed .... "); id. at 74-75 (arguing, however, that it is also not entirely meaningless); ANDREW E.
TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 148-51 (1999) (discussing the "legislative

constitution").
57

See TASLrrz, supra note 1, at 58-60.

58

See TUSHNEr, supra note 53.

HeinOnline -- 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 780 2008-2009

2009]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE HISTORY AS CONVERSATION

this role I take as a given. 59 I thus reject the hyper-skepticism that declares
legislatures unable to serve or craft any "common good" as an overstatement, and
6

one that fails, and fails badly, to consider adequately the institutional alternatives. 0
All decisionmaking processes are flawed and all require means of accountability
and self-correction; therefore, all we can hope to accomplish is to choose the least
bad option for the tasks that we set. 6'

Constitutional scholar Jefferson Powell concedes the unavoidable
imperfections that characterize our, or any, constitutional system, and the
indeterminacy of finding answers to our difficult constitutional questions.62 Yet
Powell finds solace in the obligations of all constitutional interpreters-regardless
of the branch and thus pointedly including the legislative and executive branchesto act with a "constitutional conscience," guided by constitutional "virtues.

63

These virtues include: faith, in the sense of a belief that the Constitution is
59 Jefferson Powell put the point this way:
The problem with this dichotomy-judges good, politicians and their legal eagles bad-is
that it combines an extreme cynicism about the political branches of government (and
often all branches of state government) with an extreme credulity, in practice if not
always in theory, about the federal judiciary. Both sides of this coin are gross
exaggerations of whatever truth they may contain. The history of the Republic is replete
with examples of government lawyers working in the political branches who took
positions which were not mere translations of their superiors' wishes into legalese, and to
say [even] this is to [wrongly] risk ignoring the possibility and the historical reality of
principled obedience to the law on the part of those superiors.
POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 67. Powell is obviously here addressing
both the role of the legislature and the executive branch, though the quoted comment is in a chapter
devoted to illustrating how one executive branch figure fused principles, passions, and history to
demonstrate a "conscience" about how wisely to interpret the constitution. See id.at 74-79
(developing that illustration); id. at 110-11 (noting the "priority of the political," in which legislative
and electoral politics are assumed in the Constitution to play critical roles).
60 See Andrew E. Taslitz, InterpretiveMethod and the FederalRules of Evidence: A Callfor
a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 329, 353-94 (1995) (analyzing and
responding to public choice and other theorists' critique of legislation as not having any discernible
purpose or serving any coherent notion of the public good); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Jury and the
Common Good. Synthesizing the Insights of Modern and Postmodern Legal Theories, in FOR THE
COMMON GOOD: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL 312 (R. Robin Miller &
Sandra Lee Browning eds., 2004) [hereinafter Taslitz, The Common Good] (crafting an extended
argument that the "common good" is no fiction and comes into being as a result of deliberative
dialogue and heated political conversation).
6

Cf NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS

IN LAW,

ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994) ("Institutional choice is difficult as well as essential. The
choice is always a choice among highly imperfect alternatives.").
62 See POWELL, CONSTrrTUIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 87 ("Founding-era
constitutionalists understood, correctly I think, that no legal instrument complex in its provisions or
in its goals can eliminate ambiguity. This must be true a fortiori for an instrument that ... is the
constituent act of a nation. The founders therefore accepted quite consciously the corollary that
interpreting the Constitution is an intellectually creative activity, not a mechanical process of
unveiling outcomes already fixed in the text.").
63 Id. at 11.
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intelligible, and in a commitment to using its language fairly; 64 candor about its
ambiguity; 65 and integrity in "seeking in any given situation that interpretation of
the Constitution that honestly seems to the interpreter the most plausible resolution
of the issues in the light of the text and constitutional tradition. 66 The virtues also
include: "humility," the recognition that "the Constitution is primarily a framework
67
for political argument and decision and not a tool for the elimination of debate";
and "acquiescence", 68 when one's efforts to persuade others have failed. Powell
further argues that three substantive constitutional commitments are necessary for
these virtues to thrive: first, that political struggle is generally a good; second, that
orthodox understandings must be resisted and dissenters given free reign to do so;
and third, that all Americans are to be included in the ensuing debate.69
Powell understands that appeals to virtue may sound to some readers like
hopeless naivet6, but he goes on to illustrate how, over the course of American
history, all the branches have often lived up to these ideals, while also often falling
short of them.70 Moreover, he insists that logic and experience show that the
exercise of these virtues are thoroughly consistent with the clash of self-interested

64

Id. at 11, 85.

65

Id. at 87-89.

66 Id. at 90.

67 Id.at 94, 99-101; see also HEYMAN, supra note 23, at 3 (making similar point).
68 The virtue of "acquiescence," Powell notes, is not an invariant rule of decision-exceptions

may be necessary in individual cases-but is nevertheless an obligation of political morality:
In habitually beginning from a presumption of respect for past decisions, the
conscientious interpreter acknowledges the possibility not only of error on his or her part,
but even more fundamentally the existence of principled disagreement within the
American community over the Constitution's purposes.

The virtue of acquiescence

locates the constitutional decision maker within the broader American community, which
encompasses the past, with its controversies, conclusions, and errors, as well as his or her
contemporaries, who share that past, as well as the obligation to treat constitutional
decision as the search to implement not a partisan or parochial perspective but what

Madison called "the national judgment and intention."
POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 99-100.

"Acquiescence" is, therefore, a
mark of belongingness to the American political community but not an entreaty to silence. The

discussion can continue in the loser's hope of one day persuading the winners of their error, and the
loser can do so in the expectation that, when that day arrives, those still dissenting from his position

will nevertheless acquiesce in it until such time, if ever, when they shall again win the debate.
69

Seeid.at110-13.

70

Powell discussed only one major historical example in this work. See id. at 56-79. But, in

light of his current theory of constitutional virtues, many of his other historical works can be
understood as extended examples of these virtues at work or analyses of their reasons for failing.
See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY
AND POLITICS (2002); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY
OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002); H. JEFFERSON

POWELL, THE CONSTrrTTION AND THE ATrORNEYS GENERAL (1999); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONsTrrIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993).
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groups and with "passionate commitment to one's views on contested matters of
constitutional interpretation.'
If history proves that the constitutional virtues can mean something real, then
every constitutional actor must strive to develop them because, in a world of
unavoidable legal indeterminacy, acting in good faith is all we have. Powell pulls
no punches about the consequences if the exercise of such virtues proves, contrary
to his view, unattainable:
I have identified what I believe are certain constitutional virtues,
dispositions of mind and will that are necessary if men and women are to
interpret and apply the Constitution as that instrument and the history of
our dealings with it demand. Without those virtues as ideals, and as
realities, to the extent that [it] is possible for fallible human beings [to
make these ideals real], American constitutionalism is a fraud.72
But, Powell further adds, these virtues not only set the rules of the game but
have moral significance beyond those rules, for "they draw the outline of a
particular attitude toward political community. 7 3 In short, "they describe the
characteristics of men and women who recognize the incorrigible otherness of
those with whom they must live and yet who decline the74 old, sour, ultimately
violent solution of denying the equal humanity of the other.,
My point in reviewing Powell's articulation of the constitutional virtues is that
legislatures, simply because they are political creatures, are not by that reason
alone rendered incapable of protecting fundamental rights, including those
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. 75 Correspondingly, just because hard
constitutional questions are indeterminate does not mean that legislatures, the
executive, or the judiciary are incapable of addressing such questions in a fair,
reasoned manner. But their choices are limited by moral, institutional, and cultural
constraints on the options available to them.76 History provides fodder for the
71 POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 94. Indeed, one of the essential

premises of Powell's argument is that "constitutional law's central function is to provide a means of
resolving political conflict that accepts the inevitability and persistence of such conflict rather than
the possibility of consensus or even broad agreement on many issues." Id. at 7; see generally STUART
HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000).
72 POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 100.
71

id. at 101.

74 Id.
75 See TASLIrZ, supra note 1, at 58-59 (summarizing instances in which legislatures did a
better job than the courts in enhancing protections against unreasonable searches and seizures).
76 Erwin Chemerinsky summarizes a number of the constraints operating, for example, on the

courts, including the need to elaborate reasons for decision, the regard of the relevant interpretive
communities, the likelihood that judges themselves embrace values broadly reflective of large
segments of the broader political community, the community's commitment to the separation of
powers, judicial norms governing decisonmaking methods and outcomes, the appointments process,
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exercise of the constitutional virtues by all the branches of government but does
not alone dictate outcomes.
If the courts act with these virtues while focusing on case-by-case
decisionmaking (yet with an eye toward their future implications), and if they prod
legislatures to craft more specific rules within broad guidelines, and if all
institutions act within a political culture of broad-ranging, inclusive conversation,
then the "lessons" drawn from constitutional history and other sources will be
worthy of respect and will be the best that fallible humans are likely to achieve.
That Powell and I both believe that this happens, at least sometimes, makes us

constitutional optimists in an otherwise often cynical legal and political culture.
c. The Romanticism of Constitutional Lessons

Finally, I plead guilty not only to the charge of being an optimist but also to
being a romantic. 77 History in the context of law can, among other functions, serve

to caution us against human foibles and yet still call us to noble aspirations. To
articulate a motivating vision of such aspirations and to seek to live them are
themselves, I believe, inherently worthwhile tasks.

These aspirations are not merely "academic."

They also inspire reform

movements, spark individual creativity, and encourage coalition-building. They

the at-least conscience-pulling tug of stare decisis, and, in rare cases, the fear of the Article V
amendment process. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 119-28.
77 One way-a way that I reject-to define a romantic is someone who is "[i/dealistic,
characterized by or arising from idealistic or impractical attitudes and expectations." MICROSOFr
ENCARTA COLLEGE DICTONARY 1258 (2001). I chose the word carefully because I know that some
readers might suffer from a cynicism that would equate idealism with impracticality, the pejorative
notion embodied in the above definition. But the same dictionary from which I drew that definition
also notes that one definition of an idealist is "somebody with high ideals[,] somebody who aspires to
or abides by high standards or principles." Id. at 715. Likewise, that dictionary offers an alternative
definition of being romantic as "involving adventure[,] relating to or characterized by adventure,
excitement, the potential for heroic achievement, or the exotic." Id. at 1258. I use the term
"romantic" here, therefore, to fuse aspects of these definitions, to mean someone who aspires to high
ideals, sees them as a means for motivating others to heroic achievement, and understands the
practical obstacles to changing visions or actions yet goes forward anyway, knowing that some
observers will see foolishness where the romantic sees opportunity.
But see POWELL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at 110 (rejecting a description of himself as "romantic"
if that means ignoring the virtues and hard realities of practical politics). Explains Powell:
In the American Republic the political process is not some means of channeling the
choices (which [means] if they existed would be authoritarian and frightening) of a
mythical people: it is instead the form of political struggle by which individuals and
groups seek to pursue their own goals within a shared political framework.... At our
best, as individuals and groups we take into account the existence of fellow Americans
with (sometimes) very different visions of the world, but the Constitution does not
assume that we are always at our best, nor does it demand that we be so.
Id. at 110-11.
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78
are part of the stuff of politics and of law's role in any political system. Greed,
irrationality, foolishness, confusion, chaos, randomness, and downright evil are
also part of the stuff of politics and law. I prefer to be open-eyed about the latter
without rejecting the relevance of the former. Part of my worry about the law of
search-and-seizure is that it has come to be seen as a hyper-technical set of
questions to be resolved mechanically by legal elites, of relatively little importance
in the hierarchy of liberties and of little relevance to the common man or to the
future of the republic. Examining history, particularly the too-oft ignored aspects
of that history, belies those claims, and that alone is a very worthwhile effort.
A little romanticism of this sort in thinking about constitutional law, politics,
and passions is thus as hard-headed as it is idealistic, an answer to the passivity
and despair that cynicism or pessimism can breed.

B. History as a ConversationBetween Elites and the Hoi-Poloi

Having argued in Part I1A that current constitutional interpretation is best
understood as a conversation among modem political actors, including their
understanding of the past, I turn now to defending the idea that legal history is best
envisioned as a past conversation about the kind of people we then thought we
should be. I discuss how that past conversation can further enrich the current one,
and I elaborate on some of the points made more glancingly in Part HA about
history's role in constitutional interpretation. Part liB thereby closes the circle of a
conversational theory of constitutional interpretation.
1. Legal History as Conversation
Several decades ago, historian Howard Zinn published his now-famous A
People's History of the United States.79 Zinn's goal was to tell the nation's story
from the bottom-up, focusing on the experiences of racial and ethnic minorities,
workingmen, recent immigrants, the poor, and the despised. Other book authors
have followed Zinn's example, examining narrower slices of the American
experience than did Zinn in his sweeping chronicle. 80 My approach has an affinity
for Zinn's, and particularly for the "narrower slice" variant followed by his
intellectual descendants. One of the major goals of my book was to examine one
such narrow slice: how search-and-seizure practices during slavery and
Reconstruction affected African-Americans and the White defenders of the anti78 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); Taslitz, Racial
Auditors, supra note 11, at 264-65 (arguing that the "political emotions" can be used to motivate
social change that at first blush seems unattainable).
79 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED SATES: 1492-PRESENT (HarperCollins
Pub. 2003) (1980).
80 See, e.g., DAVID WILLIAMS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR: STRUGGLES FOR THE
MEANING OF FREEDOM (2005); RAY RAPHAEL, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
How COMMON PEOPLE SHAPED THE FIGHT FOR INDEPE NDENCE (2002).
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slavery cause. But a legal history cannot entirely jettison concern with elites, for it
8
is the elites who ultimately enact and interpret the laws. 1
The elites do not always act as gods imposing their sacred law on their
worshippers, however much the contrary may seem to be the case. Elites respond
to events on the ground, sometimes having sympathy for, or a political need for the
support of, those who daily struggle for and against the law as it is practiced, other
times acting against the dissenters and protestors whom some elites find repellant.
Moreover, the meaning of the law, especially of constitutional law, is daily

disputed by the American public, if not necessarily directly

so. 82

Modernly,

Sl In this respect, my approach differs from Zinn's. Zinn and his progeny look at history from
the bottom-up. More traditional histories look at history from the top-down. I look at both
perspectives (for example, I have chapters on the masters' viewpoint and others on the slaves'
viewpoint) and try to explore the interconnections among them-the ways that the actions and,
sometimes the perspectives, of each group influenced the actions and understandings of the other.
There are, however, also differences, for example among elites, so I have chapters on Northern versus
Southern perspectives. Obviously, not all, or even many, perspectives can be offered in a book of
workable length when trying to tell an understandable story, and there is choice involved in what
groups to select and what perspectives to seek. This observation is true of all histories. I have tried
to select those groups and perspectives that I thought most relevant to my task. The key point here,
however, is that history can be seen as an interaction among many contending viewpoints, all of
which are changing, multiple, and complex. Furthermore, most human action has some
communicative element, conveying some message to someone, whether intended or not, and evoking
some responsive meaning-filled action by recipients. In this sense, therefore, history is itself a
conversation among participants, albeit one on which any historian can eavesdrop only selectively
without each portion being drowned out by the cacophony. See JOYCE APPLEBY, LYNN HUNT &
MARGARET JACOB, TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 256, 262-67 (1994) (noting that there are

always multiple simultaneously true perspectives among the various actors involved in historical
events; that there are many messages packed into each past event, not all of which were consciously
intended; and that every history involves telling a story by some degree of selection, arrangement of
events, and interpretation).
82 Constitutional historian Jack Rakove thus cautions us to distinguish between "intention"
and "understanding." See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONsTrrurION 8 (1996). "Intention" refers to an actor's purpose, while
"understanding" refers to the impressions of the actor's words or actions that are formed
in the minds

of his audience. See id. When speaking of the "original meaning" given words or actions by
historical participants, therefore, we must distinguish between the intentions of the framers and the
understandings of the ratifiers. See id. at 8-10. But, emphasizes Rakove, there is always a range of
intentions and understandings in any collective enterprise. See id. at 6-10. Furthermore, because
historical participants never act in isolation, the "ratifiers" of the constitution must at least include not
only the elected representatives to the state constitutional conventions, but also the electorate whom
they represent. See id. at 6. (I would go further and consider as well even the influence of those
Americans excluded from the vote.) Additionally, says Rakove, intentions and understandings are
dynamic and creative, making them uncertain and problematic. See id. at 10. As Rakove and other
historians note, however, this does not mean that history can be no more than a collection of acts, for
history is comprehensible only as a narrative. See id. at xiv, 6. See also MICHAEL STANFORD, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 17, 216-17 (1998). While different narratives may
be told, some are more plausible, some not, and some are better reasoned and more carefully

supported by evidence than others. See APPLEBY Er AL., supra note 81, at 259, 261-63. ("The fact

that there can be a multiplicity of accurate histories does not turn accuracy into a fugitive from a
more confident age .... "). Id. at 262 But any sound legal conclusions to be drawn from past
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internet chat room debates, television news stories, high-profile lawsuits, family
dinner conversations, and church sermons concerning everything from abortion to
police use of force to affirmative action, demonstrate this reality.
The creation, meaning, and application of constitutional law thus, I believe,
turn partly on, and arise partly from, a conversation between historical elites and
everyday people. This is a conversation that can be had both in words and in
deeds, and it is an often unpleasant conversation that is part of a struggle over
status, power, material resources, and deeply-held moral, religious, and political
84
values. 83 This historical conversation is not the sole source of constitutional law,
but it is an important one, and it is the one that I sought to emphasize.
Historians who argue, for example, that slaves themselves (by thousands of
small acts of defiance during the antebellum period and by fleeing in huge
numbers from their masters during the Civil War) played an important role in their
own freedom, held views of that freedom's meaning, and contributed to its
embodiment in the Thirteenth Amendment, are recognizing that history (including
legal history) cannot be understood solely via the words or actions of the elites.85
Correspondingly, anyone reading widely in the history leading up to the three
Reconstruction Amendments sees the critical role of elites-whether via
congressional debates, political speeches, or judicial opinions. 86 All that is said by
elites, however, cannot be taken simply at face value, because their words and
actions reflect their awareness of players in the historical drama whom they do not
mention, agendas that they sometimes seek to camouflage, and forces that
influence them but which they do not wholly understand.87
intentions and understandings must not rely upon univocal stories of the past that exclude voices that
have something to teach us today. Cf RAKOVE at 10 n.10 ("What historians do best is to make
connections with the past to illuminate problems of the present.").
81 Cf. RAKOVE, supra note 82, at 11 (noting history always involves power and exclusion).
84 Rakove thus distinguishes between using historical intentions, understandings, and
interpretations as "an informed point of departure," which makes sense to both him and me, or letting
past meanings control present law, which, even if possible, makes no sense to either of us. See id. at
9.

85 See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 236-39 (summarizing much of the historical work on
the slaves' role in attaining their freedom); ALEXANDER TSESIs, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY 4 (2004) ("[A] key to understanding the Abolition
Amendment is first to comprehend the workings of the institution that it ended.").
86 See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONsTrrtmON, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869

(1990).
87 This last observation is one of many reasons why history necessitates interpretation. As
Joyce Appleby and her colleagues have noted: "Historians . . . seek to understand the internal
dispositions of historical actors: what motivated them, how they responded to events, which ideas
shaped their social world." APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 81, at 259. Such understandings must be

divined from evidence-evidence that can support or help to falsify a particular account. See id. at
261-62. Different interpretations from the same evidence can result by assigning different weights to

the various kinds of evidence, and as a result of the author's perception of the participants' relative
influence on events, as well as from different sets of assumptions about human nature or other
factors. See id. at 256. Furthermore, the meaning of events is not inherent in them but lies in their
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A conversational approach to law-and thus to legal history-recognizes as
well that law and culture continually interact, shaping one another. In particular,
law serves an expressive function, sending messages about the kind of people we
are and the things we value. 88 Such messages affect the status, power, and selfconception of individuals and groups, matters having both instrumental and
inherent value.8 9 Those messages will, therefore, always be contested. The law
thus helps to constitute our nature as individuals, members of salient social groups,
and as Americans. Political scientist John Brigham explained the matter thus:
We call practices operating on ways of thinking and acting . . .
constitutive. Legal practices in this sense are a part of the culture, part of
our nature: our basic outlook on life is stamped by the compacts drawn
up by the colonists; by the decision that all laborers, black or white,
should be free; by the agreements concerning due process for the accused
and the convicted and the proper roles of the police and the judiciary.
The constitutive is a level in the analysis of legal practices; it comes from
constitute, meaning to form or establish. When we say of a former slave
after the Civil War that laws constitute his identity we do not mean to say
that being free is his whole being, but rather that laws operate at the level
where his being is determined, and that they operated, along with social
position and physical characteristics (such as being black), to make him
what was called at the time a "freedman." 90
inter-connection, so a historian's narrative is necessarily a partial explanation of what ties certain
events into a story. See STANFORD, supra note 82, at 217. This observation does not mean, however,
that a historian can explore only the evidence supporting the story he tells and not contradictory

evidence, for that would be a sin akin to that of "law office history"-history that is unduly selective
or merely justificatory rhetoric to achieve an advocate's goal. See RAKOVE, supra note 82, at 11.

(Trying to avoid this sin is one of the reasons for some of the lengthy footnotes in my text, which
seek to account for and weigh or explain away evidence arguably contrary to my thesis).

Yet

complete balance on all details is unworkable given the "drama, significance, irony, pathos" of a
good narrative. See STANFORD, supra note 82, at 217. Thus historian Michael Stanford asks this
rhetorical question about scrupulous balance: "Is not this the death of a good story?" Id.
88 See Taslitz, What Feminism Offers, supra note 42, at 180.
89 See id. at 180-81.
Stanford notes that interpretation in one sense turns on actors'
intentions, in another sense on their significance, and in a third sense on their meaning. See

STANFORD,supra note 8, at 16. But, determining significance always requires asking: "Significant to

whom and in what ways?" See id. Similarly, giving meaning means "making sense," which also
requires us to ask: "Making sense of what, why, and how?" See id. The questions we ask, therefore,
affect what particular struggles over the meaning of their answers best aid our understanding of the

earlier period. My interest in my book concerned questions arising from messages reflecting and
affecting the distribution of power that were embodied in nineteenth century struggles over

governmental search-and-seizure activities relating to the position of African-American slaves, then
newly-freed men, in the American polity. My answers, therefore, focused on the significance and
meaning of those events to those constitutional actors, matters necessarily affecting the distribution of
social power then and, more indirectly, now.
90 JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTrrUTION OF INTERESTS: BEYOND THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 2-3

(1996).
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Law can impose degrading meanings as well as uplifting ones, and law does
so by the daily practices of legal actors and ordinary civilians acting in the shadow
of the law. Thus, the segregated beaches, buses, and water fountains of the Jim
Crow era are described by one leading constitutional scholar as subjecting AfricanAmericans to thousands of daily "degradation ceremon[ies]" shaping the "life of
every black person within the system's reach." 9' Critical legal scholars make a
similar point when they seek to challenge the reigning legal "narratives," drawing
on the experiences of the subordinated to challenge, modify, or reject the stories
that both the law on the books and the law as it is practiced tell about the nature of
our social world.92
Here is where an important distinction must be made. In Part IIA of this
article, I explained how modernly crafting "lessons" from history presupposes a
conversational politics today. Up until now, in Part IJB, however, I have written
about a conversational approach to history, particularly legal history. This latter
approach explores the meanings of past events, including degrading meanings, to
the participants. But when we return to the task of determining what the past has
to say about how the law should help to constitute ourselves in the present, we are
leaving the historians' realm.93 This latter task changes the conversation to one
among the living and between the living and the dead. That conversation and its
legal consequences will also send94messages about the kind of people we are today
and whom we respect or degrade.
A conversational approach to legal history has several consequences for my
dialogue with Professor Smith: first, it explains what I saw as evidence for my
claims; second, it helps in understanding the scope of my project.

2. What Counts as Evidence for Legal Claims
Here, too, a background point is necessary. As already noted above, I see my
book's most important contribution as shedding light on search-and-seizure
91 See

KENNETH

L.

KARST, BELONGING

TO AMERICA:

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP

AND THE

CONSTrrTUON 4 (1989).
92 See Taslitz, What Feminism Offers, supra note 42, at 181.
93 Perhaps this is not entirely so. Joyce Appleby and her colleagues note that the telling of

history is central to a people's identity, so passionate modem conflicts can erupt over the quantity,
nature, and meaning of evidence supporting one reading of our history over another. See APPLEBY Er
AL., supra note 81, at 5. Historian Gordon Wood, while urging his audience to resist bending
historical truths to correspond to modem agendas, goes even further, arguing that history's greatest
relevance for the present is how it links us to the past, helping us to understand who we truly are. See
GORDON S. WOOD, THE PURPOSE OF THE PAST 10-13 (2008).
94 See RUBENFELD, supra note 17, at 54-58, 91-92, 95-100, 131-42, 153, 156-58 (defining a
"people" as those living out a set of commitments embodied in law over time, linking past, present,
and future into one people).
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practices during slavery and Reconstruction. Indeed, 199 pages of my text are
devoted to this subject. Smith himself finds the book at its "most compelling in
describing the extent to which southern slave owners used their extensive powers
95
of search and seizure to regulate slaves, free persons of color, and abolitionists.,
Nonetheless, he devotes but a handful of paragraphs in his review to this subject.
Smith likewise spends only two paragraphs of his review analyzing my discussion
of Reconstruction, centering those two paragraphs on his claim that I do little more
than quote John Bingham for an argument that the "framers and ratifiers" of the
Fourteenth Amendment meant to apply a re-invigorated version of the Fourth
Amendment to the states. 96 Apart from challenging my "lessons" learned from
history, Smith thus focuses his critique on Part I of my book, which briefly
explored the "original Fourth Amendment" of 1791 as background for
understanding the "Reconstructed" Fourth Amendment of Part II.
Professor Smith's critique of Part I challenges my originality, not my history,
and his critique of Part II challenges the strength of the evidence supporting my
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment rendered regulation of the states' searchand-seizure practices (as opposed to just the federal government's similar
practices) a matter of federal constitutional law. Smith does not otherwise critique
my history in Part II.
I want to begin with Smith's accusation that John Bingham's words are the
sole evidence I offer for applying the Fourth Amendment to the states, then turn to
his critique of the book's Part I.
i. Implicit "Conversations" as Evidence of "Incorporation"
Smith's focus on Bingham's words assumes that by "framers and ratifiers" I
meant the traditional notion of the members of Congress and of the state ratifying
conventions. Here I must accept some blame for lack of clarity of expression. I
used the term "framers and ratifiers" only rarely, but in the context of the entire
thrust of my book I thought it would be clear that by this term I meant the framers
and ratifiers in conversation with the American people, for it is ultimately the
95 Smith, supra note 2, at 667. Smith also describes my history as a "pioneering effort to
situate the law of search-and-seizure within the context of antebellum slavery," while, however,
deriding the lessons I draw therefrom as "ignor[ing] the workings of day-to-day criminal justice
administration." Id. at 664. Smith's latter criticism is correct, ifmy "lessons" were rigid and isolated
rules rather than, as I have said, meant to be illustrations of some ways in which history might be one
factor in helping us to re-envision what Fourth Amendment law should be like today. Therefore, I
did not in this book spend much time addressing other factors, such as the practicalities of modem
criminal justice administration. That is a task that I have undertaken elsewhere in much of the body
of my writing on criminal procedure, along with countless other academics whose insights I draw
upon, a task that I hope to continue in the years ahead.
96 See id. at 669. Smith does concede that my evidence on this point is "suggestive of the
importance of search-and-seizure law" to the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters, though he considers
it "hardly compelling," a conclusion that, I will shortly argue, ignores what should count as evidence

for the claim and misunderstands what I was claiming in the first place.
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People's authority that vests the Reconstruction Amendments, like the rest of the
Constitution, with its status as our basic law.
This vision of the American people is reflected in the conversation of word
and deed between the elites (including members of Congress and the like) and the
everyday people who make history, including the newly-freed slaves, the Union
soldiers, the seemingly triumphant abolitionists, and others.
There are indeed relatively few statements in congressional or ratifying
convention debates that unequivocally and, to modem ears, clearly support the idea
of incorporation of any amendments at all.97 Yet incorporation of most of the Bill
of Rights has become the status quo understanding of the law on the Court and
among most, though not all, leading constitutional scholars. 98 Part of the reason
97

Professor George Thomas makes this point most thoroughly and eloquently in his article
challenging the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights against the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See George C. Thomas MI, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill of Rights and CriminalProcedure, 100 MICH. L. REv. 145 (2001). But even Thomas
reads the Fourteenth Amendment as constitutionalizing regulation of state search and seizure
practices as a stand-alone amendment, though he argues that it operates in a different way from how
the Fourth Amendment regulates the federal government. See id. at 222-26. Whether Thomas would
agree with my lessons I do not know, but I explain in my book why I could reach the same
conclusions that I do under his anti-incorporationist mantle. See TASLrIZ, supra note 1, at 284 n.40.
Given that both paths would lead me to the same place, emphasizing the more familiar language of
incorporation seemed the clearest way to convey my arguments to most of my audience, who are
familiar with the idea of incorporation.
I note briefly as well that Smith criticizes my use of certain of John Bingham's words during
the debates because Bingham could have had other things in mind than search and seizure. But those
other things are not inconsistent with an embrace of search and seizure's importance to Bingham,
especially read in context. See, e.g., TASLrrz, supra note 1, at 128, 242-57 (summarizing references
by other Republicans to search and seizure concepts and to the Fourth Amendment in public debate
as well as in congressional debates leading up to, and immediately following, ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an important Fourteenth
Amendment precursor, and in light of developing Republican theories of the nature of the American
polity).
More importantly, Bingham's intentions were never my primary concern, nor were his words
the primary evidence on which I meant to rely for my claim that Fourth Amendment concerns should
best be understood as among the "core" concerns embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Social
context and the "conversation" of which I write over time are what make this history useful for
present-day lawyers. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86. Moreover, even taking the past on
its own terms requires far more inquiry than into the words appearing in isolated debates or into the
intentions of their speakers to understand just what was afoot. Explains leading historian Gordon

Wood:
The past in the hands of expert historians becomes a different world, a complicated world
that requires considerable historical imagination to recover with any degree of accuracy.
The complexity that we find in that different world comes with the realization that the
participants were limited by forces that they did not understand or were even aware offorces such as demographic movements, economic developments, or large-scale cultural
patterns. The drama, indeed the tragedy, of history comes from our understanding of the
tension that existed between the conscious wills and intentions of the participants in the
past and the underlying conditions that constrained their actions and shaped their future.
WOOD, supra note 93, at 10-11.
98 See TASLrrZ, supra note 1, at 284 n.40.
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for this is that some leading historians have made convincing arguments that those
statements that were made in Congress, when put in the context of events and in
light of the political background of the speakers, are best understood as
representative of a broader congressional intention that the Fourteenth Amendment
apply the Bill of Rights to the states (or at least recognize that that application
already existed). 99
Still, I can understand why some thinkers would find the incorporation
argument as to the entire Bill of Rights hard to swallow based upon congressional
debates alone. Furthermore, express reference to the Fourth Amendment
specifically in those debates, though not non-existent, is relatively sparse.1l° My
goal, as I expressly stated in my book, however, was not to re-create the wheel by
recounting and critiquing yet again the debate over incorporation.101 Instead, on
the one hand, I assumed the correctness of the incorporationist position, focusing
more on its consequences for the incorporated Fourth Amendment's meaning than
on whether it was incorporated at all. On the other hand, I recounted those aspects
of history that I thought best supported the incorporationist position as to the
Fourth Amendment given my conversationalist approach to legal history, gauging
its relevance for modem law. However, I did not limit my examination of the
relevant history to the congressional debates. Were that so, Smith's critique of my
position would have more force. Instead, I relied on far more wide-ranging
evidence.
I have always thought that the most viable arguments for incorporation
instead arise from the conversational perspective. Search-and-seizure issues were
at the heart of the American Revolution and of the great contest over slavery and
Reconstruction. Reading that history reveals stories of the colonists being seized
from the streets to be impressed into the royal Navy, the slaves required to produce
passes or face whippings when leaving plantations, and the abolitionists being
banished from Southern states while their letters and publications to Southern
brethren were seized by postal authorities and burned. That revelation makes
evident the centrality of search-and-seizure to the American story, and to the path
to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judicial decisions, political speeches, newspapers, public protests, sermons,
and street violence similarly reflected these concerns. If much of the Bill of
Rights, and particularly the Fourth Amendment, was made applicable to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is because that is the best way to make sense of
this relevant portion of the American story. It is not because legislative debates
come close to conclusively resolving this matter. Although it was not my goal,
one way to read the bulk of my book, therefore is as, in part, an extended argument
in support of incorporation, at least as to the Fourth Amendment.
99 See MCHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 110-30, 218-20 (1986).

100

See TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 242-57.

"01See id. at 284 n.40.
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Yet that reading would itself be slightly misleading because of the awkward
nature of the word "incorporation." The word "incorporation" conjures up images
of Congresspersons' and ratifying convention members' intent. My point instead
is that the Fourteenth Amendment is best understood as imposing on the states
restrictions on their search-and-seizure practices informed by the nation's
experiences with such practices during slavery and Reconstruction. I think that the
best and most convenient way to understand and express this idea is to see the
Fourth Amendment as being applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
the latter mutating the meaning of the former to embody the people's lived
conversational experience with political elites. But, as I explain in a lengthy
footnote, 0 2 the same result could be reached on a theory that the freestanding
Fourteenth Amendment imposes, in its own right, independently of the Fourth
Amendment, restrictions on modem search-and-seizure practices. I thus saw the
everyday Americans' struggles-their implicit and explicit conversations with
their ruling elites-as making incorporation a sensible idea, while acknowledging
that, even jettisoning the assumption of incorporation's wisdom, similar results can
be achieved through alternative constitutional paths.
ii. Post-1868 Case Law as Irrelevant to My Project
Similar reasons explain why I did not address case law development or indeed
any other search-and-seizure history post-1868. Whether based upon the theory of
incorporation, free-standing due process, or the privileges and immunities of
American citizens, it is the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 that
is best understood as imposing, for the first time, serious constitutional limitations
on the search-and-seizure practices of the states. That the courts did not figure this
out until the mid-twentieth century is quite irrelevant to a people-focused,
conversational narrative approach to constitutional interpretation.
Bruce
03
Ackerman, in his We the People1
series of books makes a similar point when he
argues that judges often have a certain myopia that blinds them from fully
comprehending the implications of the People's verdict in making major changes
in our constitutional order.
Ackerman's pathbreaking work has faced other criticisms, 1°4 but I think that
his argument that judges can at least temporarily be blinded to constitutional
change embodied in the ongoing struggles of the American People-and that
judges therefore often give outdated or cramped interpretations to constitutional
text-is consistent with the teachings of an array of modem sociological, political
science, and psychological studies of "how judges think" and with a clear-eyed

102 See id.

103 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000).
104 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 97-121 (summarizing such critiques).
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understanding of the political functions of the courts.105 In any event, whether
Ackerman is right or not, because a conversational approach to legal history is a
theory about how to interpret that history, I simply note here that I think that the
interpretive premises that led courts for too long to abdicate their responsibility to
craft a jurisprudence of constitutional regulation of state search-and-seizure
practices were wrong.
iii. The Relevance of Great Political Events as Evidence to Resolve

Concrete Modern Controversies
A similar line of reasoning explains why I do not accept Smith's assertion that
great political events have little relevance for crafting law governing the common
fare of ordinary criminal cases. 10 6 Again, if by this he means, for example, that
understanding how Southern slave masters used the equivalent of general warrants

to limit slaves' free movement and ability to invade their white masters' property
does not dictate what the rule should be when modern police engage in inventory
searches, he is right. In one sense, a narrower use of history, perhaps searching for
nineteenth century practices akin to inventory searches, would arguably provide
more specific guidance. But, as Thomas Davies, in his powerful studies of the
original Fourth Amendment's history concludes, there are strong normative
reasons for not giving such narrow, specific histories a decisive or even especially
07
important role in resolving modern day Fourth Amendment controversies. 1
105 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 19, at 97, 103-05. Posner declares it "implausible that people
are libertarians, or socialists, or originalists because libertarianism, or socialism, or originalism is
'correct."' Id. at 97. Rather, he considers these "isms" "hypothesis-driven rather than fact-driven,"
because "[n]othing is more common than for different people of equal competence in reasoning to
form different beliefs from the same information," "seeing the same thing but interpreting it in
opposite ways." Id. This observation, argues Posner, applies to how originalists use history, id at
103, because interpreting history, tradition, and what counts as settled precedent are "tasks so fraught
with uncertainty that the judge's preferences as to outcome will not only shape his theory but also
determine its application to specific cases." Id. at 105. A judge blinded by the ideology with which
he has been raised, I therefore argue, is often blind to seeing that events may have rendered that
ideology obsolete.
106 See Smith, supra note 2, at 676 (asserting that the history of criminal procedure in
prosecuting political offenses and slavery has nothing to offer in understanding procedure in ordinary
criminal cases).
107 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
740-50 (1999) (arguing for applying history's lessons to modem Fourth Amendment law only when
stated at a high level of generality); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Characterof Law-and-Order
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239, 437-38 (2002) ("An accurate understanding of
how constitutional criminal procedure came to take the shape that it has provides valuable and
liberating perspectives on current issues. However, in the end, it teaches that .... [d]ecision making
regarding criminal procedure will be more likely to produce sound policy-and less likely to
succumb to undiluted statism-if it proceeds without the distorting influence of fictional law-andorder originalism."). Another way to use history in Fourth Amendment analysis is to ask what the
common law permitted or prohibited at the time of the original Fourth Amendment's ratification. I
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Furthermore, even if such more specific histories are given such a role, that
does not render the history of broader political struggles any less important.
Indeed, the centrality of the colonists' search-and-seizure disputes with the British
to the American Revolution °8 is now widely recognized by most thinkers who pay
attention to such things; and the colonists' complaints about general warrants and
an array of other British practices, and the meaning that those complaints hold for
informed the Court's crafting of more specific Fourth
us today, have repeatedly
1
Amendment rules. 09

If, as I have sought to suggest, a general framework is needed for debating
constitutional questions in any particular area (such as search-and-seizure); if
certain values or lessons should guide how much weight the Court gives to various

will not dwell on this approach here but note that it has been soundly debunked by others and, in any
event, misunderstands the common law as a fixed set of doctrines when it is really an approach to
careful, flexible, and reasoned evolution of the law to meet changing circumstances. See generally
Sklansky, supra note 12; see also infra note 109 (expanding upon the flaws in an overly-specific
common law originalism).
108

See

SAMUEL DASH, THE INTRUDERS: UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES FROM KING

JOHN TO JOHN ASHCROFr 2-31, 37, 41 (2004) (noting that the "writs of assistance... were the yoke
the colonists would not bear" and that "unreasonable searches and seizures were partly responsible
for igniting the Revolution .... ).
109 See Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1739 (praising an "older tradition" on the Court of "using
the background of the Fourth Amendment to illuminate not its precise demands but its general
aims"); id. at 1739-43 nn.2-22 (summarizing some leading illustrative cases and scholarship in this
vein). Sklansky notes that this older tradition was largely, though not entirely, displaced by an
"ahistoric" approach, followed more recently by a new originalism that Sklansky properly derides.
See id. at 1742-44. Sklansky begins by summarizing the older tradition that he reveres:
Justices Bradley, Brandeis, and Frankfurther all focused on particular forms of search and
seizure condemned in the years preceding the American Revolution: the general warrants
struck down by English Courts in the 1760s, and the writs of assistance that provoked
They sought to generalize from those
widespread opposition in the colonies.
controversies to the underlying evils against which the Fourth Amendment took aim.
Both the Court and its commentators have favorably contrasted this strategy with
approaches that would limit a constitutional prohibition to the "mischief which gave it
birth." So it would be odd if the Court now read the Fourth Amendment to prohibit only
general warrants and writs of assistance.
Id. at 1743. Sklansky contrasts this approach with the Court's new originalism that does seem to use
history in the blinkered way that he and others have condemned. While the Court has not gone so far
as to limit the Fourth Amendment to prohibiting general warrants and writs of assistance only, its
approach, argues Sklansky, moves it in that direction, asking what government action was considered
unlawful under the common law at the time the amendment was framed. See id. "Novelty aside" says
Sklansky:
[T]his is a curious reading in at least two respects. First, the Fourth Amendment on its
face says nothing about common law, but bans all unreasonable searches and seizures,
whether or not they were legal before the Amendment was adopted. Second, the chief
proponent of the Court's new understanding of the Fourth Amendment has been Justice
Scalia, who is also its most vocal advocate of giving constitutional and statutory
provisions their "plain meaning."
Id. at 1743.
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interests in crafting constitutional rules; and if a constitutional provision is not to
be viewed as a mere technicality but rather as an expression of a broad, symbolic
vision of who we are as a people and how we should live our lives, then the
political struggles that define and redefine the social compact that we call the
"Constitution" must play a role in crafting a constitutional search-and-seizure
jurisprudence. That role can and should inform holdings in specific cases, and aid
in crafting rules to guide future cases, even those governing routinepolice
conduct.
l0
The Court and other scholars do this routinely, and I think wisely so."
In my view, those who embrace a narrower view of history condemn the Bill
of Rights to slow, subtle erosion-to becoming a withering constitutional flower.
If my specific efforts to show how the lessons of our second American Revolution
can translate into modem doctrine do not persuade Professor Smith, that is fine,
but I do not see the wisdom of the argument that the task should not be attempted.
Additionally, the task I set for myself was to emphasize too-long ignored
aspects of search-and-seizure history, specifically those involved in slavery and
Reconstruction, that shed light on the importance of expressive violence, race,
dissent, and protection of society's weakest. Smith is therefore right when he says
that I wrote "a" but not "the" definitive history of the Fourth Amendment. I did
not try to do the latter and do not believe that it can effectively be achieved in a
single volume of manageable length. William Cuddihy's magisterial dissertation
on the original Fourth Amendment is three thick volumes long,' and his newlypublished book-an updated and streamlined version of his dissertation is just
under one thousand pages.1 2 Thus, I did not address the rise of police forces in the
nineteenth century because that history
was beyond the scope of my project. I
13
leave that history for another day.

110 See DASH, supra note 108, at 2-10 (arguing that remembering history, particularly the

history of the American Revolution, is essential to preventing the many seemingly minor, routine
intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights that are too often sanctioned by the courts from cumulating to
blow a hole in that Amendment); id. at 120-31 (offering the Court's approach to standing and its
creation of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as examples of what the author saw as
misguided Fourth Amendment doctrines because they ignored the broad teachings of history).
"'
See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 6021791, at 1-3 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with UMI
Dissertation Services).
112 See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FouRTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING

602-1791 (2009).
113 Important work on nineteenth-century search-and-seizure history and its link to the rise of
modem police forces has recently been done by Wesley Oliver. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The
Rise and Fall of Material Witness Detention in Nineteenth Century New York, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LmERTY 727 (2005).
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3. On Originality
This discussion of the conversational approach to legal history leads me back
to Smith's claim that chapter two of my book, covering the "Original Fourth
Amendment," says little that is new. Part of his complaint is that others have
written about the Fourth Amendment's role in taming political violence, and he is
right. But Smith cites scholars who have largely relied on arguments other than
history to do so. 114 The one work of history he does cite for this point is William
Cuddihy," 5 and here he is absolutely right, and I am pleased to be placed in such
company, but, as Smith concedes, "no scholar has stressed the ubiquity of
'political violence' to the same degree as [Taslitz] ..
Smith also says that
others have made the point that constitutional law is forged not only in the courts
but by people on the street, and here too he is right, but he cites a superb book by
Larry Kramer that is not focused on how this happens in the area of search-andseizure. 1 7 Smith also notes that Akhil Amar has stressed the public, political
functions of the Fourth Amendment,1 18 and here too Smith is correct, but Amar did
not explore much of the history that I do, did not portray that eighteenth-century
history as laying the groundwork for the nineteenth-century history (which Amar
does not examine), and reaches very different conclusions from mine.119
More importantly, Smith ignores my use of "political violence" as a shorthand
term for "expressive political violence"-the idea that violence by and against the
state always carries with it messages about status, power, equality, and the inherent
worth of persons as fundamentally political beings. 20 Without addressing this
aspect of my definition, and without explaining how he reaches his conclusion,
Smith says my definition is "so vague and so expansive that those eschewing [t]his
12
path have seemingly taken the more defensible approach." '
My definition is indeed expansive, but that was exactly its point: to
demonstrate that expressive violence is ubiquitous when the state engages in
searches and seizures and that even the daily, little occurrences of stopping
individuals on the street can, properly understood, have political consequences.
These consequences underscore the Fourth Amendment's importance. Seeing
much human behavior as expressive, and seeing most state action as political (in
the sense that it affects power and cultural understandings relevant to power), are
'..,,116

114 See Smith, supra note 2, at 665-66.
15 See id.at 666 n.14.
116 See id. at 666.
17 See id. at 666 n.17 (citing LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTrUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEw (2004)).
118 See id., at 666 n.16.

119 See AMAR,supra note 52, at 1-45 (offering a concise and updated presentation of Amar's
work on the Fourth Amendment).
120 See TASLrrZ, supra note 1, at 2-5, 14, 17, 71, 261, 279 n.4.
121 Smith, supra note 2, at 666.
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insights consistent with the work of critical, feminist, and critical race scholars, of
"bottom-up" historians like Zinn, and of a wide array of less left-leaning legal,
linguistic, political, and legal scholars who emphasize the expressive function of
the law. 21 2 Those whose works lean more to the hard-right or who simply reject
the expressive vision of the law will find my definition of expressive political
violence unhelpful, but it is within a stream of thought that many scholars have
found enlightening, and I do not think that it necessarily
only supports conclusions
23
consistent with progressive political policies.1
Part I of my book indeed tries to argue that the idea of expressive political
violence is implicit in the Lockean social contract theory that was so important in
the framers' era-a theory that also stresses the oft-legitimate role of such violence
in maintaining the public peace124-and tells the story of the original Fourth
Amendment in a way that emphasizes struggles over expression, voice, and
meaning.' 25 My tale of the original Fourth Amendment thus emphasizes such
matters as: seditious libel disputes; the colonists' righteous anger at having an
unrepresentative Parliament dictating search-and-seizure
policy; their
correspondingly seeing a close connection between British policies in this area and
the tyranny that justified revolution; the insult experienced by colonial leaders and
businessmen facing searches pursuant to general warrants; the sense of degradation
experienced by ordinary colonists forcefully impressed into the British navy; the
anger generated by the unjustified seizures of sloops involved in smuggling that
was seen as a protest against British policies; the symbolic importance of the home
and the diminishment experienced by its denizens upon its violation; and the
perception that British search-and-seizure
practices lowered colonists to the
126
dishonorable status of the slave.
The messages sent by British searches and seizures and received by the
colonists fed fuel to the fire of revolution and sent us on a path to the Fourth
Amendment. These were pieces of a great political struggle, but the pieces and
their meaning happened one-at-a-time, often to individuals. The citizen impressed
122See Taslitz, What Feminism Offers, supra note 42, at 179-87 (summarizing the work of
feminist legal scholars writing about the expressive function); supra notes 63-65 (discussing the
relevance of Zinn's work and that of his successors).
123 For example, my reading of the literature on the Second Amendment right to bear arms has
led me to believe that it embraces both collective and individual rights components, but that if the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment against the states, it revised the latter
amendment to far more heavily stress the individual rights component-a conclusion generally
associated with the political Right. (I have not written about this specific matter and thus merely

state my conclusion to make the noted point). See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008) (interpreting the Second Amendment to create an individual right to bear arms but
without deciding the incorporation question); cf TASLrrz, supra note 1 at 147, 248-52 (discussing
the historical connections among thinking about the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments

during the period of Reconstruction).
124 See TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 3-4.

5 See id. at 17-44.
'26 See id.
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on the street, the warehouseman whose goods were seized, and the mother who
faced armed men of the king rifling through intimate items in her home were
perhaps then concerned with their own fate, but their plight helped shape the fate
of the nation.
I take no credit for originality in the approach to constitutional interpretation
that I assumed and briefly recounted but did not fully defend in my book-and that
I elaborate on a bit more here-but I do claim originality in using that approach as
a lens for understanding the original Fourth Amendment and its 1868reconstructed child, and I do claim originality for telling in particular the tale of
search-and-seizure practices under slavery and during Reconstruction. I do not
claim that my perspective is the only legitimate one, nor is it the only one that
guides my own work, but I do claim that it is one legitimate perspective worth
debating.
Ill. A COMMENT ON TONE
Professor Smith also faults me for what he sees as my oddly combative
tone.12 7 I must say that this is a criticism I have never heard about my work from
anyone, and I am not sure what he means by it or what evidence he cites for it. It
particularly troubled me because I tried, I thought, to go out of my way to
demonstrate that, in most respects, my work was consistent with that of other
scholars of search-and-seizure history, though I sought to build on their work and
to cast some of their evidence in a different light. The critique also troubled me
because I so object to the common academic style of not simply disagreeing with
someone but of trashing their work, as if someone who disagrees with you has
thereby produced trash. 128 I expressed disagreement with other scholars (what
Smith calls "quibbles") only where I thought it unavoidable, in order to defend my
own perspective.
For example, I accepted and relied upon much of the excellent work of Tom
Davies, but I disagreed with Davies's writing off the Fourth Amendment's
reference to a right "of the people" as a mere rhetorical flourish; I instead see it as
central to understanding the Amendment's meaning, and I see nothing combative
about trying to explain why this is so. I did not insult or diminish Davies's work
but indeed complimented him along the way.
Smith strangely tries to argue that I am too combative and not combative
enough simultaneously. Thus, he faults me for devoting an extended footnote to
arguing that Davies was wrong to conclude that ships and commercial premises
were excluded from the scope of the original Fourth Amendment. Then, however,
he suggests I have wasted my time "belabor[ing]" the point because I end my note
127
128

See Smith, supra note 2, at 678.
See ROBERT J. SPrrZER, SAVING

THE CONSTrrUrION FROM LAWYERS: How LEGAL TRAINING

AND LAW REVIEWS DISTORT CONSTrLrONAL MEANING 5, 23 (2008) (bemoaning the stridency, onesidedness, and harsh tone of much legal scholarship as aimed more at advocacy than truth).
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by "admit[ting]" that the difference between Davies and me is that "Davies relies
more heavily ... on official and elite statements about the law" than do I.129 But I
saw no flaw in acknowledging that reasonable people might differ on a point and
explaining candidly why and how I reached a different conclusion than Davies.
Smith seems to suggest that my candor undermines the strength of my argument,
while I find the hyperbole and lack of candor in so much legal writing both unfair
and unconvincing.'30
Simultaneously, Smith seems to think that I meant my statement about
Davies's and others' reliance on elite sources as a criticism, thus presenting
himself as their defender by noting that "it is to their credit, not their detriment"
that they do so. 13 ' But, I agree. My position is simply that elite sources are not the
only ones that matter in understanding history on its own terms or the lessons that
it teaches the law; a greater emphasis on non-elite sources is crucial to the
conversational approach to legal history. If the "people" in conversation with their
rulers-most often via expressive action-are considered to be important
constitutional actors, maybe the most important ones, then greater weight should
be given to their actions, and I argued only that doing so led me to a different view
than Davies on a fairly specific question. I meant no slight to others writing about
the Fourth Amendment's history, and several of them-William Cuddihy and
Tracey Maclin, joined also by leading constitutional scholar H. Jefferson Powellgraciously offered effusive
praise for my book that adorns the hard cover version
32
of the book's jacket.1
I do not claim to be holier than thou. Too many qualified statements and too
much tentativeness in expression can be boring, sometimes meandering, and even
create the impression of lack of confidence in one's work. The line between a
strongly-held position fairly defended and a combative stance can sometimes be a
thin one, and I am sure I must have crossed it at times. Indeed, I worry that this
Smith, supra note 2, at 666-67.
130 Cf SPrrZER, supra note 128 (analyzing in extended fashion some major examples).
129

131 See Smith, supra note 2, at 667.
132 Tracey Macin praised the book's "unique vision," particularly its emphasis on "tam[ing]

political violence" and on "respect for the individual," finding the "research on search and seizure
practices of Southern states during Reconstruction" "illuminating."
TAsLrrz, supra note 1
(reviews
on
back
cover
of
dust
jacket),
available
at
http://www.nyupress.org/product-info.phpproductsid=4825&reviews=1.
William Cuddihy lauded

the book for removing a "critical gap" in the historical literature and "break[ing] new ground by
exploring the Fourth Amendment's connections with political violence and slavery." Id. Finally, H.

Jefferson Powell described the book thus:
Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment is a remarkable scholarly accomplishment. It
presents one of the most radical challenges to standard constitutional thinking-not just
about searches and seizures but also about the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a protection of individual rights-in recent literature. Taslitz stakes out a
radical and compelling position on a pressing contemporary issue-the protection of

individual privacy against government invasion-and does so on impeccably researched
and intellectually conservative grounds. It is a must read.
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essay may read a bit combatively because I thought that Smith often took my
words out of context or used the reductio ad absurdum argument style openly to
ridicule my work. 133 I admit that this irked me. As does any scholar, I have faced

criticism before, sometimes even heated or sarcastic criticism, but I rarely viewed
it as unfair, and sometimes I benefited from it enormously. Smith's analysis of my
work is probably the only one that has irked me so. But I felt nothing but pleasure
in wrestling with other scholars in my book and struggled to avoid some sort of
academic showdown with them, so I was, to say the least, surprised by Smith's

characterization.
IV. CONCLUSION

My displeasure with Smith's review arose primarily from what I saw as its
lack of balance and its harsh tone. But Smith's underlying objections raise fair
points about the role of history in constitutional interpretation. I thank him for
presenting the opportunity for me to at least try to clarify the assumptions about the
interpretation that, as I briefly explained in my book, underlay both the history
presented there and the illustrative, admittedly debatable lessons that I drew from

it. I also said in that book that I wrote it to prompt debate, not to end it, and this
too Smith has done, for which I again express my appreciation. I find no
contradiction in saying that I can find disagreement with another scholar's work,
even find fault in it, and even take away hurt feelings from it, yet still find it to
have merit as well and to serve the laudable goal of continuing the conversation.

133 Smith also describes my book as "irritating," dropping a footnote bemoaning what he
describes as "stock[ing]" my footnotes with citations to popular culture, like The Sopranos and The
Rolling Stones. Smith, supra note 2, at 678 n.66. I cannot recall references to popular culture
elsewhere in the book, except for my discussion of The Matrix; this is hardly a "stocking" of the text
with such references which were used where I thought they expressed or illustrated a theoretical point
nicely, never as a substitute for historical analysis. See id. (agreeing that I cite "extensively from
both primary documents and respected secondary sources"). He further bemoans my voice as
"unpredictable" for including some normative theory (my "lessons") and, again, for briefly (in an
introduction and scattered in a few footnotes) discussing popular culture, and for drawing on my
"personal experiences with race relations" (the latter being something I did only in my book's
Preface, to explain what prompted my interest in the book's subject area). Id. He also argues that my
coverage is "extremely selective," which I take as meaning that he objects to the fact that I did not
address the nineteenth-century rise of police forces-a task that, as I have explained, was outside my
focus on the culture of the Slave Power and that would, in itself, deserve a separate text in order to be
treated fairly. Id. This collection of vituperative comments ends his review, leaving a harsh
impression and, as is true of his entire review, rejecting any serious attention to the history that
occupies the bulk of the text. Spirited, even passionate, pull-no-punches debate and criticism are
essential to scholarly progress. But I have always failed to understand how lack of balance, selective
isolation of pieces from the puzzle as a whole, and language dripping with contempt help to achieve
that goal.
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